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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of HIV and AIDS on democratic 
consolidation in two democracies in Southern Africa: Botswana and South Africa. Mattes 
(2003), Barnett and Whiteside (2006) and others warned that in states with high HIV 
infection levels, the negative impact of the pandemic - especially in terms of socio-economic 
conditions, budgetary pressures and a loss of human capital in the state and the economy - 
was potentially so great that it may affect democracy detrimentally. In contrast, some 
scholars, particularly Anthony Butler (2005a) and Alex de Waal (2006), contended that 
although the pandemic had negative effects, democracies might survive it and that in some 
specific ways, democratic consolidation might even benefit from the its consequences. For 
instance, they argued that in South Africa, the civil society response to the government’s 
controversial HIV and AIDS policy deepened the institutional framework of democracy.  
The methodology for the above comparative analysis is based on the application of a 
minimalist multivariate model which, following the thinking of Bratton and Van de Walle 
(1997) consists of both institutional and socio-economic factors. Factors are selected for 
their relevance to democratic consolidation, as argued by scholars such as Linz and Stepan 
(1996), Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (1996), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) 
and Leftwich (2000).  
The chosen factors are the system of government (the relationship between the branches of 
government); the electoral system; political rights and civil liberties; economic indicators 
(affluence, economic growth and the reduction of inequality); human development (as 
measured by the United Nations Development Program) and civil society.  
This is a descriptive, qualitative, desktop study, using secondary literature in books, as well as 
articles. There is no empirical component, such as fieldwork, surveys or questionnaires. As 
stated below, such methodology may be used for further elaboration and refining of the 
findings of this desktop-based comparative analysis. 
The main finding is that currently, despite the cost and human implications of the disease, 
there are no indications that it is directly threatening to destroy the democracies of Botswana 
or South Africa. This finding differs from the more negative expectations of the scholars 
mentioned above. It is suggested that the increasing provision and effectiveness of anti-
retroviral treatment (ART) enables these democracies and their economies to avoid some of 
the ravages of the disease that seemed inevitable a few years ago. Furthermore, it is suggested 
that the comparative affluence of the two states in question shields them from some negative 
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effects of HIV and AIDS and that this may be different in poorer Southern African states. 
This is an issue for further research. Such research should go beyond desktop research to 
include fieldwork and questionnaires. 
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Opsomming 
Die doel van hierdie tesis is om die impak van MIV en VIGS op demokratiese konsolidering 
in twee Suider-Afrikaanse demokrasieë, Botswana en Suid-Afrika, vas te stel. Mattes (2003), 
Barnett en Whiteside (2006) en ander het gewaarsku dat die negatiewe uitwerking van die 
pandemie - veral in terme van sosio-ekonomiese toestande, begrotingsdruk en ’n verlies aan 
menslike hulpbronne in die staat en ekonomie - potensieel so groot is dat dit demokrasie 
nadelig sou beïnvloed. In teenstelling hiermee het ander akademici, soos Anthony Butler 
(2005a) en Alex de Waal (2006), geredeneer dat demokrasieë die pandemie mag oorleef ten 
spyte van die negatiewe effekte wat dit wel het en dat demokrasieë selfs op sekere wyses by 
die gevolge daarvan mag baatvind. Byvoorbeeld, het hulle geargumenteer, in Suid-Afrika het 
die burgerlike samelewing se reaksie op die Mbeki-regering se kontroversiële MIV en VIGS-
beleid die institusionele raamwerk van demokrasie verdiep. 
Die metodologie vir hierdie vergelykende analise is gebaseer op die toepassing van ’n 
minimalistiese multiveranderlike model. Soos gepostuleer deur Bratton en Van de Walle 
(1997), wat beide institusionele en sosio-ekonomiese faktore insluit. Faktore is gekies op 
grond van hulle relevansie tot demokratiese konsolidering (volgens vakkundiges soos Linz en 
Stepan (1996), Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub en Limongi (1996), Bratton en Van de Walle 
(1997) en Leftwich (2000), asook vir dié se moontlike relevansie tot demokrasieë wat 
spesifiek deur MIV en VIGS geaffekteer word.  
Die gekose faktore is die regeringstelsel (die verhouding tussen die uitvoerende, wetgewende 
en regsprekende gesag), die verkiesingstelsel, politieke regte en burgerlike vryhede, 
ekonomiese aanwysers (welvaart; ekonomiese groei en die vermindering van ongelykheid), 
menslike ontwikkeling (soos gemeet deur die Verenigde Nasies se Ontwikkelingsprogram) en 
die burgerlike samelewing.  
Hierdie tesis is ’n literatuurstudie van ’n beskrywende, kwalitatiewe aard. Daar is gebruik 
gemaak van sekondêre literatuur in boeke, asook van artikels. Daar is geen empiriese 
komponent soos veldwerk en meningspeilings nie. Soos hieronder beklemtoon word, kan 
empiriese metodes in toekomstige studies gebruik word om op die bevindinge wat hierdie 
navorsing opgelewer het, uit te brei en dit te verfyn. 
Die hoofbevinding is dat daar tans, ten spyte van die finansiële en menslike koste van MIV 
en VIGS, geen aanduiding is dat die siekte ‘n direkte bedreiging inhou vir die voortbestaan 
van demokrasie in Botswana en Suid-Afrika nie. Hierdie bevinding verskil van die meer 
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negatiewe verwagtinge hierbo uitgespreek. Dit word voorgestel dat die toenemende 
voorsiening en effektiwiteit van antiretrovirale behandeling hierdie demokrasieë en hulle 
ekonomieë daartoe in staat stel om gedeeltelik die verwoesting van hierdie pandemie te 
vermy, iets wat enkele jare gelede nog as onvermydelik beskou is. Verder word die voorstel 
gemaak dat die impak van die pandemie op armer Suider-Afrikaanse state vergelyk behoort 
te word met die bevindinge wat hier aangebied word. Sulke toekomstige navorsing behoort 
nie net literatuurstudie in te sluit nie, maar ook veldwerk en meningsopnames. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the African HIV pandemic coincides with the establishment of formally 
democratic regimes in many African states. Due to the scale and the complex institutional, 
economic and social impact of this pandemic, many political scientists have argued that this 
pandemic may have serious negative implications for the consolidation of African 
democracies. In contrast, some scholars, particularly Anthony Butler (2005a) and Alex de 
Waal (2006), contend that African democracies may survive the pandemic and that in some 
ways, democratic consolidation may even benefit from its effects. Robert Mattes (2003) 
pointed out a need for comparative cross-sectional research into this topic. Using a 
multivariate framework of democratic consolidation similar to those developed by Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997) and others (such as Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 
1996 and Leftwich 2000), this study presents a comparative assessment of the effect of HIV 
and AIDS on two Southern African democracies: Botswana and South Africa.  
The overview of this chapter serves to introduce the research themes of this study: the 
prevalence and unique characteristics of HIV and AIDS in Africa and its impact on African 
societies, economies and democratic institutions, particularly as studied by Tony Barnett and 
Alan Whiteside (2002; 2006), Mattes (2003), Per Strand (2005), Butler (2005a) and De Waal 
(2003; 2006), as well as the work edited by Kondwani Chirambo (2008). In the problem 
statement, the differing scholarly arguments concerning the impact of the disease on African 
democratic consolidation are juxtaposed and the countries selected for comparative study are 
introduced. This is followed by a discussion of the purpose and significance of the study. 
The chapter concludes by presenting the research methodology employed in the study.  
1.1. Overview 
AIDS has, over the past fifty years, become the sixth greatest cause of death in the world 
(WHO 2011). Emerging as a virus capable of causing a human global epidemic by 1959 
(Iliffe 2006: 8), the acquired immunodefiency syndrome (AIDS) which is caused by the 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) had killed at least 25 million people in the world by 
2008, with 33.4 million more infected with HIV (UNAIDS 2009a: 1). Botswana’s prevalence 
rate1 (25% of adults2 aged 15 to 49 were estimated to have HIV in 2008) is the second 
                                               
1 When studying HIV/AIDS trends, it is important to note the distinction between prevalence and 
incidence: prevalence indicates the amount of individuals that are HIV positive at a given point in time while 
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highest in the world (UNAIDS 2009c: 19), while in South Africa the 16.9% adult (aged 15-
49) prevalence rate translates to 5.7 million infected people, making it the country with the 
largest number of people living with HIV and AIDS in the world (UNAIDS 2009c: 19; 27). 
The main strains of HIV were carried over to humans through contact with the blood of 
primates that carried simian (monkey) immunodeficiency viruses in West and Central Africa 
in the 1930s3 (Whiteside 2008: 23). The fact that the virus originated in Africa as well as its 
unique characteristics (discussed below), allowed the virus to spread extensively and with 
many loci of infection throughout Sub-Saharan Africa before it was properly identified or 
understood (Iliffe 2006: 58). Elsewhere in the world HIV was usually introduced within 
identifiable high risk subsets of the population, such as men who have sex with men (MSM), 
sex workers, haemophiliacs and injecting drug users (IDU). Once the major transmission 
routes of HIV were identified in 1986 (Quinn, Mann, Curran and Piot et al. 1986, quoted in 
Avert 2010b), such groups were relatively easy to target with interventions. By this time 
however, HIV had already infected large parts of the general heterosexual population in 
many African states. 
Africa remains by far the worst affected area in the world, with incidence levels peaking in 
the mid 1990s (De Waal 2006: 2). In 2002, Sub-Saharan Africa had 28 million, or 70%, of the 
40 million AIDS sufferers in the world (Pharaoh and Schönteich 2003: 2-3). By 2008, most 
national epidemics were apparently stabilising, but at extremely high levels, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa was home to 22.4 million, or 67%, of the 33.4 million infected individuals. By 
comparison the second and third most infected regions, South and Southeast Asia and Latin 
America, had 3.8 million and 2 million respectively (UNAIDS 2009a: 1). By this time, 
however, it had also become increasingly possible for patients in Africa to receive treatment 
that slow the progression of the virus into full-blown AIDS (discussed below). 
Although Africa is the worst affected area in the world, there are significant regional 
variations. Southern and eastern Africa are much more heavily affected than West or North 
                                                                                                                                      
incidence indicates the amount of new infections over a given period. Antiretroviral treatment (ART) may 
increase prevalence because it enables people living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA) to live longer. Declining 
incidence is thus a better indicator of a country’s success in combating AIDS, but it is more difficult than 
prevalence to estimate.  
2 HIV prevalence and incidence rates are usually expressed as a percentage of adult citizens – defined by the 
World Health Organisation and UNAIDS as persons aged 15 and older – or if indicated as such, adults 
between the age of 15 and 49 (Avert.org 2010c). 
3 Rival theories for the origins of HIV/AIDS abound, but the abovementioned is now commonly accepted 
in scientific communities (Avert.org 2011b). 
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Africa. In 2009 the nine states in the world with adult prevalence rates of more than 10%4 
were all in Southern Africa: Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique 5 (UNAIDS 2009b).  
Faced with a mounting pandemic by the late 1980s, a handful of African states responded 
effectively, notably Senegal and Uganda (Joseph 2003: 163; Iliffe 2006: 71-2). In general, 
however, the responses of African governments have lacked urgency and scale (De Waal 
2003: 2) and the crisis escalated to the levels discussed above. Historian John Iliffe (2006: 67) 
presents the following reasons for African political leaders’ initial unwillingness to engage 
with the disease: “it questioned their competence because they had no remedy, it threatened 
to raise demands for assistance that they could not afford to give, it distracted them from 
more pressing anxieties, it was potentially divisive, its victims had as yet no political voice 
and it might damage their country’s image and tourist industry”. More pessimistically, 
Richard Joseph (2003: 163) argues that African governments’ widespread failure to address 
HIV and AIDS highlights the fact that in most African states, “[w]hatever the rhetoric, the 
reality is that those who win governmental office concentrate on serving themselves and 
their narrow circles of supporters”. 
Although Africa bears the brunt of many widespread diseases, the specific characteristics of 
HIV and AIDS, scholars argue, sets it apart as particularly relevant to the study of African 
political systems. Firstly, in the absence of treatment, AIDS is fatal. Patients without ART 
usually survive an estimated 7 to 12 years after infection with HIV6. As will be discussed 
below, antiretroviral treatment (ART)7 can now significantly prolong and improve the lives 
of those it reaches and ART coverage has increased dramatically over the past few years. 
However, there is neither cure nor vaccine for HIV and AIDS yet. 
Secondly, HIV is transmitted primarily through sexual intercourse. 75%-85% of infections 
worldwide are sexually transmitted and most of these are through heterosexual sex 
                                               
4 These prevalence rates have now stabilised in most states, albeit at such extremely high levels. Incidence 
seems to have peaked in all southern African states in the mid-1990s, except in rural Angola (UNAIDS 
2009c: 27). 
5 From this list it is also clear that HIV and AIDS affect democracies and non-democracies alike: in 2010 
Freedom House considered three of these nine countries Free, four Partly Free and two Not Free. This 
study will deal with two of the Free states as it focuses on the impact of HIV and AIDS on democratic 
consolidation. 
6 The net median survival time is estimated at 11 years (UNAIDS and WHO 2007: 10). It is probably less 
in resource-poor settings. 
7 Antiretroviral treatment, abbreviated ART, is a broad term to describe treatment regimes that entail the 
use of any antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), such as Nevirapine, Lamivodine and the drugs that constitute 
highly active antiretroviral treatment (HAART) (see, for instance, Van Dyk 2008: 91-120 and Wood 2008: 
504). 
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(Whiteside 2008: 28). Addressing HIV and AIDS in Africa therefore necessarily means 
engaging with behaviour and with African sexuality and gender in particular. In a post-
colonial and largely patriarchal context this has led to great controversy. As an extreme 
example, former South African president Thabo Mbeki considered the discourse around 
HIV and AIDS the “latest manifestations of a centuries-old [Western] medical discourse that 
pathologised Africans as near-savage in their libidinal excess” (Gevisser 2007: 739). His 
policy decisions, influenced by this perception, will form an important part of this study. 
Thirdly, because it is usually sexually transmitted, HIV mostly infects individuals between the 
ages of 15 and 49 (Pharaoh and Schönteich 2003: 2). As De Waal (2006: 68) points out, it is 
sadly “normal” for many African children not to survive beyond the age of 5. What is 
abnormal, and potentially destabilising, is that where ART does not reach, adults’ lives are cut 
short before they have contributed to society as they otherwise would. In other words a 
disproportionate number of Africans become sick and die at the phase of their lives when 
they are most likely to be contributing to the economy (and supporting those who are not), 
participating in politics (such as voting and being active in voluntary organisations) and 
having children. Whiteside (2008: 92) reviews plummeting life expectancies in countries 
heavily affected by HIV and AIDS and argues simply: “In these settings, state collapse must 
be a real possibility”. Many scholars similarly argue that the “hollowing out” of these adult 
populations affects the sustainability of social structures, such as economic growth and 
democratic institutions.  
Not only is HIV and AIDS lethal, usually sexually transmitted, and disproportionately 
prevalent among young adults, but compared to other infectious diseases HIV has an 
exceptionally long incubation period before it develops into symptomatic AIDS and affects 
the sufferer’s life. The connection between cause and effect is therefore obscured and the 
risk of infection often unapparent. De Waal (2006: 17) explains that it is “a disaster with few 
parallels, because it is so easy to make it invisible or pretend it is something else”. 
Particularly, the sufferer suffers few symptoms shortly after infection, yet this is when viral 
load is extremely high and the virus highly infectious. This makes the risk of rapid 
transmission high, particularly in societies where multiple concurrent sexual relationships are 
common, such as is the case in Southern Africa (Halperin and Epstein 2007). 
Given these characteristics of the pandemic – its deadliness; the fact that it is sexually 
transmitted; the fact that it affects individuals in the prime of their lives; and its long 
incubation period – over the past three decades the pandemic reached such magnitudes and 
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affected populations in such particularly destructive ways that many believed that it threatens 
African economies, societies and even democracies. Especially so when death could be 
expected to follow HIV within 12 years. Now, ART is changing these expectations.  
Considered an unviable option for African policymakers until the early 2000s, ART has now 
become essential to any study of the African HIV and AIDS situation. While not a cure, 
ART inhibits the progression of HIV in the body and allows the body to recover from any 
damage that HIV may have caused already8. In this way, ART reduces both morbidity and 
mortality – in other words, it allows patients to live both healthier and longer lives. There is 
evidence that HIV positive patients in Africa, with appropriate ART, can live almost as long 
as people who are HIV negative. In a recent study, Ugandan HIV patients who initiated ART 
at the age of 359 increased their life expectancy by 28 years (Malan 2011). In this way, annual 
AIDS-related deaths are considerably reduced (see Figure 1). 
  
ART is reaching more and more Africans, at a lower cost. It was formerly assumed that most 
Africans would not be able to access ART because antiretroviral drugs were “prohibitively 
                                               
8 There is also proof that ART can be used in HIV negative individuals to reduce (but not eliminate) their 
risk of contracting the virus. It thus adds to a set of measures that reduce the risk of infection: among them 
abstinence, male and female condoms, male circumcision, vaginal microbicides and post-exposure 
prophylaxis (PEP). None of these are foolproof, but ART is an important addition to the prevention 
“toolkit” (Hall 2011). 
9 Most countries follow World Health Organisation (WHO) guidelines to determine at which point during 
the progression of HIV patients should commence ART (Avert 2011c). The WHO adopted new guidelines 
in 2010, recommending that ART is commenced when a patient’s CD4 count declines to 350, instead of 
only when the patient’s CD4 count declines to less than 200. In other words, these guidelines have recently 
become stricter, making more individuals officially eligible for treatment. 
Figure 1. Annual AIDS-related deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2009 
Source: UNAIDS 2010c. 
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expensive” in the 1990’s (Chirambo 2008: 34). For example, Youde (2001: 30) discusses the 
cost of ART in 2001 and concludes that few individuals in African states would have the 
means to benefit from such expensive medicine. First-line ART would cost a person $12 000 
to $14 000 per year in the 1990’s. That figure fell to about $100 per person per year by 2008 
(Coriat 2008: 9). Africans access ART either through private medical schemes (including 
those provided by employers) or through public health systems. Public funding for ART 
comes from governments’ budgets as well as major international sources of funding such as 
the World Bank’s Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) created in 2000, the Global 
Fund against Tuberculosis, Malaria and HIV/AIDS (Global Fund) created in 2002 and the 
United States of America’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) launched 
in 2004 (Coriat 2008: 3-9). The combination of increased organisational support, lowering 
cost and increased funding has vastly improved ART access, with Africa benefiting the most. 
From less than 2% six years earlier (UNAIDS 2009c: 25), by the end of 2009 37% of 
Africans who needed treatment were receiving it (UNAIDS 2010c: 29).  
Because people living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA) who adhere to appropriate ART can 
live longer, productive lives, it is hoped that some of the severe economic and social impacts 
of losing them can be diminished and the “hollowing out” of societies referred to above, 
therefore slowed. These impacts may now be assessed. Thereafter, the relevance of these 
effects to the future of democratic politics in Africa will be discussed. 
One of the most cited effects of AIDS-induced adult mortality is an unprecedented increase 
in orphans. An estimated 16.6 million children aged 0-17 have lost one or both their parents 
to AIDS and 90% of them live in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2010:112). Children 
orphaned by AIDS can grow up in particularly difficult social and economic circumstances, 
suffering stigmatisation, trauma and neglect long before they are orphaned (Avert 2010a; 
Whiteside 2008: 74). An increase in orphans is expected to affect the quality of African 
children’s development and education – especially that of AIDS orphans, but also that of the 
children who must share resources with them and come to terms with the strain that 
increasing amounts of orphans place on schools and communities. HIV and AIDS may 
therefore affect African children’s employability and opportunities in adulthood. According 
to one South African study (Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach et al. 2006) the economic 
disadvantage of AIDS orphans may impact on their societies for generations to come if 
nothing is done, but can be substantially reduced by implementing expensive intervention 
programmes.  
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Because of their difficult circumstances, it was initially argued that AIDS orphans may be 
more prone to developing antisocial tendencies and engaging in crime, or may contribute to 
political instability (Fourie and Schönteich 2001: 38-40; Barnett and Whiteside 2002: 210-213; 
Pharaoh and Schönteich 2003: 10-11). These arguments have been disputed (Bray 2003; 
Pharaoh and Weiss 2005), but Youde (2001: 9) points to another source of political 
instability around the pandemic. He argues that, because HIV is a behaviourally transmitted 
disease, the pandemic may exacerbate social cleavages as groups in divided societies may 
blame each other for behaving in ways that spread the disease. This scholar considers this 
especially likely because of the diversity of historically antagonistic groups that live together 
in postcolonial African states. 
Another oft-discussed effect of HIV and AIDS is a widening of inequality between 
households in the upper and lower social strata (Piot, Greener and Russell 2007: 1572). 
Whereas risk of infection is not always greatest among the poorest citizens10, scholars agree 
that poorer households that are affected by HIV and AIDS are exceptionally vulnerable to 
decreases in their standard of living. In order to cover the costs associated with providing for 
members with HIV and AIDS, such households are more likely than other classes to cut into 
savings, liquidate assets and/or reduce regular expenditure (Smit and Ellis 2009: 258). When 
it is the economically active family members that are infected with HIV and AIDS (which, as 
has already been pointed out, is often the case), the burden of providing for elderly relatives 
and the young will fall on the remaining productive adults, further reducing household 
income and personal savings (Mattes 2003: 4). Those middle class households that are 
affected by HIV and AIDS may be better placed to afford ART or to access it through 
private medical schemes and to cope with the additional financial pressures brought on by 
the disease, but this class will probably still suffer more than the upper classes because of the 
disease. De Waal (2003: 14) suggests that the property-owning middle class as a whole 
(including those who are not infected) could be negatively affected as HIV and AIDS could 
shift the structure of national economies away from the industries in which the middle class 
is typically employed, towards less skill-intensive activities such as mining and the informal 
sector. Price-Smith and Daly (2004: 19) also argue that not only the lower class (the poor), 
but also the middle class bear a disproportionate share of the AIDS burden.  
In terms of the effect of HIV and AIDS on business, a loss of precious human capital is an 
oft-cited challenge (De Waal 2006: 93). High unemployment rates (such as in South Africa) 
soften the impact of a loss of unskilled labour, but the loss of skilled labour may prove 
                                               
10 In some regions other factors, including expendable income in poor environments, weigh heavier. 
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seriously debilitating. Even if new employees can be found, high staff turnover in business 
means a loss of institutional memory (Price-Smith and Daly 2004: 19) and that money is 
spent on recruitment and training (Smit and Ellis 2009: 257). Thus companies can bear great 
financial burdens because of HIV and AIDS. Standard Bank estimated in 2010 that for every 
year a senior staff member remains productive, it saves about R300 000, an estimate which 
rises to R750 000 for middle managers (Jacks and Khanyile 2010). Therefore losing staff is 
highly undesirable. 
In an effort to avoid losing staff to AIDS, companies in areas heavily affected by HIV 
consider it necessary to spend money managing the disease through wellness programmes, 
voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), prevention, awareness campaigns and support 
structures (Jacks and Khanyile 2010). Companies also cope with increasing absenteeism and 
lower productivity, especially where no support is offered to infected employees. It is 
expected that the additional costs incurred by companies due to HIV and AIDS will be partly 
paid for by consumers (by an increase in prices) but probably, for the most part, will reduce 
companies’ profits (Smit and Ellis 2009: 257).  
Governments, like households and businesses, suffer the debilitating effects of HIV and 
AIDS. Scholars emphasise two challenges: governments must deal with the effect of AIDS 
on government employees and on the populations they serve (in other words, they must 
develop an AIDS policy).11 
To begin with, scholars have drawn attention to vulnerability of government employees to 
HIV and AIDS. Like businesses, government structures that lose employees to AIDS will 
also become less effective due to falling productivity, a loss of institutional memory and 
lower morale (Youde 2001: 9; Mattes 2003: 6-7; Strand 2005: 2; Pharaoh and Schönteich 
2003: 6). Barnett and Whiteside (2006: 323-324) expect the effect on governments to be even 
more pronounced than on business, because compared to the private sector, civil servants 
are given a high degree of job security and are particularly difficult to dismiss. “The result is 
that, as levels of illness and death rise, government departments, educational establishments 
and health facilities face situations where absenteeism increases, productivity falls and little 
can be done.” This precipitates what Butler (2005: 6) calls a “double crisis of administrators 
and delivery actors”, in other words productivity will be affected both among those 
bureaucrats who sustain the executive branch, legislatures, judiciary and independent offices, 
                                               
11  Of course, politicians themselves are also affected by HIV and AIDS. That will be discussed along with 
the potential effect of the pandemic on elections. 
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as well as among members of the civil service. Similarly, Mattes (2003:6) writes that the 
“pandemic is likely to devastate large portions of policy-makers, national legislators, local 
councillors, election officials, soldiers and civil servants – including doctors, nurses, teachers, 
ambulance drivers, fire fighters and the police”.  
Supporting these arguments, scholars (Birdsall and Hamoudi 2006: 139; Chirambo 2008: 37-
38) argue that HIV and AIDS may severely impact on the Southern African public sector, 
especially teachers. In Southern Africa, 200 000 of the region’s 650 000 teachers are 
projected to die from AIDS, while about half the teaching positions in the region are vacant 
already (Chirambo 2008: 37-38). This has critical implications for education and therefore for 
human development in the region. With regards to militaries, Heinecken (2001; 2003) argues 
that, should unrest ensue because of the social and economic effects of HIV and AIDS, the 
very armed forces and police that may be called in to maintain law and order will also be 
weakened physically and organisationally because of the disease. 
Besides the challenges of managing a civil service affected by HIV and AIDS, governments 
face the challenge of coping with it in the population as a whole by developing effective 
policy. Governmental health sectors particularly need to cater increasingly for prevention 
initiatives, as well as HIV and AIDS-related health care and welfare expenditure. In South 
Africa, access to health care and welfare are constitutional rights (RSA 1996: S27). The 
problem is exacerbated by the lack of skilled health professionals in Africa and the fact that 
doctors and nurses, too, become infected with HIV. Government support of orphans is also 
set to become a new massive expenditure. Governments need to find a way to meet these 
new demands. Increased HIV and AIDS-related expenditure through limited deficit 
spending may be affordable for the richer states, but many African states face a choice 
between allowing this imperative to crowd out other spending priorities, increasing taxes for 
the shrinking productive part of the population, or increasing their reliance on foreign 
assistance (Mattes 2003: 5).  
The latter option, namely increased reliance on international assistance, has become very 
common and has received increased attention in political science (Mattes 2003: 6). 
International assistance, notably the programmes mentioned earlier – MAP, the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR – have overshadowed government HIV and AIDS expenditure in many 
African states (Mukotsanjera 2008: 35). Although external funding has provided a great boost 
to the funding of HIV and AIDS policy, its sustainability is questionable – for instance, the 
aggregate amount spent per annum flattened for the first time in 2009 amid global financial 
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instability (UNAIDS 2010c: 96). Furthermore, donors’ perspectives, priorities and interests 
may differ from those of African citizens; it may also come with explicit conditionalities 
(Mattes 2003: 6). In 2006, De Waal (2006: 114) speculated that, with more than 80% of HIV 
and AIDS programmes funded from international sources, African governments and NGOs 
could become primarily mechanisms for processing donor funds to provide ART to keep 
people alive.  
Taking into account the effect of the pandemic on households, business and governments, 
economists who study the macroeconomic impact of AIDS on African states agree that HIV 
and AIDS tend to reduce GDP growth12 (Piot, et al. 2006). Because they employ divergent 
methodologies and assumptions, scholars’ estimates of this loss differs between 0.1 and 4.4 
percent annually in the next 10-20 years (Smit and Ellis 2009: 252; Bonnel 2000, quoted in 
Rajaraman, Russell and Heymann 2006). While some scholars expect the growth of national 
affluence, measured as annual gains in GDP per capita, to be smaller than it otherwise would 
have been, there is also a suggestion that annual GDP per capita may actually increase, if an 
AIDS-induced decline in population growth should outweigh an AIDS-induced decline in 
GDP growth. However, as already mentioned, AIDS is also expected to increase inequality 
because of worsening skills shortages and the disproportionate financial effect of HIV and 
AIDS on poorer households. AIDS is thus likely to reduce GDP growth and aggravate 
inequality, while its impact on aggregate GDP per capita is uncertain (Mattes 2003: 4; Nattrass, 
quoted in Butler 2005a: 4).  
It is also argued that African civil society, like African households, business and government, 
may become less effective because of HIV and AIDS. Mattes (2003: 9) argues that many of 
the kind of citizens that are most active in civil society organisations are also particularly 
susceptible to HIV infection, because they tend to be younger, more mobile and spend more 
time away from the office during the course of their work. There are also suggestions that 
civil society organisations do not lose only those who have AIDS themselves, but also those 
who drop out of organisations where they previously volunteered because of responsibilities 
such as caring for the sick or coping with the financial implications of the disease (Mattes 
2003: 9; De Waal 2003: 13).  
Strand (2005: 3) and De Waal (2006: 41-42) cite these arguments, but then both mention that 
HIV and AIDS may also motivate people to get involved in public life. There are accounts of 
                                               
12 For a brief review of studies on the macroeconomic impact of AIDS on different African countries, and 
a comparison of their results, see Smit and Ellis 2009: 248-253. 
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HIV and AIDS motivating citizens to become engaged members of society, mobilising them 
to promote awareness and HIV and AIDS literacy, care for those affected by AIDS and 
lobby government for policy change (De Waal 2006: 42). Especially a more political engaged 
civil society, and not just a larger one in terms of citizen participation, would be regarded as 
beneficial to democratic consolidation. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) of South 
Africa is a case in point that was studied by Butler (2005a) and Vandormael (2007) and will 
be elaborated upon in Chapter 4, when the effect of AIDS on South Africa is examined. If 
“citizens affected by AIDS” are defined only as those providing home based care to AIDS 
patients and then survey data (Afrobarometer, quoted in De Waal 2006: 42) shows that both 
the positive and negative expectations hold true in different African states. 
Strand (2005) and researchers led by Chirambo (see Chirambo 2008: 31-44) investigated the 
impact of AIDS on Southern African electoral systems. Strand (2005: 4) sees AIDS as 
affecting both electoral governance, defined as “the wider set of activities that creates and 
maintains the broad institutional framework in which voting and elections take place”, and 
electoral systems, “a set of rules that defines how parties’ support in the voting population gets 
transferred into a distribution of seats in the legislative assembly through a general election”. 
The main electoral systems are first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation 
(PR).  
With regards to different types of electoral systems, the abovementioned sources argue that 
PR electoral systems are preferable to FPTP systems in an era of AIDS13 (Strand 2005: 7; 
Chirambo 2008: 31). If a member of parliament (MP) dies in a state that employs a PR 
system, his or her political party can simply nominate the next person on the list to 
parliament. In contrast, the FPTP system necessitates a by-election every time an MP dies. 
According to Strand (2005), an increase in by-elections has three main disadvantages that can 
affect democratic consolidation. Firstly, it can become expensive, even unaffordable in some 
contexts (Strand 2005: 8), secondly, by-elections tend to attract a reduced voter turnout 
because it is difficult to motivate voters to vote outside the general elections, meaning that 
the newly elected representative enjoys less democratic legitimacy (Strand 2005: 10), and 
thirdly, they may tip the balance of power in favour of large (ruling) parties, who have the 
capacity to contest repeated elections successfully (Strand 2005: 10). 
                                               
13 Strand, Chirambo, Strode and Matlosa (2005: 78) also report on a study of the influence on AIDS on 
elections in South Africa specifically. They point out that although South Africa has a PR system at 
national and regional level, South Africans elect their local government through a hybrid system that 
combines FPTP and PR. Therefore the country’s “local government system has not spared it from the 
ravages of the epidemic by and large” (Strand, et al. 2005: 78).   
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With regards to electoral governance, firstly it was noted that electoral management boards 
(EMBs) could run into many of the same problems as businesses, government and civil 
society, such as a loss of human capital, linked to a potential decline in efficiency and 
institutional memory. This was a concern both in terms of potential losses of full-time staff 
and in terms of part-time staff and volunteers. The fact that teachers form the core of 
volunteers in electoral processes, and that their attrition rate was considered particularly high 
in Southern Africa (as mentioned earlier), was expected to impact on the quality of elections 
and raise training costs (Chirambo 2008: 37). EMBs were also expected to face challenges 
because of the effect of HIV and AIDS on voters. First, it was reported that unprecedented 
mortality levels posed serious administrative challenges especially in states without 
institutionalised citizen and voter registration systems, such as Malawi, where “ghost voters” 
inflate the voting roll and affect the credibility of elected leaders (Chirambo 2008: 38). 
Second, the disease has been highlighted as an impediment to the political participation of 
PLWHA, both structurally and attitudinally (Chirambo 2008: 43).  
To conclude, HIV and AIDS is a unique pandemic that is disproportionately prevalent in 
Africa. Although ART contributes to ameliorating its effects, it does not yet reach half of 
Africans who need it to keep living productive lives. The effects of the pandemic thus 
continue: longevity is reduced; Africa must care for unprecedented numbers of orphans; the 
divide between social strata is widened; business and government face new demands and 
reduced productivity; and economic growth is believed to be hampered. Scholars have 
expressed divergent arguments with regards to the impact of the pandemic on affluence 
(GDP per capita) and civil society. Furthermore, scholars have pointed to the preferability of 
PR over FPTP electoral systems in the context of AIDS and the potential challenges 
associated with running elections in heavily affected areas.  
These effects, scholars have argued, could affect democratic consolidation. They point out 
that democracies do not necessarily live forever: democratic systems of government, once 
established, can “break down” and governments can revert to authoritarianism, or the quality 
of democracy can be “eroded” (Schedler 1998). Whether the negative effects of HIV and 
AIDS erode democracies to the point of breakdown or not is the central question asked in 
this study. On the other hand, it may be that HIV and AIDS affects certain sectors, 
particularly civil society, in such a way as to deepen democratic politics (Butler 2005a). As 
will now be explained, this study aims to engage with these possible positive and negative 
effects of the pandemic for democratic consolidation by means of a comparative analysis. 
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1.2. Problem Statement 
This section presents the “where”, “what” and “why” of this study to the reader. The 
geographic focus (the “where”) of the study is Botswana and South Africa, the relationship 
to be examined (the “what”) is the influence of AIDS on the variables of a multivariate 
model of democratic consolidation and the main rationale (the “why”) of the study is the 
lack of consensus among scholars about whether AIDS only negatively affects democratic 
consolidation in Africa, or whether it also has a positive influence as argued by Butler (2005a: 
21-22). 
South Africa and Botswana have been selected for comparative study because a study of the 
influence of AIDS on the two states may yield results that differ in illuminating ways. South 
Africa and Botswana have some important variables in common: they both have high HIV 
prevalence rates, are among the wealthiest states in Africa and are considered by Freedom 
House to be democracies. 
Both Botswana and South Africa today have exceptionally high HIV prevalence rates. The 
virus was first detected in these countries in the early 1980s, but under very different 
circumstances. In Botswana, the first diagnosis of HIV occurred in 1985 in the mining town 
of Selebi-Phikwe (Molatole and Thaga 2006: 23), whereafter migrant labourers and long-
distance truck drivers probably spread infection into the country. Iliffe (2006: 42) suggests 
that a high degree of cultural homogeneity probably helped to facilitate the spread of the 
disease as social interaction occurs easily among most citizens. In contrast, the South African 
population was deliberately kept apart. In 1982, a white, homosexual man was consequently 
diagnosed with the same strain of virus as American homosexuals and the epidemic was 
quickly contained among the white, homosexual, South African population. The black 
heterosexual population’s infection (the first case was diagnosed in 1986) was remarkably 
devoid of a core group. It was not, for instance, sex workers or miners that initially spread 
HIV, but rather a “diffusion across a long, much-permeated northern frontier and through 
individual contacts in many sectors of a mobile, commercialised environment” (Iliffe 2006: 
44).  
The governments of South Africa and Botswana, especially in the initial phase, responded 
differently to the epidemic. Fourie (2006: 50-64) argues that the South African political 
situation under Apartheid was a perfect environment for AIDS to flourish. It was further 
neglected because of the political turmoil and transformation of the late 1980s and early 
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1990s, and arguably both the pre- and post-Apartheid governments missed the window of 
opportunity for preventing a massive epidemic (Campbell and Williams 1999: 1630-1). 
Thereafter the South African government’s alleged mismanagement of AIDS was 
dramatically exacerbated by the denialism of president Thabo Mbeki (this will be discussed in 
Chapter 4). The initial failure of the South African government to address AIDS affected its 
legitimacy and, Butler (2005a) argues, indirectly created an opportunity for strengthening the 
institutions of democracy in the country. At the same time, of course, this failure exacerbated 
the problem. In 2008, South Africa’s adult (aged 15-49) prevalence was estimated at 16.9% 
(UNAIDS 2009c: 19). The country has recently intensified efforts to achieve universal HIV 
prevention, treatment, care and support and allocates increasing fiscal funds to the AIDS 
response, with some significant success in reducing infection rates among young people and 
from mothers to children (UNAIDS 2010a).  
The government of Botswana, in contrast, was not in denial. Botswana’s authorities took 
HIV and AIDS seriously shortly after the first heterosexual infections were reported, but 
whether its (Western-influenced) policies were the best choice, can be disputed (Allen and 
Heald 2004; Heald 2006). Despite government efforts, HIV spread exceptionally rapidly into 
both urban and rural Botswana in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (Iliffe 2006: 38). Some 
adaptations to AIDS policy, including the first introduction in Africa of routine HIV testing, 
as well as the formation of national AIDS committees and an increasingly multi-sectoral 
approach, demonstrate a continued effort to increase policy effectiveness. The achievement 
of more than 80% ART coverage mentioned earlier is further proof of this government’s 
commitment. Afrobarometer data indicated that citizens of Botswana are the only African 
citizens that overwhelmingly consider AIDS a priority and are positive about their 
government’s efforts to address it (Strand, quoted in De Waal 2006: 43). Still, HIV 
prevalence remains exceptionally high. By 2008 Botswana had an adult prevalence rate of 
25%, which is second only to Swaziland (UNAIDS 2009c: 19).  
The second commonality is that South Africa and Botswana are among the wealthiest states 
in Africa: South Africa’s GNI per capita (PPP) was estimated at $10 060 and Botswana’s at 
$12 860 in 2009 (World Bank 2010a). Later, the implications of this in terms of Przeworski, 
et al.’s (1996) assessments of “impregnable”, “fragile” and “extremely fragile” states will be 
considered. Of course, relative wealth does not necessarily translate into good conditions or 
opportunities for all their citizens: South Africa has one of the highest GINI coefficients14 in 
                                               
14 The GINI coefficient (or index) indicates the extent to which the distribution of income within an 
economy deviates from equal distribution (World Bank 2011e). It ranges from 0 (complete equality) to 1. 
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the world and in Botswana citizens spoke of their country as “a rich country of poor people” 
(Iliffe 2006: 42). Both are considered to have “medium” levels of human development, but 
lost “points” as life expectancies plummeted from highs of over 60 years of life expectancy 
in the early 1990s.  
The effective rollout of ART has only recently begun to make inroads against this decline, 
with Botswana’s success with ART  demonstrated vividly in the statistics: Life expectancy in 
South Africa was higher than in Botswana from 1995 to 2005, but between 2005 and 2006 
life expectancy in South Africa dropped to a lower level (from 51.8 to 51.5) than that in 
Botswana (50.8 to 52) for the first time since 1994. Life expectancy in South Africabegan to 
increase slightly again by 2008, for the first time since 1993 (World Bank 2011c). The Human 
Development Report 2010 indicates that life expectancy at birth is at 55.5 for Botswana and 
52.0 for South Africa. At present both South Africa and Botswana have high school 
enrolment: the mean years of schooling that adults in Botswana have undergone is 8.9 and 
those in school are expected to undergo 12.4 years of education; the corresponding figures 
are 8.2 and 13.4 years respectively for South Africa. Taking into account per capita income, life 
expectancy and school enrolment, South Africa’s Human Development Index (HDI) has 
declined slightly since 1990, now standing at 0.597, 110th in the world. Over the same period 
Botswana’s HDI has risen significantly, now standing at 0.633, 98th in the world in 2010 
(UNDP 2010: 142; 144-5; 149-150). 
Finally, Larry Diamond’s (1996) system of classification would identify both South Africa 
and Botswana as “liberal democracies” according to their 2010 Freedom House ratings15, 
although neither are fully consolidated democracies (Afrobarometer 2009b). South Africa 
received a rating of 2 for both political rights and civil liberties since 2007. Its political rights 
rating had been 1 from 1995 until Freedom House changed it to 2 in 2007 “due to the ruling 
ANC’s growing monopoly on policy making and its increasingly technocratic nature” 
(Freedom House 2007). Botswana scores 2 for political rights and 3 for civil liberties, scoring 
2 for both categories since 1995 and regressing from 2 to 3 in 2010 due to “decreased 
transparency and accountability in the executive branch” (Freedom House 2010a).  
Botswana and South Africa differ in terms of their electoral systems as well as the size and 
diversity of their populations. Botswana’s electoral system is FPTP while South Africa uses 
                                               
15 Diamond (1996: 24) considered states with Freedom House ratings of 1.0 to 2.5 the best available 
empirical indicator of “liberal democracies”. Later he narrowed this classification only to include states 
with ratings of up to 2.0, classifying as “electoral democracies” states with scores of 2.5 (Diamond 2002: 
30-31).  
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PR for national government. It may therefore be expected that, based on research mentioned 
earlier (especially the research led by Chirambo 2008), Botswana’s national electoral system 
may become expensive if many parliamentarians must be replaced because of AIDS. At the 
local level, both states run the risk of increased costs as both employ Mixed-Member 
Plurality (MMP) systems at the local level. 
Another important difference is that South Africans are vastly more populous than the 
citizens of Botswana. The 16.9% of the South African adult (aged 15-49) population 
translates to 5.7 million infected people, making it the country with the largest number of 
people living with HIV in the world (UNAIDS 2009c: 27). In contrast Botswana’s 
population totals only 1.9 million but it has a 25% adult (aged 15-49) prevalence rate 
(UNAIDS 2009c: 19). The AIDS challenge in South Africa, in real terms, is therefore much 
greater and will require considerably more funding. Finally, South Africa is ethnically highly 
diverse, potentially “locking” the disease into separate social groups, especially black Africans 
(see Chapter 4), as opposed to Botswana where a great majority are black African and 
Setswana-speaking people. 
To understand in which way AIDS can affect the health of these democracies, this study 
turns to theories of democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation, according to Larry 
Diamond (1996: 33), is “the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all 
significant political actors, at both elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is 
better for their society than any other realistic alternative they can imagine”. This will be 
expanded upon in Chapter 2. 
Political scientists have developed theories of what promotes democratic consolidation and 
what makes it less likely to be obtained. Some scholars have focused predominantly on the 
socio-economic factors that are empirically associated with democratic consolidation (e.g. 
Joseph Schumpeter and Seymour Martin Lipset), while others have focused on the 
institutional characteristics of consolidated democracies (e.g. Linz and Stepan). These factors 
can be encapsulated in a “multivariate model” of democratic consolidation, similar to the 
models that Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997) developed to study such 
phenomena as the extent of transition and democratization in Africa between 1988 and 1994. 
Such a model will be developed in Chapter 2 and, based on the assumptions of Bratton and 
Van de Walle, will include both institutional and socio-economic variables (or factors), very 
similar to the studies of Przeworksi, et al. (1996) and Leftwich (2000). The influence of HIV 
and AIDS on these variables in South Africa and Botswana is the “what” of the study. 
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The majority of scholars reach negative conclusions about the effects of HIV and AIDS on 
democratic consolidation. Mattes (2003: 11) concludes his article on the topic by arguing that 
HIV and AIDS threatened “to block and even reverse democratic development across the 
[Southern African] region”. Other prominent scholars echo this conclusion (Fourie and 
Schönteich 2001: 11; Whiteside, Barnett, George and Van Niekerk 2003: 3; Price-Smith and 
Daly 2004; Youde 2009: 220). Shell (2000) even titles his work “Halfway to the Holocaust”, 
emphasising how much destruction he expected the pandemic to sow by 2010. Their 
reasoning, as well as the contradicting arguments of Butler (2005a) and others, will now 
briefly be linked to the effects of HIV and AIDS as mentioned in the previous section. In 
Chapter 2, their arguments will be considered in the selection of some (but not all) of these 
factors for comparative analysis. (See methodology, below.) 
A key democratic institution which, scholars have argued, may be negatively affected by HIV 
and AIDS, is the institution of elections. As mentioned, electoral governance is expected to be 
affected in any state with high prevalence of HIV and AIDS, while when it comes to 
electoral systems, FPTP systems are expected to be more vulnerable than PR systems. This is 
an obvious concern, considering that free, fair and regular elections are generally considered 
a prerequisite for democracy (see Dahl 2005, in Chapter 2).    
Butler (2005) also points out that the politics around HIV and AIDS policy in South Africa 
has had positive outcomes for the legitimacy of accountability-protecting institutions, such as 
the judiciary, in the context of what he considers the “anti-democratic trajectory” of the 
executive. This is significant if South Africa is to avoid becoming stuck in a “dominant 
power politics” syndrome which, Carothers (2001) points out, is not always a stepping stone 
to consolidated democracy. 
Besides those mentioned above, most arguments are centred around socio-economic factors 
that are considered relevant to democratic consolidation. To begin with, Przeworski, et al. 
(1996) demonstrated the relevance of certain macroeconomic indicators – national affluence 
(measured in terms of per capita income), economic growth and trends in inequality 
(measured in terms of GINI coefficients) – for the survival of democratic regimes from one 
year to the next. In this they concurred with the work of Lipset (1959). As discussed earlier, 
scholars generally expected HIV and AIDS to affect economic growth and inequality 
detrimentally, while there are conflicting theories concerning the impact of the disease on 
affluence. On these three counts (affluence, economic growth and the reduction of 
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inequality), Mattes (2003) and others are not very optimistic about the effect of the pandemic 
on African democratic consolidation.   
Furthermore, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 237-239), Leftwich (2003) and before them, 
Barrington Moore (1966) pointed out that a sizable middle class (bourgeoisie) correlates well 
with consolidated democracy. This class emerges in the context of urbanisation, high literacy 
levels and above average incomes. For this reason, although middle class households have 
greater access to ART, De Waal’s (2003: 14) projection of decreased opportunities for the 
middle class as a whole is important.  
Besides the effect of AIDS on economic indicators and the middle class, scholars express 
their concern about its effects on other measures of human development which are also 
considered important for the consolidation of democracy. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 
238) consider it valuable to consider literacy rates in order to understand the socio-economic 
characteristics of population when assessing its chances at democratic consolidation. 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) find empirical evidence that human development precedes and 
enables political liberalisation (See Chapter 2). For this reason the projected increase in AIDS 
orphans and the resultant developmental challenges for them and their peers (mentioned 
above) is cause for concern. So too is Chirambo’s (2008: 38) assertion that teachers are at 
great risk of HIV infection. The effect on life expectancy, as stated above, has been 
extremely negative in heavily affected countries but is now slowly being alleviated by ART. 
In short, scholars argue that in AIDS-stricken countries across Africa, the disease is 
“imposing a steady decline in the key indicators of human development” (Boutayeb 2009: 1) 
and therefore poses a threat to democratic consolidation.  
The opposing views of the impact of AIDS on the robustness of civil society, as discussed 
above, is central to this study. Linz and Stepan (1996: 17), Leftwich (2000: 146) and Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997: 253-255) all argue that a strong civil society is significant for 
endurance and consolidation. Mattes (2003) and Butler (2005a) both make the link between 
this impact and democratic consolidation, with Mattes expressing concern about its potential 
negative effects in Southern Africa, such as potential weakening of this sector associated with 
a loss of human capital, and Butler pointing at what he considers the unforeseen positive 
impact of the pandemic on civil society in South Africa.  
A final socio-economic factor that contributes to democratic consolidation is the provision 
for the differing interests of a heterogeneous society. Linz and Stepan (1996: 25-28) and 
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Leftwich (2000: 147) argue that, where deep ethnic or cultural cleavages exist, provision must 
be made for peaceful coexistence. For this reason Youde (2001: 9) is concerned about the 
potential exacerbation of social cleavages because of HIV and AIDS, as mentioned earlier. 
To conclude, authors that argue that HIV and AIDS has a potentially detrimental effect on 
democratic endurance and consolidation because it could affect economic indicators, middle 
class, human development, civil society and peaceful coexistence in a heterogeneous society 
negatively. Most of these considerations are socio-economic. On the other hand, others, 
especially Butler (2005a), argue that the disease may also affect democratic consolidation 
positively, especially through a positive impact on civil society and the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions. 
The rationale behind this study – the “why” – lies in this lack of consensus among political 
scientists with regards to the question: How has HIV and AIDS affected the consolidation of 
African democracies and how can we expect it to do so from here onwards? Is the impact 
positive or negative, and to what extent is it significant? Despite the negative predictions of 
Mattes (2003) and others, there has in fact been remarkably little visible political upheaval 
associated with HIV and AIDS so far. Joseph (2003) remarks on the ability of democratically 
elected governments to retain legitimacy while failing in AIDS service delivery. If AIDS is 
pushing African states towards authoritarianism, it is not yet obvious at first glance, 
suggesting that the arguments of Butler (2005a) and De Waal (2006), although challenging 
the then prevailing views, have some validity. These contrasting arguments will be considered 
in the comparative analysis of the pandemic’s impact on Botswana and South Africa. 
The “where”, “what” and “why” of this study may yield results that differ in illuminating 
ways. Did AIDS only strengthen South African civil society because it was already vibrant 
and was faced with an overtly denialist government, or can it spur on a historically weaker 
civil society culture such as that in Botswana? Is a culturally homogenous population better 
placed to confront the democratic challenges posed by AIDS or can ART be targeted best in 
heterogeneous societies by focusing on groups more exposed to infection? To what extent 
does near-universal ART rollout ameliorate the projected socio-economic and institutional 
damages of AIDS? Ultimately, such questions can offer a nuanced answer as to what extent 
HIV and AIDS impacts on the consolidation of democracy. 
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1.3. Purpose and Significance 
The purpose of this study is to ask how HIV and AIDS impacts on democratic consolidation 
in Africa. Critical engagement with existing theories of democratic consolidation, combined 
with analyses of democracies with high AIDS figures in Southern Africa is crucial to a real 
understanding of how the African AIDS story will play out economically, socially and 
especially politically. It will examine how South Africa and Botswana in particular will be 
affected by AIDS. By comparing the impact of AIDS on several variables of democratic 
consolidation in only two states, it hopes to complement existing studies that focus on the 
impact of HIV and AIDS.  
In order to do so, the purpose of Chapter 2 is to analyse literature on democratic 
consolidation, defining the concept and developing a multivariate model of democratic 
consolidation similar to those used by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Przeworski, et al. 
(1996) and Leftwich (2000) to examine processes of democratization in African democracies. 
The socio-economic and institutional factors of consolidation identified by them will then be 
elaborated upon. Chapter 2 thus aims to create a theoretical framework of variables that may 
be applied in the studies of Botswana and South Africa. 
The purposes of Chapters 3 and 4 will be to describe the prevalence of HIV and AIDS in 
Botswana and South Africa in turn, focusing on the particular impact it has on socio-
economic and institutional factors of consolidation identified in Chapter 2. In line with 
Leftwich’s thinking, distinctions are made between survival and the endurance, or 
consolidation, of democracy. 
In Chapter 5, the study aims to assess comparative dimensions, evaluating similarities and 
differences in Botswana and South Africa. It is hoped that it will be illuminating to compare 
these two relatively affluent, but unequal and parliamentary democracies with their extremely 
high incidences of HIV. The obvious differences are that they have different electoral 
systems, vastly differing histories of HIV and AIDS policies, populations that differ in terms 
of size, cultural homogeneity and strength of civil society, and Botswana also had an earlier 
start with the rollout of ART. To conclude the study, Chapter 6 will consider the relevance 
of the findings of the study to other African democracies and suggest problems for further 
research.  
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1.4. Research Methodology 
This will be a descriptive, qualitative, desktop study, analysing academic journals and books, 
as well as other secondary sources and the official documents of governments, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media. Although these will include quantitative 
data, the conclusions drawn will be qualitative. The methodology is confined to desktop 
work and does not include fieldwork or questionnaires. 
The characteristics of HIV and AIDS are introduced in Chapter 1. The second chapter is a 
literary study devoted to conceptualising and operationalising the concept of democratic 
consolidation. In order to operationalise democratic consolidation, a multivariate model like 
those of Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Przeworski, et al. (1996) and Leftwich (2000) will 
be developed, consisting of both institutional and socio-economic variables. Informed as it is 
by a review of existing scholarship, the multivariate model incorporates variables (or factors) 
of which the relevance to democratic consolidation has been established by scholars 
mentioned above. However, in Southern Africa there are rival assumptions: those of Mattes 
(2003) pertaining to negative consequences for consolidation, and Butler (2005a), postulating 
more positive outcomes. Once the multivariate model of democratic consolidation is 
developed, the effect of AIDS can be examined and compared in terms of the factors 
chosen.  
The comparative approach is an approach employed to discover correlations among 
variables. This study takes two states, South Africa and Botswana, as main units of 
comparative analysis and investigates the relationship between the independent variable, HIV 
and AIDS, and the dependent variable, democratic consolidation, within these states. 
Choosing to compare two units has benefits and disadvantages. The fact that only two states 
are selected, does limit the representivity of the study. The findings of a study of two 
Southern African democracies cannot be said to describe the general experience of all 
African democracies. However, it must be taken into account that due to the time limitations 
of this study, a cross-unit analysis would necessarily have been more cursory and may 
deserve Butler’s criticism (2005: 8-9) of African comparativists’ democratic theory for 
skimming over important validity considerations. The fact that only two cases have been 
selected makes it possible to engage them in their (desktop) variations, leading to insights 
that may not have been possible in a broad sample of states.  
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By selecting these states as main units of comparative analysis, this study takes Przeworski 
and Teune’s “most similar systems” approach to comparative inquiry (quoted in Mahler 
2003: 8). According to this approach, units of analysis are selected for their similarities in 
order to highlight the importance of their differences on the relationship between their 
dependent and independent variables. The important similarities between Botswana and 
South Africa are that both are electoral democracies in Africa; both are relatively affluent; 
and have extremely high levels of HIV prevalence. The question is: Do their democracies 
suffer under the impacts of HIV and AIDS? 
Differences found between South Africa and Botswana will less likely be attributable to their 
current level of democratic development or HIV prevalence and more likely be attributable 
to other aspects in which they differ, such as the robustness of civil society or their electoral 
systems. As Ian Taylor (2004: 151) points out about Botswana, the combination of “a 
burgeoning economy and burgeoning infection rate, make[s] the country of profound 
interest to any discussion of the political implications that the AIDS pandemic might have in 
Africa”. If a great HIV and AIDS burden can harm democracy, Botswana may be one of the 
first African countries to show this (Mukhara 2004: 30). The same reasoning is true for South 
Africa.  
Chapters 3 and 4 are each mostly concerned with longitudinal comparison – it examines HIV 
and AIDS-related changes in the attributes of the variables (such as institutions and human 
development indicators as well as the robustness of civil society), over time (longitudinally). 
With regards to time frame, this study will analyse applicable sources from the beginning of 
the (heterosexual) epidemic to the present (August 2011) in each state. For Botswana, an 
epidemic was perceived to threaten the population by 1986 (Iliffe 2006: 38) and in South 
Africa the epidemic was rapidly spreading by 1987 (Iliffe 2006: 43). The processes identified 
in the study will, of course, have implications for the future effects of HIV and AIDS on 
democratic consolidation. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTS 
2.1. Definition of Democratic Consolidation 
This chapter defines the concept of democratic endurance or consolidation, discusses 
institutional and socio-economic factors that are considered important to the process, and 
uses a minimalist set of variables possibly impacted by HIV and AIDS that will be assessed 
and compared in Botswana and South Africa.  
The first basic prerequisite for democracy, as the term will be employed in this thesis, is the 
existence of a state. Linz and Stepan (1996: 14) state simply: “[n]o state, no democracy”. 
Where there is a state, one may turn to the influential work of Robert A. Dahl to determine 
whether or not the system of government is democratic. Democracy, or what Dahl (1971:1) 
prefers to call polyarchy, is characterised by the continuing responsiveness of the government 
to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals. For such a system to exist 
over a period of time, citizens must have unimpaired opportunity to formulate their 
preferences; to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government; and to 
have their preferences weighted equally with no discrimination because of the content or 
source of the preference (Dahl 1971: 2).  
These characteristics, in modern democracies, are embodied in a set of political institutions 
that can be identified in order to classify regimes (Dahl 1971: 3; 1989: 221; 2005: 188). Dahl 
(2005: 188) holds six institutions up as the minimal requirements for a democratic country. 
These are:  
1. Elected officials. 
2. Free, fair and frequent elections. 
3. Freedom of expression. 
4. Alternative sources of information. 
5. Associational autonomy (i.e. civil society). 
6. Inclusive citizenship. 
 
To summarize these requirements, arguably the most important characteristics of democracy 
are participation and opposition (or contestation) (Dahl 1971: 4). Schedler (1998: 92) 
summarises them as “civil and political rights plus fair, competitive and inclusive elections”.  
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A distinction must also be drawn between democratic and authoritarian (undemocratic) 
regimes (Schedler 1998: 92). For example, since 1974, there has been a great increase in 
democratization across (almost) the whole world. By 2003, 63 percent of states, home to 70 
percent of the world’s population, exhibited some key features of democracy (Heywood 
2007: 35). This expansion of democratic features is what Huntington (1991: 3) called the 
“Third Wave” of democratisation.  
The Third Wave also swept through Africa, where there was a considerable increase in 
multiparty elections in African states (Van de Walle 2002: 67). Initially this created great 
optimism that fully-fledged democracy was taking hold in Africa. Indeed, some African states 
have now acquired the institutional trappings of democracies (Van de Walle 2002: 68). But 
some of these countries, while moving away from dictatorship, were not necessarily in 
transition to democracy (Carothers 2002: 14). There also were, and continue to be, many 
states that hold regular, relatively free and fair elections and yet do not meet all the minimal 
requirements for democracy as set out by Dahl above. As this demonstrates, elections are a 
necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for democracies (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 81; 
Schedler 2002: 37). Although not completely authoritarian, such regimes cannot be 
considered fully democratic (and therefore democracy cannot be said to be enduring or 
consolidating). 
It is therefore necessary to speak of levels of democraticness. Schedler (1998: 92-3) 
distinguishes three levels of democraticness, apart from authoritarian regimes, which are 
simply undemocratic. What Schedler calls electoral democracy is any “diminished subtype” 
of democracy that fulfils some, but not all, of Dahl’s minimal requirements for a democracy 
(all of them have some form of elections). The other two levels are liberal democracies and 
“advanced democracies”. The distinction between liberal democracies and advanced 
democracies is that liberal democracies merely fulfil Dahl’s minimal requirements (they 
demonstrate Leftwich’s “survival”, explained below) while advanced democracies 
“presumptively possess some positive traits over and above the minimal defining criteria of 
liberal democracy” (Schedler 1998: 93) and are, presumably, consolidated. 
 Having established this system of classification, Schedler (1998: 93-94) discusses scholars’ 
awareness that democracies may move either “back” towards authoritarianism or “forward” 
towards advanced democracy. Democracies do not, in other words, necessarily live forever: 
they may “erode” or “break down”.  
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Similarly, Thomas Carothers (2002: 6) points out in his article “The end of the transition 
paradigm” that new democracies do not move inevitably towards higher levels of democracy, 
as the “transition paradigm” (inspired by O’Donnell and Schmitter’s early work on 
“transitology”) assumed. Many new democracies “have not achieved relatively well-
functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening or advancing whatever democratic 
progress they have made” (Carothers 2002: 9). Instead, most of them in fact operate in a 
“grey zone”, which is broadly synonymous with Schedler’s electoral democracy. Two 
political syndromes Carothers identifies as common in this zone, are “feckless pluralism” 
(Carothers 2002: 10-11) and “dominant-power politics” (Carothers 2002: 11-13). He also 
disputes the “no preconditions” assumption implicit in the transition paradigm, pointing out 
that the more successful recent cases of democratization demonstrated the value of both 
socio-economic factors and institutional legacies (Carothers 2002: 8; 16). This study makes 
similar assumptions. 
Given the understanding that there are levels of democraticness and that progression over 
time, from lower to higher levels of democraticness, is not guaranteed, the phenomenon of 
democratic consolidation has received increasing attention.  
Schedler defines a consolidated democracy as “a democratic regime that the relevant 
observers expect to last well into the future” (Schedler 1998: 103) – one that is considered 
safe from democratic erosion (a slow regression in the quality of democracy) and democratic 
breakdown (an overt reversion to authoritarianism). Diamond’s (1994) definition may be 
considered complementary. He emphasises legitimation. To him, democratic consolidation is 
“the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its 
citizens that it is very unlikely to break down.”  
The emphasis upon legitimation is elaborated by Linz and Stepan (1996: 15), who define a 
consolidated democracy as one in which democracy becomes “the only game in town”. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, they argue that democracy is consolidated behaviourally, when 
violent overthrow is never contemplated; attitudinally, when even in crises democratic 
procedures are upheld; and constitutionally, when political conflicts are dealt with within 
established norms (Linz and Stepan 1996: 15-16). They emphasise the role of civil society 
and institutions in the consolidation of democracy. 
The simplest operationalisation of democratic consolidation is Huntington’s two-turnover 
test (1991: 267). According to Huntington, a democracy may be expected to last well into the 
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future if the incumbent political party accepts losing an election and hands over to the 
winners peacefully, and this party then accepts defeat in a subsequent future election. 
Huntington argues that such turnovers demonstrate “the heart of democracy”, the ability to 
elect rulers – or if things go wrong, “the unique democratic remedy of ‘peacefully dismissing 
the government’” (Giliomee and Simkins 1999: xv). Bratton (2003) finds that in terms of 
public opinion, alternations of power can re-establish the legitimacy of democracy where it is 
often declining in Africa (Bratton 2003: 156).  
For Huntington, as long as a state fails the two-turnover test it is not yet consolidated; as 
soon as it passes the test, it is considered consolidated. If one applies this minimalist test, one 
may withhold the label of consolidation in enduring democracies (Beetham 1994: 160). For 
instance, the two-turnover test alone cannot explain the consolidation of democracy in 
Japan, in which democracy has endured since 1947 without any turnovers (Garcia-Rivero, 
Kotzé and Du Toit 2002: 166). Still, no scholars dispute the consolidation of democracies 
that have seen two turnovers. In Southern Africa, only Mauritius meets this requirement. 
Some scholars (Diamond 1996: 35; Dahl 1980: 315) suggest that consolidation is partly a 
process of habituation and that the passage of time is instrumental. Others analyse mass 
support for democracy. Afrobarometer (2009b), for instance, suggest that a democracy is 
consolidated when, over some time, more than 70% of citizens both express support for 
democracy and believe that they live in a democracy16. 
However a consolidated democracy is operationalised, scholars put forward conditions and 
factors to explain why some democracies (which start out as minimally democratic in Dahl’s 
terms) erode or break down, while others consolidate. For instance, Linz and Stepan (1996) 
list five mutually reinforcing conditions for democratic consolidation. They emphasise 
institutions, while Przeworski, et al. (1996) emphasise socio-economics. 
Other scholars distinguish between democratic “survival” and “consolidation”. For instance, 
for Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 237) the key question is which of the new African 
democracies will “survive at all, thus beginning the arduous process of long-term 
consolidation”. They distinguish between “short-term survival” and “long-term 
consolidation” – “emerging democracies may survive, in the sense of enduring without 
reversal to authoritarianism, without making much progress on the difficult process of 
consolidation” (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 235). Still, there is a relationship between 
                                               
16 See also: Garcia-Rivero, et al. 2002: 165-166. 
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the two processes: the longer democracy survives, the likelier is consolidation (Bratton and 
Van de Walle 1997: 236).  
Leftwich (2000) presents two separate sets of factors which may both be considered 
important for this study. First, Leftwich (2000: 136) offers five “conditions for democratic 
survival” which he paraphrases “conditions for democratic consolidation”. He argues that 
these are “critical structural conditions that make for democratic stability” (Leftwich 
2000:145). Without at least some of them (Leftwich 2000: 147), a democracy may fulfil 
Dahl’s minimal criteria but might not do so for very long. They are geographical, 
constitutional and political legitimacy; adherence to the rules of the game; policy restraint by 
the winning parties; overcoming the obstacle of widespread poverty where it is present; and 
overcoming the difficulties of sharp ethnic, cultural or religious cleavages where they are 
present (Leftwich 2000: 136-145).  
Under the heading “Democratic Endurance” Leftwich (2000: 145) then lists a separate set of 
“wider factors” that enable the aforementioned conditions to take hold. The factors he then 
lists correlate with those that promote more than democratic “survival” according to 
Przeworski, et al. (1996). Thus Leftwich uses the word “survive” when discussing factors for 
democratic “endurance”, but has separate “conditions for democratic 
survival/consolidation” and “wider factors for endurance”. He also argues that “democracies 
need to be consolidated if they are to endure” (Leftwich 2000: 147). Przeworski, et al. (1996) 
also use the word “endure” to describe long-term survival (see Przeworski, et al. 1996: 41; 
49), but consider “consolidation” an empty term, although the meanings are almost 
synonymous. 
To summarize, Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) distinguish between survival and 
consolidation; Leftwich (2000) separates conditions for survival/consolidation from factors 
for endurance, while Przeworski, et al. (1996) separate survival/endurance from 
consolidation. For the purpose of this study consolidation and endurance will be used as 
synonyms. Survival will be considered a prerequisite for endurance/consolidation and 
therefore factors that affect it will also be deemed relevant.  
Two different schools of thought, the institutionalists and the so-called modernization 
theorists, focus on institutional and socio-economic factors respectively when studying 
democratic consolidation. Recently most scholars have considered both. For instance, Linz 
and Stepan (1996) who are institutionalists, list five conditions for democratic consolidation, 
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of which four are institutional. The non-institutional condition, which they list first, is civil 
society. Similarly, Leftwich (2000: 145-146) lists factors for endurance, mainly of a socio-
economic nature, but he includes parliamentary systems as well. Following these scholars, as 
well as such scholars as Przeworski, et al. (1996), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) and 
Schedler (1998), this study will include both institutional and socio-economic variables that 
are considered important for the endurance/consolidation of democracy. An overview of the 
literature considering institutional factors will now be presented; followed by an overview of 
socio-economic factors. Because of its constraints, this study omits the international and 
regional context and focuses on domestic factors. 
2.2. Factors for Democratic Consolidation 
2.2.1. Institutions 
2.2.1.1. Presidential and parliamentary systems of government 
A theme in the literature on the Third Wave (i.e. literature around transitions, 
democratization, democracy, survival and endurance/consolidation) is a comparison of 
parliamentary systems and presidential ones. These systems of government represent 
different relationships between the legislature and the executive. In a parliamentary system 
(such as the British system) the executive is drawn from, and accountable to, parliament – in 
other words, there is a degree of fusion between the legislative and executive arms. Such a 
government by definition has the confidence of parliament and retains power only as long as 
it retains this support. In contrast, presidential systems (such as the American one) are based 
on a strict separation of powers between the legislature and the executive, which are 
separately elected and relate to each other through a system of checks and balances 
(Heywood 2007: 239-340).  
When it comes to the influence of different systems of government upon democratic 
consolidation, Linz (1990) discussed the “perils of presidentialism”, arguing that 
parliamentary systems had proven more conducive to a stable democracy than presidential 
systems and that they were so for several reasons. In 1991, Arend Lijphart suggested the 
same; as did Riggs (1994: 72), who suggested that presidentialism as a political formula is 
“seriously flawed”, because of the frequent collapse of presidentialist Third Wave 
democracies.  
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Counterarguments abound, but Mainwaring (1993) and Przeworski, et al. (1996) confirmed 
the superiority of parliamentarianism for the endurance of democracy in empirical studies. 
The latter study found that, over 135 countries, for the period 1950-1990, presidential 
systems were considerably less likely to survive from one year to the next than were 
parliamentary systems: democracies under presidential systems tended to last less than 20 
years, while under parliamentary systems they lasted 71 years (Przeworski, et al. 1996: 44-7). 
Three oft-cited explanations for this finding will be listed here. 
First, presidential systems are prone to legislative-executive deadlock. Because the president 
and legislature are elected separately, both the president and the parliament can claim 
democratic legitimacy. In contrast, in a parliamentary system, the only democratically elected 
institution is the parliament. The prime minister has the ability to dissolve parliament and call 
for re-elections, but except for this drastic move the prime minister cannot “appeal to the 
people over the heads of their representatives” in parliament (Linz 1990: 52). Linz therefore 
argues that the presidential system creates a tension between the legislature and chief 
executive, and especially when the opposition wins a majority in the legislature, a deadlock 
can emerge. This argument was supported by Stepan and Skatch (1993: 18), who highlighted 
the lack of a constitutionally legitimate “impasse-breaking device”. Mainwaring (1993) 
agreed, arguing that presidentialism combined with multipartism (as opposed to a two-party 
democracy) is especially likely to create such a deadlock. Przeworski, et al. (1996: 45) found 
that the conditions for executive-legislative deadlock were common under presidentialism. 
Secondly, Linz argues that the stakes are very high in presidential elections, because of the 
great amount of power vested in the president (especially compared to the leader of the 
opposition). Opposition groups may perceive elections as a zero-sum game17, which grants 
this system greater potential for conflict and polarization than a parliamentary system and is 
therefore particularly dangerous for democracies in the transition or consolidation phase 
(Linz 1990: 56-7; 60). Furthermore the president, as representative of both the population as 
a whole and the ruling party specifically, may conflate the will of the ruling party with that of 
the people and make the policies of the opposition out as “the selfish designs of narrow 
interests”, leading to indifference or even outright hostility to the opposition (Linz 1990: 61). 
                                               
17 A zero-sum game is a contest in which one person’s loss is equal to another person’s gain. The 
implication, in politics, is that there is no scope for long-run cooperation between the players; mutual 
increase of gain is impossible (Concise Oxford dictionary of politics 1996: 537).  
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The third issue is the president’s fixed term in office. Linz argues that it breaks political life, 
for all political actors, into rigid presidential terms, and in the case of death or incapacity of 
the president, may result in the appointment of someone the electorate would not have 
voted for (Linz 1990: 54). The time limitation on his or her presidential term may also result 
in a sense of urgency in the president’s policies; or for the sake of continuity the removal of 
the limitation or appointment of an agreeable but unsuitable “yes-man” as successor (Linz 
1990: 66-67). 
One can conclude that parliamentary systems are more likely to consolidate and that 
democracies with presidential systems must make every effort to recognize and safeguard 
against the “perils of presidentialism”. In Africa, many presidents usurp their constitutional 
powers, undermine parliament and make the executive dominant. (This was, almost always, 
the precursor to the establishment of one-party states in Africa, prior to the emergence of 
“Third Wave” democracies.) 
2.2.1.2. Electoral system: First-past-the-post and Proportional Representation 
Dahl (2005: 195) lists regular, free and fair elections as a requirement for democracy. The 
need for a fair electoral system is taken for granted in literature, he writes. Yet there is a fair 
amount of debate about what kind of voting system best ensures such freeness and fairness.  
The main options are first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems (also called plurality or constituency 
systems) and proportional representation (PR) systems. The FPTP system entails the election 
of the legislature by (at the national level, usually single-member) voting constituencies. PR 
models vary greatly, but the PR list model treats the whole country as a single constituency 
and parties are allocated seats in direct proportion to the votes they gain in the election 
(except if there is a threshold) (Heywood 2007: 263). 
It is widely accepted that the FPTP system is associated with the emergence of two large 
political parties, a one-party cabinet and the dominance of the legislature (through a strong 
ruling party) over the executive branch of government. In contrast, the PR system is 
associated with multiparty systems, coalition governments and greater equality between the 
legislature and the executive (Lijphart 1991: 72-73). Because of the concentration of power in 
the hands of the ruling party in the FPTP system, Lijphart (1991: 73) labels it the majoritarian 
model of democracy, while PR, which encourages broad coalitions, he labels the consensus 
model. 
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Most scholars are willing to discuss the benefits and disadvantages of both electoral systems. 
Because PR grants smaller parties a place in the legislature, it is a more inclusive model. It 
provides a means of including ethnic or religious minorities and for new democratic forces to 
share power with old antidemocratic elites (Lijphart 1991: 75). It is therefore often adopted 
as a means to promote unity in new, heterogeneous democracies, lessening the threat to 
democratic consolidation (Reynolds 1995: 120). Its focus is on representivity. In contrast, 
FPTP tends to magnify the gains of the winning party, even when this party does not have 
an absolute majority of the popular vote. Many votes are thus “wasted” and electoral 
preferences are distorted (Heywood 2007: 257). Losing parties may feel excluded from 
politics and less motivated to cooperate democratically. 
On the other hand, proponents of FPTP claim that it is the only system in which clear 
accountability for government policy can be achieved (Lijphart 1991: 76). Put differently, the 
proponents argue that FPTP promotes the “vertical” dimension of democracy, namely a 
representative relationship between elites and non-elites with a common political interest 
(Reynolds 1995: 117). This is achieved because voting districts vote specific individuals into 
parliament, who then become accountable to their constituencies. Importantly for the 
purpose of this study, ministers and members of parliament (MPs) who cannot complete 
their term, must be replaced in by-elections in order to keep their voting district represented 
in parliament.  
Supporters of FPTP also argue that more effective government can be achieved by a one-
party cabinet, which is a common result of this system (England and some members of the 
British Commonwealth are cases in point). However, the experience of effective government 
in continental Europe disproves this claim (Beetham 1994: 170). The fact that this system 
tends to produce a two-party system and that coalition government is therefore not 
necessary, may limit the power of small extremist parties and promote stable government 
(Heywood 2007: 257).  
South Africa uses a PR system and Botswana an FPTP system at national level. Whatever 
model a state adopts, Leftwich (2000: 138) argues that popular confidence in elections is a 
necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy (he goes on to advocate adherence 
to the rules of the game and policy restraint by the winning parties). This includes confidence 
in both the process and the outcome of elections; in other words, not only must the public 
deem PR or FPTP a legitimate system, but they must also consider elections legitimately free 
and fair. It is particularly in the latter sense that the effect of AIDS will be studied. 
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2.2.1.3. Political rights and civil liberties 
Political rights, according to Freedom House (2011), “enable people to participate freely in 
the political process through the right to vote, compete for public office and elect 
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the 
electorate”. These are distinguished from civil liberties, which “allow for the freedoms of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state”. These are relatively narrow definitions, in 
particular, the definition of civil liberties has to do mostly with non-interference and does not 
imply that a democracy must provide in all positive rights of citizens (which may vary and 
may be very extensive in some states) before it is considered “free”. 
Political rights and civil liberties are an essential part of democracy and therefore of 
democratic consolidation. This is obvious in Schedler’s (1992: 92) definition of democracy. 
Bratton and Van de Walle’s (1997: 236) conception is similar; and Linz and Stepan (1996: 20) 
argue simply: “[d]emocracy is a form of government in which the rights of citizens are 
guaranteed and protected”. Quite often, levels of democraticness relate to either an increase 
or an erosion of these rights (see Schedler 1998; Van de Walle 1997; Diamond 1996 and 
Carothers 2002).  
Diamond (1996: 34) argues that the less respect political actors have for political rights and 
civil liberties, the more democratic consolidation is obstructed, in two ways. Firstly, where 
these ratings deteriorate below a certain level, democracy cannot, by definition, consolidate 
because the procedural underpinning that defines the democratic nature of the regime is 
drawn into question. Secondly, to the extent that a regime is or becomes “shallow, exclusive, 
unaccountable, and abusive of individual and group rights,” it loses legitimacy in the eyes of 
citizens and lowers the perceived costs of reverting to authoritarianism, thereby making 
democratic breakdown more likely. For Leftwich (2000: 135-145) legitimacy is the most 
important condition for the survival of democracy. Afrobarometer data analysed by Bratton 
and Mattes (2001) supports these arguments about legitimacy: they found that citizens’ 
approval of democracy hinges to a considerable extent on its ability to guarantee their 
political rights (see also, Youde 2009). Disrespect for political rights and civil liberties thus 
obstruct democratic consolidation both by definition and causally.  
Given the centrality of political rights and civil liberties to democracy, any development that 
affects a state’s respect for political rights and civil liberties directly, can be considered a 
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threat for democratic consolidation. Conversely, developments that affirm political rights and 
civil liberties support democratic consolidation by implication. This includes forces that 
affect the rule of law (Linz and Stepan 1996: 18-19), because the judiciary is critical to the 
survival of these rights (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 248).  
For this reason Diamond and others (e.g. Breytenbach 2005) consider Freedom House 
ratings important in the evaluation of democratic consolidation. Freedom House is an 
organisation that releases an annual survey of the “progress and decline of freedom” 
(Freedom House 2011e: 30). Freedom House measures political rights and civil liberties on 
separate scales of 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. 
When these two scores produce a combined average of 2.5 or less, the state is rated “free”. 
From 3.0 to 5.0, the state is rated “partly free” and states with ratings from 5.5 to 7 are rated 
“not free”. Breytenbach (2005: 51-52) points out that prominent democratization theorists 
consider Freedom House’s annual ratings a useful operationalisation of levels of democracy. 
This operationalisation is measurable and therefore comparable.  
2.2.2. Socio-economic factors  
2.2.2.1. Affluence 
As stated above, democracies are formed on the basis of institutions. For modernisation 
theorists, these are necessary for the mere survival of democracies, but not necessarily 
sufficient. What makes for sufficiency?  
It is generally accepted that affluence is conducive to democratic survival. The correlation 
was initially suggested by Seymour Martin Lipset, who argued “[t]he more well-to-do a 
nation, the greater chances that it will sustain democracy” (1959: 56). In line with this 
suggestion, Przeworski, et al. (1996: 40) operationalised affluence by linking it to annual per 
capita incomes and found that, at above $6 000 democracies are “impregnable”; poorer 
democracies, between $6 000 and $1 000, are “fragile” and those with per capita incomes 
below $1 000, are “extremely fragile”. These were data for 1950-1990. Huntington (1991: 
272), using 1987 data, draws the same conclusion about the influence of affluence on 
democratic consolidation, finding that by 1990, India was the only extremely poor Third 
Wave democracy that had survived (of course, many poor democracies were born thereafter, 
but not all survived. Ghana and India are the exceptions in Africa and Asia). Leftwich (2000: 
145) as well as Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 237-8) also allude to per capita incomes. 
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Leftwich (2000: 143) suggests that it is the struggle for scarce resources and the 
comparatively enormous benefits of political power that makes incumbents in poor 
democracies more inclined to suspend democracy and remain in power. 
Much of the initial theorizing around the relationship between affluence and democracy was 
part of modernisation theory, a school that holds that democratization is a result of 
economic growth. However, the work by Przeworski, et al. (1996) disproves this. They find 
that transitions to democracy are random with regard to the level of economic development, 
but that the affluence of democracies, once established, is relevant to their survival, as stated 
above (Przeworski, et al. 1996: 40). In the Third Wave especially, many poor nations have 
adopted democracy – but once they have done so, their chances at survival are significantly 
slimmer than those of affluent democracies.  
Przeworski, et al.’s (1996: 81) income figures are based on 1985 constant purchasing power 
parity (PPP) dollars. Following Diamond (2003: 18), this figure may be adjusted for inflation. 
The affluence line of $6 000 would be equivalent to $12 195.78 in 2010 (US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics 2010). Above this level, democracies may be considered impregnable 
according to this thinking. The threshold for “fragile” democracies was between $12 195 and 
$2 032 and for “extremely fragile” systems, lower than $2 032 (US Bureau of Labour 
Statistics 2010).  
2.2.2.2. GDP growth and low levels of inflation 
It is important to note the weight of the previous point before continuing. Przeworski, et al. 
(1996) found that affluent democratic nations were “impregnable”: “once democracy is in 
place, affluence is a sufficient condition for it to survive regardless of anything else” 
(Przeworski, et al. 1996: 42). No other factor was found to have such explanatory power.  
Przeworski, et al. (1996) also found correlations between democratic survival and economic 
growth; and democratic survival and the reduction of inequality. Economic growth can to 
some extent compensate for poverty in ensuring democratic survival (Przeworski, et al.. 
1996: 42; Leftwich 2000: 145). In times of economic downturn, democracy is more likely to 
break down. The same is true for inflation: poor democracies that succeed in sustaining 
moderate levels of inflation also have better chances of survival (at inflation rates of under 6 
percent, an average life span of 44 years) than those with high inflation (at inflation rates of 
over 30 percent, an average life span of 16 years) (Przeworski, et al. 1996: 42). Although the 
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Leftwich (2000) study came four years after the Przeworski, et al. (1996) study, it fully 
underwrites their conclusions about affluence and endurance. 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 240) explain the relationship between economic 
performance and democratic consolidation as follows: “[i]n a consolidated democracy, 
economic grievances are expressed through the ballot box and can lead to the replacement of 
one elected government by another; in a nonconsolidated democracy, however, the penalty 
for poor performance may well be the end of democratic rule itself and a return to 
authoritarianism”. 
Although economic performance is crucially important for democratic endurance 
(Przeworski, et al. 1996: 42), no scholars argue that economic growth alone is a sufficient 
condition for democracy (as some argue affluence is). As Diamond (2008) points out, Kenya 
demonstrates this point. Despite at the time registering significant economic growth for the 
first time in many years, much of Kenya’s democratic gains were reversed by the wave of 
ethnic violence that followed its 2007 elections. Events and circumstances that promote 
economic performance, especially in poor democracies, promote democratic consolidation 
indirectly; and events and circumstances that make it more difficult, threaten democratic 
endurance and consolidation indirectly. 
2.2.2.3. Inequality reduction 
A third socio-economic factor studied by Przeworski, et al. (quoted by Leftwich 2000: 145), 
is income inequality. The Gini coefficient can be used to measure income inequality and can 
range from 0 (complete equality) to 1 (one person has all the income). Przeworski, et al. 
(1996: 43) found that, although there is no proof that democracies with high socio-economic 
inequalities are more prone to failure than more egalitarian societies, the phenomenon of 
rising inequality is detrimental to democratic survival, with an average democratic “life span” 
of only 22 years in such countries. On the other hand, democracies that manage to reduce 
socio-economic inequalities can expect to live, on average, 84 years. “People expect 
democracy to reduce inequality,” the authors explain, “and democracies are more likely to 
survive when they do” (Przeworski, et al. 1996: 43).  
Diamond (1990: 57) argues that the necessity of reducing inequality is a difficult paradox of 
democracy. On the one hand, deep class cleavages may lead to bitter political polarization 
and democratic instability. On the other, socio-economic reforms that attempt to address 
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inequality could meet with bitter resistance from “entrenched elites” such as large 
landowners and the employers of cheap labour (Diamond 1990: 57), who may resort to 
undemocratic means to secure their interests if they consider the costs of such action low 
enough. Thus both addressing inequality and a failure to address it are likely to lead to some 
measure of democratic instability. He (Diamond 1990: 57) also connects economic growth 
and the reduction of inequality, arguing that “only in the context of economic growth can 
inequality be reduced in a way that brings an enduring reduction in poverty”.  
From the above discussion it follows that the prospects for democratic consolidation 
increase when there is reduction in inequality. What matters in this study, is whether HIV 
and AIDS impact on the reduction of inequality in Botswana and South Africa.  
2.2.2.4. Trends in Human Development 
Using the UN Development Report 
For modernisation theorists, human development, measured in a variety of ways, has gained 
importance as a factor of endurance, often used in conjunction with measurement of income 
levels.  
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 238), acknowledging that per capita income may not 
accurately reflect citizens’ circumstances and opportunities where national economies are 
dependent on oil or mineral resources, suggest using literacy scores in conjunction with 
income per capita to measure the socio-economic characteristics of a given state. Leftwich 
(2000: 53) defines the major components of human development as “a long and healthy life, 
education and access to resources that provide a decent standard of living”. Similarly, 
Diamond (2003: 6) indicates that socio-economic realities could be measured by referring to 
the United Nations Human Development Index (UN HDI) and Breytenbach (2005: 52) 
operationalised development as a combination of economic development (per capita income) 
and UN HDI. He then juxtaposed this with Freedom House’s classifications and found that 
freer nations correlated with higher HDI levels and that unfree nations also correlated with 
poorer ones in Southern Africa.  
Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) use the World Values Surveys to identify a causal 
relationship between human development and democratization: socio-economic 
development (which is defined not as GDP per capita but more broadly as “growing 
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individual resources”) tends to shift society’s values toward a greater emphasis on human 
emancipation and choice, which in turn stimulates the demand for democratization as it 
provides legal guarantees of choice by institutionalizing “freedom rights”. Welzel, et al. 
(2003) thus confirm the assumptions implicit in the abovementioned (mostly earlier) works. 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) expanded upon these findings, demonstrating that human 
development leads to a replacement of survival values with self-expression values, which are 
causally prior to sustainable and effective democratic institutions (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 
288-289). Unfortunately, neither study tests the effect of declining human development (such 
as declining levels of health and longevity). Their study does at least suggest that in the event 
of a decline, the human development trend in a country can no longer be said to promote 
democratization.  
Berg-Schlosser (2008) also tests for the explanatory strength of variables related to human 
development in explaining democratic success and finds significant bivariate correlations 
between democratic success and human development factors. In his step-wise regression of 
these human development factors, declining infant mortality emerged as the single factor that 
correlates most strongly with democratic success (Berg-Schlosser 2008: 289). He does not 
establish causation.  
The United Nations Development Programme proposes a composite of three variables with 
their Human Development Index, updated annually in the United Nations Human 
Development Report. The Report (1990) was an answer to calls for a broader measurement 
of “development” than standard economic measurements. Its Human Development Index 
was explicitly devised as a usable rival to pure GDP per capita (Sen 2010: IV). It combines 
three indicators: health (life expectancy at birth), education (literacy rates) and income (GDP 
per capita). The methodolody changed somewhat in 2010. A rating between 0 and 1 (with 1 
being the most developed and 0 being the least developed) is annually assigned to each state. 
States are also ranked from highest to lowest levels of human development. Botswana and 
South Africa rank in the medium categories, with Botswana ranking higher than South 
Africa.  
Welzel, et al. (2003: 356) prefer the more complex Vanhanen Index to the UN HDI18. 
However, the UN HDI is well-known, easily available and presents a snapsnot of socio-
                                               
18 Welzel, et al. (2003: 356) explain that the Vanhanen index (Vanhanen 1997) includes both physical and 
intellectual resources and measures not only levels but also the distribution of these resources. It also 
includes a measure of social complexity. 
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economic conditions that is comparable across states. In the 2010 rankings (UNDP 2010) 
Botswana was rated 98th and South Africa 110th in the world. 
2.2.2.5. Heterogeneity  
As early as the 1860s, John Stuart Mill (1861, quoted in Beetham 1994: 169) wrote that “free 
institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities” because 
“each fears more injury to itself from the other nationalities than from the common arbiter, 
the state”. Although no longer considered “next to impossible”, the existence of deep social 
cleavages in Third Wave democracies has been flagged as an impediment to their endurance 
and consolidation. The majority of African democracies are heterogeneous (whether their 
fault lines run along cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious lines or a combination of these) 
and the presence of settler societies added a racial element to some of them (Breytenbach 
1996: 10). They are by no means nation-states, like the older democracies of Germany, Japan 
and France. 
Beetham (1994: 169) summarized the heterogeneity hypothesis in question as follows: 
“societies divided by clearly defined and historically antagonistic groups will have great 
difficulty in sustaining democracy”. He writes that the reasons why heterogeneity is 
considered detrimental to democratic consolidation are twofold: firstly, because democracy 
relies on popular consent in conditions of free expression and association and there is no 
democratic solution to a society that refuses to consent to living together. Secondly, electoral 
competition is itself a very divisive process, which in the absence of cross-cutting loyalties 
may exacerbate social divisions. 
Similarly, Leftwich (2000: 143-145) also discusses sharp “national”, ethnic, cultural or 
religious differences as “obstacles” to democratic consolidation and argues that they must be 
provided for carefully if democracies are to survive. Linz and Stepan (1996: 23-27) call 
heterogeneity a “surmountable obstacle”. They argue that prospects for democratic consoli-
dation in a heterogeneous context can be improved by inclusive and equal citizenship and a 
state-mandated and state-enforced set of individual rights. Crafters of democracy may also 
consider nonmajoritarian measures such as federalism, publicly supported communal 
institutions and proportional representation (Linz and Stepan 1996: 26). 
In a similar vein, Berg-Schlosser (2008: 276) operationalises heterogeneity. He proposes that 
the ethnic/linguistic constellation in a state may be more or less conflict-prone. Particularly, 
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he suggests that populations in which one group is clearly numerically dominant but where 
other significant groups exist, are considered the most at risk of conflict. But he, too, 
emphasizes that “it is not ethnic or religious affiliation or identity as such, but the way these 
are translated into the political processes that determined the potential conflict of these 
groups” (Berg-Schlosser 2008: 289).  
Conflict and democratic breakdown in heterogeneous states is thus not inevitable, but if 
democracies are to endure and consolidate, heterogeneity should be borne in mind and 
carefully provided for in institutional design. This is particularly important in Africa, where 
postcolonial states are often home to diverse and/or antagonistic groups. It is not 
heterogeneity as such, but the political polarization along social fault lines that it may 
produce, that obstructs democratic endurance and consolidation. Botswana is more 
homogeneous than South Africa, as will be explained later. 
2.2.2.6. Middle Class  
The notion that a large middle class is important for the consolidation of democracy was 
postulated by modernization theorists such as Barrington Moore (1959). Moore considered a 
large middle class not only a beneficial factor but an essential prerequisite for 
democratisation. Therefore the statement: “No bourgeois, no democracy” (Moore 1966: 
418). This class, “a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers” in Moore’s (1996: 418) 
phrasing, was to Moore an independent variable upon which the dependent variable, 
democracy, depended (Breytenbach 2005: 53).  
The implication of Moore’s statement is that democratic consolidation requires not merely 
affluence or economic growth, but (the development of) an economic structure that creates 
and sustains a socio-economic class with an interest in, and the means to, support democracy 
(Beetham 1994: 166). This essentially implies a diversified capitalist economy. Linz and 
Stepan (1996: 21-23) also discuss the importance of capitalist development for the 
consolidation of democracy. According to Rueschemeyer, Stevens and Stevens (1992, quoted 
in Beetham 1994: 166-167), capitalism is conducive to the survival of democracy inasmuch as 
it has two effects: a reduction of the power of large landowners on the one hand and the 
development of a substantial urbanized working class on the other. It is in the context of 
urbanisation that civil society arises as voluntary associations separate from the state.  
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Rueschemeyer, Stevens and Stevens (1992, quoted in Beetham 1994: 166-167) differ from 
Moore by including urban workers in their definition of the middle class and excluding 
“capital”, or big business (Breytenbach 1996: 21-22). This results in some conceptual 
confusion, but it is clear that the middle class does not constitute the very poor or the top 
elites. With regards to the inclusion of workers and big business, Breytenbach (1996: 21-22) 
suggests that the class of big business might be good consolidators because of their vested 
interest in the status quo (i.e. stability – whether democratic or not), while the smaller middle 
classes and the workers may play an important role in democratization itself, perhaps 
through the workings of civil society. Since both groups will expect government to serve 
their interests, a democracy must possess two further attributes if it is to consolidate. The 
first is sufficient national wealth to satisfy the demands of both capital and labour, and the 
second is a democratic political system in which both groups can be represented 
(Rueschemeyer, Stevens and Stevens 1992, quoted in Beetham 1994: 167). In the absence of 
such conditions, one of the classes may be alienated and be tempted to support authoritarian 
alternatives. 
Beetham (1994: 167) ends his discussion by pointing out that the organised working class in 
developing democracies are generally relatively small. Therefore, it is important to pay 
attention to members of all economic strata “whose conditions of social activity incline them 
to defend the freedoms of association, expression, and so on” that democracy promises, and 
not only organised economic interests. In the absence of a strong middle class, a democratic 
coalition between class interests and such groups may be essential, hence the importance of 
“civil society”, which can now be discussed. 
2.2.2.7. Civil Society  
Civil society is defined as associations that are independent from government and organized 
by individuals in pursuit of their own ends (Heywood 2007: 8). Diamond (1999: 221) adds 
some more attributes. For him, civil society is “the realm of organized social life that is open, 
voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting […]. It is distinct from “society” in 
general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere” (Diamond 1999: 
221). Civil society operates within the rule of law and forms an intermediary level between 
the state and the private sphere.  
Leftwich (2000: 146-147), Diamond (1999: 218-260), Linz and Stepan (1996: 17) and Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997:254) stress the importance of a rich and pluralistic civil society for 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2: Concepts The impact of HIV and AIDS on Democratic Consolidation   
 41 
the survival of democracy. Berg-Schlosser (2008: 290) finds that the correlation between 
democratic survival and press freedom is highly significant. However, Chazan (1992: 282) 
speaks of the “missing middle” and Bayart (1993) of the “bourgeois illusion” in African 
democracies, pointing to the fact that civil society is often worrisomely absent.  
Civil society is usually organised in urban environments and mostly draws its members from 
the middle and working classes, but certain civil society organisations can also encompass all 
classes. Churches are a good example (Breytenbach 1996: 22). Other examples include youth 
groups, trade unions, the independent media and interest groups (Leftwich 2000: 145).  
The value of civil society is that it both pressures the state and restrains an over-active state, 
“thereby strengthen[ing] the assumptions and practices of democratic self-management in 
complex societies” (Leftwich 2000: 146). Scholars discuss several ways in which civil society 
influences democratic consolidation; four will be listed here. The first is that civil society 
adopts the role of checking, monitoring and restraining state power and keeping it 
accountable (Linz and Stepan 1996: 18; Diamond 1999: 240; Chazan 1992: 283). This is 
possible because through membership of civil society organisations, “citizens acquire a 
source of power which does not derive directly from [the state] and is not dependant [sic] on 
it” (Friedman 2003: 10). In this way civil society organizations can play an especially 
important role in checking corruption in young democracies (Diamond 1999: 240). Second, 
civil society does not only contain state power but also legitimates state authority (Chazan 
1992: 283; Linz and Stepan 1996: 18), because by definition, their purpose is neither to seize 
government nor to dispute the legitimacy of the democratic regime. In fact, they often take it 
upon themselves to educate citizens for democracy (Diamond 1999: 243). Third, civil society 
contributes to the consolidation of democracy by stimulating political participation, 
increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens and promoting an 
appreciation of the obligations as well as rights of democratic citizens (Diamond 1999: 242). 
In short, civil society groups can act as “large free schools” of democracy (Tocqueville, 
quoted in Diamond 1999: 242). Finally, civil society groups provide multiple channels, in 
addition to political parties, for political engagement, which is of particular value for 
marginalized groups (Diamond 1999: 243).  
However, Steven Friedman (2003) warns that it is inappropriate to elevate civil society to a 
“repository of unquestioned virtue”. Because civil society derives its independence from 
freedom of association, subjective observers will see civil society to comprise the “virtuous 
and the vicious, the progressive and the retrogressive, the enlightened and the misguided”. 
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Therefore he argues that, instead of considering civil society, its constituent elements (such 
as the media, churches and trade unions) or members (individuals or organizations) of these 
groups virtuous in any specific way, it is more correct to argue that its existence has virtuous 
effects (as listed in the previous paragraph). Furthermore, he emphasizes that representivity 
is not a property of civil society and that civil society organizations are not necessarily 
internally democratic (Friedman 2003: 9). The democratic state, through general elections, 
remains the only body with a proven mandate to decide for entire societies (Friedman 2003: 
10-11). It must therefore also “check” the power of civil society.  
As the above discussion demonstrates, the relationship between civil society and the state is 
an important one. For Linz and Stepan (1996: 17-18) it is especially important that civil 
society and political society do not oppose each other, but that their complementary roles are 
recognised by state and civil society alike. On the other hand, they must not cooperate so 
well as to become indistinguishable. State and civil society are not alternatives to each other – 
“beneficial outcomes are possible only if both elements of the equation are capacitated” 
(Friedman 2003: 8). Leftwich (2000: 147) emphasises that the co-optation of civil society 
groups by dominant one-party states is a dangerous trend in Third Wave democracies. In 
South Africa, powerful trade unions as a component of civil society are partners in the ruling 
“tripartite alliance”, which raises questions about its co-optation by the state. Maundeni 
(2004) also argues that the BDP has managed to co-opt several key civil society members and 
groups, thus undermining their authority. 
2.3.  The Multivariate Model of a minimalist kind 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 221-225) construct multivariate models to explain the 
extent of transitions and democratization in African regimes from independence to 1989. 
They find that democratization can be explained to a great extent with reference to only a 
minimal set of variables. The four variables most significant to explaining democratic 
transition were all institutional (these were, during the pre-democratization phase: the 
number of military interventions, the number of elections, the frequency of political protest 
and the percentage of seats in the legislature (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 224). 
However, the authors expect that socio-structural factors gain greater explanatory power 
with regards to democratic consolidation (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 237). The model 
used in this study is therefore not an adoption of theirs, but also accepts a modest, 
minimalist set of variables, including both institutional and socio-economic variables of the 
kind used by Przeworski, et al. (1996) and Leftwich (2000). 
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This chapter has discussed the concept of democratic consolidation, describing it as a 
process of legitimation and safeguarding against breakdown and erosion. In terms of a direct 
effect on democratic consolidation, scholars do not argue that AIDS is directly effecting an 
outright reversion to autocracy in either state. Furthermore, neither Botswana nor South 
Africa is likely to pass Huntington’s two-turnover test soon and the ruling parties remain 
dominant despite HIV and AIDS. We must therefore choose more indirect factors of 
democratic endurance/consolidation upon which the pandemic has an impact. Taken 
together, its impact on these factors may rather contribute to democratic erosion, a slow death 
of democracy. 
The first institutional factor that was discussed is the legislative system. When it comes to 
presidentialism and parliamentarianism, parliamentarianism is generally considered 
preferable. South Africa and Botswana both have parliamentary systems in which a president 
is elected by parliament (RSA 1996: S86 (1); Botswana: 1966: S32 (3)). These presidents are 
heads of state and of the executive (RSA 1996: S83; S85; Botswana 1966: S30; S47), but they 
and their cabinets are formally accountable to parliament (RSA 1996: S92; Botswana 1966: 
S50 (1)). Butler (2005: 16) points to an absence of multiple impediments to prolonged abuse 
of executive power in South Africa. In other words, although parliamentary, the South 
African governmental system allows its president executive power greater than that 
commonly vested in the prime minister and therefore some of the “perils of presidentialism” 
(such as a divisive succession contest, or a weakened cabinet) may arguably still emerge.  
Another institution to consider is choice of electoral system. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
Strand (2005), Strand, et al. (2005) and the study led and edited by Chirambo (2008) 
underscore the effect of AIDS on electoral processes. This is one of the most explicit and 
extensively investigated detrimental effects of HIV and AIDS on democracy, and since 
South Africa uses a PR system and Botswana an FPTP system, comparison of the effect of 
the pandemic on these two electoral systems is a key aspect of this study.  
It may also be fruitful to look at political rights and civil liberties, especially since South 
Africans relied on their civil liberties of freedom of expression, organisation and association 
in order to demand their constitutional right to life-saving ART. De Waal’s argument that 
international donors may develop inordinate influence on public policy, and that African 
governments could become primarily mechanisms for processing donor funds to provide 
ART to keep people alive, is also relevant to citizens’ political rights. 
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When it comes to socio-economic factors, a review of the literature in Chapter 1 concluded 
that AIDS is expected to reduce GDP growth and increase inequality, while there is 
disagreement about whether it will increase or decrease the growth of per capita incomes. All 
three factors (affluence, economic growth and inequality reduction) will be assessed to 
present a full picture of the impact of HIV and AIDS on economic trends in Botswana and 
South Africa. The impact of the pandemic inequality is also likely to impact the size and 
composition of the middle class, but this factor will not be studied in its entirety. 
As demonstrated in UN HDI ratings, human development is being profoundly affected by 
HIV and AIDS and should be assessed. Heterogeneity is a reality in both South Africa and 
Botswana, but a preliminary study of the relevant literature did not reveal expectations that 
the disease will affect the heterogeneous composition of these states in any significant way, 
or directly exacerbate tensions along social cleavages.  
Chapter 1 also discussed the different arguments of scholars with regards to the impact of 
HIV and AIDS on civil society in Africa. The effect of the pandemic on civil society in 
Botswana and South Africa will be studied and compared.  
The multivariate model of democratic consolidation will thus consist of 1) systems of 
parliamentary or presidential governance, 2) electoral systems, 3) political and civil liberties, 
4) affluence, economic growth and inequality reduction, 5) UN HDI and 6) civil society. 
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CHAPTER 3: BOTSWANA 
3.1. Background: HIV and AIDS in Botswana 
Botswana is a democracy whose political stability since independence is unparalleled in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Tsie 1996: 600). It is relatively affluent – the per capita income is high enough 
for its democratic form of government to be “impregnable” according to Przeworski, et al. 
(1996) rankings. HIV has spread through the population since the mid-1980s. Driven to a 
great extent by population mobility linked to trade and trucking routes (Molatole and Thaga 
2006: 26; 60), prevalence reached extremely high levels, especially in northern and (initially) 
urban areas, despite government’s extensive efforts to combat it. Prevalence has begun to 
decline slightly since the mid-2000s, but serious policy challenges remain.  
Botswana is a landlocked state with a population of 1.95 million in 2009 (World Bank 2011a). 
About 80% of the population speak Setswana and claim membership of one of eight Tswana 
tribes19. The Kgalakgadi desert covers a large part of the country. 
The area was declared the Protectorate of Bechuanaland under the British crown in 1885. 
Having declared the Protectorate mostly to prevent colonization or expansion into the area 
by others20, the British did not take an active interest in governing or developing the area. 
The Tswana chiefs were recognized as rulers21 with only a handful of new constraints (Holm 
1988: 183).  
Following the first parliamentary elections in 1965, which the Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) under Seretse Khama won by a landslide, Botswana peacefully gained independence 
from Britain in 1966. The BDP has been in power ever since and all elections have been 
declared free and fair by observers. The presidency has changed hands thrice: Khama was 
succeeded upon his death in office by Quett Ketumile Masire in 1980, who was succeeded by 
Festus Mogae in 1998, followed by Ian Khama (the son of Seretse Khama) in 2008. Support 
                                               
19 For a list of the eight Tswana tribes and the regions where they are dominant, see Robinson (2009: 1). 
20 The British perceived Germany in the west, Portugal in the east, and the northward expansion of the 
Afrikaners from the south as potential threats to road access between South Africa to areas of British 
interest further north; some Tswana chiefs also expressed the desire for protection (Colclough and 
McCarthy 1980: 12). 
21 The other ethnic groups of the region were thus denied separate ethnic representation. In independent 
Botswana the House of Chiefs also initially consisted only of Tswana chiefs, and “struggles for 
representation by [minority ethnic groups] have been countered by majoritarian efforts to maintain the 
status quo of an inherited colonial hierarchy of ethnic groupings” (Nyamnjoh 2003: 107). 
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for democracy is consistently high among the population of Botswana and has resurged in 
2008 after a gradual decline over the preceding decade (Afrobarometer 2009c).  
A mostly agricultural economy at independence in 1966, diamonds and other minerals were 
discovered in Botswana shortly after independence. Under the leadership of Seretse Khama, 
a profitable long-term partnership was established between the government and Debswana 
(the Botswana branch of the De Beers mining corporation). A regime of fiscal and monetary 
discipline created an attractive environment for foreign investment, so that Botswana 
managed to achieve sustained economic growth, boasting an average annual growth rate of 
5.9% for the period 1975-2005 (Robinson 2009: 2; Leith 2005: 120-122). The government 
continues to receive substantial diamond revenues, which it has spent on public priorities 
such as health, education and welfare provision (Thomson 2004: 102). To a lesser extent, the 
economy also features beef exports and tourism, but it remains largely undiversified, 
rendering it vulnerable to shocks in the diamond market. This vulnerability was recently 
demonstrated as the country’s diamond production fell by 90 percent amid the global 
financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 and the government ran a deficit of 14 percent 
(Gaothlobogwe 2011). Thereafter diamond sales have reached historically unprecedented 
levels (Mguni 2011). Diamond and mineral production, although still lucrative for some 
decades, is expected to decline as reserves are depleted. 
In this relatively stable and prosperous democracy, the first case of HIV was reported in the 
mining town of Selebi-Phikwe in 1985 (Molatole and Thaga 2006: 23). Thereafter, incidence 
escalated rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s to stabilize at an adult prevalence level 
second only to Swaziland (see Figure 3). Barnett and Whiteside (2008: 137) find some 
explanation for this in the fact that Botswana was and remains characterized by rapid 
economic growth, an expanding transport network, population mobility, urbanisation, cross-
border trade and inequality, all of which are characteristics of a risk environment for the 
spread of HIV. Molatole and Thaga (2006: 27-29) echo most of these points and also 
emphasise stigma and denial, the subordination of women and the influx of refugees from 
neighbouring states. Stegling (2004: 230) suggests that most answers offered for the rapid 
spread of the virus through Botswana provides only a partial explanation and that further 
analysis of this topic is needed.  
Today, prevalence is higher in northern and northeastern areas than in southern and western 
areas – demonstrating that the pandemic spread to Botswana from the north, through trade 
and trucking routes – and in urban rather than more traditional and sparsely populated rural 
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areas (Barnett and Whiteside 2006: 132; Molatole and Thaga 2006: 25-26). Prevalence levels 
were significantly higher in urban than in rural areas until recently, but today, the distinction 
between rural and urban prevalence levels is not clear anymore (Dorrington, Moultrie and 
Daniel 2006: 36; Mookodi, Ntshebe and Taylor 2011). The difference in infection between 
rural and urban areas narrowed significantly between 2004 and 2008, and is now, on the 
whole, within one percentage point from one another (17.1% in rural and 17.9% in urban 
areas) (UNAIDS 2010b: 11). As Figure 2 below demonstrates, HIV prevalence remains 
higher in major tourist destinations like Chobe and migrant labour centers like Selebi-Phikwe 
(Molatole and Thaga 2006: 26).  
 
Unlike many others in Africa, the government of Botswana was never in denial about HIV 
and AIDS. After the first AIDS case was reported, the government responded (though on a 
small scale) in 1986, by establishing the National AIDS Control Programme, followed by the 
development of a one-year Short Term Plan in 1987 and the initiation of the first broad-
Figure 2. HIV prevalence by district, Botswana, 2008 
Source: UNAIDS 2010b. 
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based Medium Term Plan (MTP I, 1987-1993). This plan was successful in educating a large 
percentage of the population about HIV transmission, but did not seem to make any impact 
on the alarmingly escalating incidence22 (UNDP 2000: 42).  
 
By 1995, adult HIV prevalence was estimated at 19% (see Figure 3). Recognizing the multi-
sectoral nature of the problem, the second Medium Term Plan (MTP II) which ran from 
1997 to 2003 was developed through broader consultation with stakeholders such as NGOs 
and private firms, and established many of the multi-sectoral coordination structures in 
operation today, including the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA). During this 
period, in 1998, Botswana pioneered the rollout of Prevention of Mother-to-Child 
Transmission (PMTCT) treatment; and in 2002 it launched a large-scale ART rollout 
programme called Masa (“new dawn” in Setswana). Mostly because of increased access to 
these medicines, in 2003 life expectancy began to increase for the first time since 1989 (as 
will be discussed in 3.3.2). The weaknesses of MTP II included a lack of clarity concerning 
the implementation responsibilities of different stakeholders. 
Thereafter followed the National Strategic Framework (NSF I) for 2003-2009. NSF I saw 
several achievements and new developments, including the introduction of Routine HIV 
Testing (the first such policy in Africa) and increased voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) 
centers. In this period the positive effects of Masa also began to be felt. Although progress 
was slow at first, and although the programme continued to need more medical practitioners 
                                               
22 The UN Development Report for Botswana (2000: 42) explains that the authorities in Botswana came to 
the following realization: “It does not matter how much information on HIV and AIDS is disseminated; 
how attentively it is absorbed; or how many condoms are supplied; [as long as the underlying factors of] 
poverty, financial dependence, inequality, gender discrimination and formidably defended social and 
cultural norms […] continue to exist at current levels, the epidemic will rage on.” 
Figure 3. HIV Prevalence: Botswana 1990-2007 (% of Adults aged 15-49) 
Source: UNAIDS/WHO 2008. 
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than are available (AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit 2007: 15), Masa has by now 
proven extremely successful, reaching universal access (more than 80%23 of those who need 
it) to ART and PMTCT (Avert 2011a). Botswana therefore boasts the most extensive public 
ART programme in Africa (Jefferis, Kinghorn, Siphambe and Thurlow 2008: 112). The 
effect of this success in treatment (if not incidence) plays out in several ways. The increase in 
ART coverage correlates vividly with a decline in tuberculosis (TB) (UNAIDS 2010c: 108). 
AIDS-related deaths have already peaked (Jefferis, et al. 2008: 114) and declined by more 
than half between 2002 and 2009. The estimated number of children newly orphaned fell by 
40% between 2002 and 2009 (UNAIDS 2010c: 29). Depending on the progression of their 
parents’ disease, many of these children have a chance of coming of age before their parents 
die of AIDS. Prevalence has also decreased: by 2004, adult prevalence had risen to 25.9%, 
but then it began to drop slowly, reaching 23.9% in 2007 (see Figure 3). Overall, there is now 
evidence that during the decade 2000-2010, prevalence declined among young people (aged 
15 to 24) and pregnant women presenting at antenatal clinics, while prevalence leveled off 
for other groups (UNAIDS 2010b: 10). 
The more important figure in the long run, of course, is not prevalence but incidence: the 
number of new infections, which determines the burden of HIV and AIDS sufferers the 
country must continue to bear in the future. An important problem in this regard is that 
Botswana’s young people (aged 15-24) lag behind their peers in other severely affected 
countries in their knowledge about HIV and AIDS transmission. Other prominent problems 
are multiple concurrency24 (UNAIDS 2010: 15) and continued widespread social stigma and 
denial. Still, 95% of respondents in a 2008 Botswana Afrobarometer survey think that the 
government is doing well or fairly well in handling HIV and AIDS, which makes it the aspect 
of service delivery with which the population is most satisfied (APO 2009). The second 
National Strategic Framework (NSF II), which will run from 2010-2016, was developed 
through wide consultation with stakeholders and has four aims: preventing new HIV 
infections; systems strengthening; strategic information management; and scaling up 
treatment, care and support. The government and HIV and AIDS stakeholders have set the 
target of “no new infections by 2016”.  
The next section will deal with the question of how the country’s institutions dealt with this 
pandemic. Clearly there must be lessons for others. 
                                               
23 Botswana’s coverage is over 95% of “those who need ART” if these individuals defined according to the 
WHO’s older guidelines, which were in place when Masa was initiated. See footnote 9. 
24 Multiple concurrency means having more than one sexual relationship that overlap over the same period 
of time.  
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3.2. Institutions 
3.2.1. System of government  
Botswana is a bicameral parliamentary democracy similar to the English system, but features 
a president who is by no means a “first among equals” like the prime minister in the 
Westminster system. Because Botswana’s system of government combines elements of both 
parliamentalism and presidentialism, the possible risks to democratic consolidation posed by 
both systems should be considered. This section mentions the most salient features of the 
system in Botswana and assesses literature regarding the impact of HIV and AIDS on this 
system.  
Section 58 of the constitution (amended 1992 and 2002) dictates that the National Assembly 
consist of 57 members of parliament (MPs), elected by the 57 constituencies; 4 seats co-
opted by parliament; the attorney-general; and the president. The second chamber is the 
House of Chiefs25 (Ntlo ya Dikgosi). Any National Assembly bill that is of tribal concern 
must be referred to the House of Chiefs for advisory (not binding) opinion (Kadima, 
Matlosa and Shale 2006: 10).  
The constitution grants the president of Botswana extensive powers (Freedom House 
2011b). From among the members of parliament the president appoints the vice president 
(subject to parliamentary approval) and cabinet, of which the president is the head. He (or 
she) is also commander in chief of the armed forces (French 2007: 5). The president alone 
appoints the Secretary of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and has the power to 
determine the date and time of the elections, arrangements to which members of the 
opposition have, predictably, objected (Good and Taylor 2005b: 64; Lekorwe and Tshosa 
2005: 52-56; Shale 2009: 64). The president also has the ability to dismiss parliament at any 
time.  
The president is not elected by the general electorate; instead, the presidential candidate 
supported by more than half of the MPs is declared president (as in prime ministerial 
parliamentary systems). This “indirect” election of a very powerful president has been a point 
of some contention (Maundeni 2005: 85), but still satisfies the majority: in 2008, 
                                               
25 The tradition of chieftaincy in Botswana, far from being obsolete in the democratic system, has 
“displayed a remarkable dynamism, adaptiveness and adaptability to new socio-economic and political 
developments” and remains relevant in Botswana today (see Nyamnjoh 2003: 93-114). 
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Afrobarometer found that 58% of citizens supported the current electoral system, as 
opposed to 41% who favoured direct presidential election (APO 2009).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the strongest objections against presidentialism are the high risk 
of legislative-executive deadlock; the high stakes of presidential elections; and the president’s 
fixed term of office (see Chapter 2). Because, in the case of Botswana, the ruling party in 
parliament effectively appoints the president, there is no risk of cohabitation which could 
lead to deadlock. This aspect of the system is typically parliamentary. However, the amount 
of power vested in the president is far greater than that vested in a typical prime minister and 
this has shaped politics in Botswana; and the president’s fixed term in office has caused 
controversy because all presidents have either died or retired before the end of their term, as 
will be discussed later. The influence of HIV and AIDS on these dynamics will now be 
discussed. 
The president of Botswana is allegedly powerful enough that there have been instances 
where each president has broken the law without serious repercussions. In a work about 
“growing authoritarianism in Botswana”, Taylor (2005: 3) argues that Seretse Khama, Masire 
and Mogae have not hesitated to “subordinate the law and the constitution to the political 
exigencies of the time” (although Freedom House ratings, which will be discussed below, 
indicate that they have done so within limits). Taylor lists several examples, but none of them 
are related to these presidents’ handling of HIV and AIDS.  
In fact, the powerful position of the president may have strengthened the ability of Mogae, 
whose term coincided with the height of HIV prevalence in the country, to become an 
influential “AIDS activist” himself. The beginning of his presidency in 1998 marked 
unprecedented governmental commitment to combating the disease. Writing the foreword to 
the 2000 United Nations Development Report on Botswana, the then president expressed 
his understanding of the disease as an unprecedented national challenge to which his 
government was committed, with the aim of achieving “an AIDS-Free generation in our 
lifetime” (Mogae 2000: V-VI). Mogae also vowed never to speak in public without 
mentioning HIV and AIDS and publicly took an HIV test in 2003 (Heald 2006: 11). Under 
his leadership, Botswana established a public-private partnership called the African 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP) in 2001 to cooperate with international 
organisations and companies such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Merck 
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Pharmaceuticals26. ACHAP aimed not only to channel a great amount of resources into HIV 
and AIDS efforts but to encourage a new openness in the place of stigma around the disease 
(Heald 2006: 7). Despite this external injection, in 2006, the government under Mogae 
funded at least 70% of the national HIV and AIDS effort (Heald 2006: 8) and Khama 
announced that 90% of HIV and AIDS funding in 2007 came from domestic resources 
(Khama 2008a). As far as the available literature indicates, the president did not use the 
pandemic as an excuse for marginalising the opposition or civil society groups. It was during 
the presidency of Mogae that the second Medium Term Plan (MTP II) saw the inclusion of 
hitherto excluded stakeholders such as NGOs and private firms in policy development and 
implementation.  
Only one incident of an unlawful extension of presidential power is linked to the pandemic. 
The executive, in return for unspecified American HIV and AIDS funding, signed an 
agreement not to hand over American soldiers accused of war crimes. Parliament was not 
given a chance to debate this decision (Osei-Hwedie and Sebudubudu 2004: 36). This is an 
example of, firstly, the strength of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature, and secondly, the 
decreased bargaining power of an AIDS-ridden state dependent on international assistance, 
which Mattes (2003: 6) and De Waal (2006: 114) argued could erode state policymaking 
autonomy and legitimacy. Yet it seems to have been an isolated case. 
Aside from this example, if HIV and AIDS exacerbated the problem of an over-powerful 
president, it was primarily by giving him an opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to 
the cause, possibly gaining legitimacy that allowed him to act forcefully in other policy areas. 
Even Good and Taylor (2005a; also 2007a, in a scathing article entitled “The Bitter Freedom 
of Festus Mogae”), do not mention HIV and AIDS in their enumeration of the president’s 
failings.  
As for Mogae’s successor, Ian Khama demonstrates a clear understanding of the issues 
confronting the country in terms of HIV and AIDS. He has particularly emphasized that the 
next challenge is to curb incidence and not merely care for the already infected, and called on 
citizens to change their behaviour and heed the call of “O Icheke [check yourself], break the 
chain of sexual partners and HIV infection”27 (Khama 2009). Although there might be 
                                               
26 Other partners include the Harvard Institute, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
WHO, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and SADC (Molatole and Thaga 2006: 33). 
27 The practice of having multiple concurrent partnerships is an important factor in driving the epidemic in 
Botswana (UNAIDS 2010c: 3). 
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concerns that the new president is increasingly authoritarian, it is hard to establish causality 
between his behaviour and the problem of HIV and AIDS. 
We now turn to the dynamic of the president’s fixed term of office. Linz (1990: 54) points 
out that “[i]t is a paradox of presidential government that while it leads to the personalization 
of power, its legal mechanisms may also lead, in the event of a sudden midterm succession, 
to the rise of someone whom the ordinary electoral process would never have made the chief 
of state.” This, critics argue, is a core feature of politics in Botswana. Masire, Mogae and 
Khama all held the position of vice president and were automatically declared president at 
the death in office (in the case of Seretse Khama) or retirement of their predecessors, before 
being elected president in the subsequent elections. This, labeled the practice of “automatic 
elitist succession” by Good and Taylor (2005b), has come under fire since it enables the 
president, in appointing his deputy, also in effect to appoint his successor. It thus excludes 
parliament from the succession process (at least until the end of the retired president’s term). 
No studies suggest a link between HIV and AIDS and presidential succession. 
Having examined the impact of HIV and AIDS on the presidential elements of Botswana’s 
system of government, we turn now to parliamentary elements. In parliamentary systems 
there is a degree of fusion between the legislature and executive: in Botswana the executive 
(cabinet) is drawn from, and accountable to, the legislature. In theory, these groups are 
dependent for their functioning upon mutual support: the constitution grants parliament the 
power to pass a vote of no confidence in the president and his government (Part V Section 
59) and in turn also allows the president to dissolve parliament at any time (Part V Section 
91). Both actions would result in new elections. The provision that the legislature may 
dismiss the executive is, however, rarely a practical consideration in Botswana. Members of 
parliament (MPs) are generally at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the executive, as they lack the 
necessary expertise to draft bills, and the executive is inclined rather to formulate policy 
based on the professional expertise and recommendations of the civil service (Sebudubudu 
and Osei-Hwedie 2006: 38). What is more, executive ministers are not directly called to 
account in parliament; instead, the permanent secretaries (who are civil servants) appear 
before the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2006: 39).  
The president’s power to dissolve the parliament, on the other hand, has been a political 
consideration at certain turns, such as when Mogae threatened to dissolve parliament if it 
opposed his controversial appointment of Khama as deputy president (Good and Taylor 
2005a: 10). Scholars conclude that – as is the case almost always, and worldwide – cabinet 
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and the bureaucracy occupy stronger positions than parliament (Sebudubudu and Osei-
Hwedie 2006: 37-38). Given the executive’s relatively “spotless” effort to address HIV and 
AIDS, led by the president, the crisis has not afforded much opportunity for this relationship 
to change. One could even argue that the strength of the executive was beneficial to 
Botswana, as the government responded admirably to the pandemic.  
3.2.2. Electoral system 
Botswana employs an FPTP electoral system consisting of 57 single-member constituencies. 
The country has since independence functioned as a multiparty democracy in which one 
party is dominant. The BDP has (in ten elections) consistently won decisive majorities in 
parliament28. Although opposition parties (led by the Botswana National Front (BNF) since 
1979) are weak and prone to infighting, scholars argue that these failings are not the only 
reason for their consistent losses at the polls. There is reason to argue that political parties in 
Botswana, like those in Georgia, Malaysia and Malawi, compete on an “uneven playing field” 
that is skewed in the ruling party’s favour (Levitsky and Way 2010). The ruling party’s 
unequal and opaque access to resources, as well as its partisan use of state media, is 
important matters in this regard (Taylor 2005: 11-13; Saleshando 2009). The problem is 
compounded by urbanisation and the geographical division of constituencies, which grants 
disproportionate weight to rural constituencies (Holm 1996, quoted in Osei-Hwedie and 
Sebudubudu 2005: 42). Since independence the ruling BDP dominated rural constituencies 
with fewer voters, as opposed to opposition parties who captured many urban constituencies 
with more voters. This led to disproportionality of representation. 
A comparison of votes cast and seats allocated may illustrate this point. The BDP’s 
popularity was on the decline from 1984 to 2004, as it obtained a smaller and smaller 
percentage of the vote in each successive election: it obtained 75% in 1979, a majority which 
declined to only 51% in 2004. Under a proportional representation system the opposition 
parties would thus have come close to being able to form a ruling coalition, and potentially 
forcing the BDP to demonstrate the extent of its commitment to a democratic system that it 
does not control. Such a turnover would be regarded as an important indicator of democratic 
consolidation (although Huntington insists on a double turnover before a country is regarded 
as entirely consolidated – see Chapter 2). Under the current system, the BDP won 65% of 
the vote yet was awarded 91% of parliamentary seats in the 1989 election; but when it won a 
                                               
28 A table of the outcomes of all parliamentary elections from 1965 to 2004 is available in Molomo (2005: 
32-33). 
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mere 51% of the vote it was awarded 77% of seats in 2004 (Molomo 2005: 32-33). In the 
2009 election the BDP’s popularity increased marginally for the first time since 1974. It won 
52% of the vote but 79% (45 out of 57) of the seats (IEC Botswana 2011.).  
The discrepancy is largely explained by noting that, as mentioned above, the opposition 
draws its support mostly from urban areas while the increasingly sparsely populated rural 
areas are usually BDP strongholds – indeed 80% of seats in parliament represent rural areas 
while more than half the population is now urbanized29. Under the FPTP system, rural and 
urban constituencies carry the same weight regardless of the size of the population they 
represent, sending one MP each to parliament – even if urban constituencies include 
considerably more voters. The vastly disproportionate translation of votes into seats is the 
clearest motivation for calls for electoral reform away from disproportionate constituencies. 
The fact that, until recently, HIV prevalence was also considerably higher in urban than rural 
areas would be one more reason to argue that rural and urban constituencies need to be 
equally represented to parliament in terms of population size. 
Calls for electoral reform have emanated from the opposition, civil society and academia (see 
Molomo 2005; 2007; Matlosa 2004; Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005: 7-9). If an 
alternative system is suggested, it is usually Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) (for 
instance, Molomo 2004 and Matlosa 2004). However, the general population is comfortable 
with the system: in 2008, 66% of respondents believed that the electoral process worked 
either well or very well in ensuring that Parliament reflected the will of the voters (APO 
2009). In other words, proponents of electoral reform are so far unsuccessful in convincing a 
population that tends to “go with the flow when it comes to politics” (Cook and Sarkin 2010: 
477), that their democracy leaves room for improvement in this regard. This may be part of 
the reason why civil society in Botswana remains rather weak. 
Whether the issue of electoral reform enjoys attention or not, its supporters do not explicitly 
cite the influence of HIV and AIDS on the viability of FPTP as a motivation for their 
campaign. Yet Per Strand (2005: 7) made the point that proportional representation (PR) is 
superior to FPTP in the context of HIV and AIDS because FPTP requires holding by-
elections when an MP needs to be replaced between general elections, whereas with PR, the 
                                               
29 Sources vary on the rate of urbanization in Botswana. Depending on methodology and data sources, the 
urban population as a percentage of the total population has respectively been estimated at 48% (Barnett 
and Whiteside 2008: 137), 73% (Thomson 2004: 104), 57% (World Bank 2010b – data for 2005); and 60% 
(Unicef 2010) in the last decade. What is evident is that rapid urbanisation is occurring and that the urban 
population - however it is measured - can be expected to grow even larger in relation to the rural 
population. 
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next person on the party list may simply be appointed to parliament. As stated in Chapter 1, 
Strand (2005) argued that the disadvantages of a (possibly AIDS-induced) increase in by-
elections include increased expense for the treasury; a reduced voter turnout and weaker 
mandate for the winner of the by-election and a possible increase in the ruling party’s power. 
The important study led and edited by Chirambo (2008) on the political cost of AIDS in 
Southern African states, which tested the abovementioned hypotheses, did however not 
cover Botswana. This study therefore draws upon the work of Gossett and Lotshwao (2010), 
who studied the impact of AIDS on electoral systems in Botswana specifically. 
Strand’s (2005) argument (above) about the preferability of PR over FPTP systems in the 
context of HIV and AIDS was based upon the expectation that the pandemic would cause 
the death of a significant number of elected representatives. Bearing this in mind, Gossett 
and Lotshwao (2010) studied the reasons why MPs in Botswana vacated their seats between 
1965 and 2009. Too few parliamentarian by-elections had taken place to allow patterns to 
emerge – 21 in the 44-year period covered. Only four of the by-elections between 1984 and 
2009 (the period in which HIV was known to be present in Botswana) were due to the death 
of the representative. During this period only once, between 1995 and 1999, did two MPs die 
in the same term. Both these men had at least 20 years’ experience in politics behind them 
and the authors suggest that their deaths could just as easily have been because of other 
diseases related to aging rather than because of AIDS. There is thus no evidence that a single 
MP has died of AIDS. 
On the local level, in contrast, the authors found a clear trend as they studied 160 by-
elections for district council and town council positions. Since 1994, deaths as a percentage 
of all members have reached higher levels than ever before. The period 1999 to 2004 saw an 
unprecedented spike in deaths as a percentage of councillors from 4.4% to 6.9% (see Figure 
4). However in the period 2004 to 2009, deaths as a percentage of positions declined again 
(to 5.9%), but were still more than any period before 1999 (this roughly corresponds with the 
increasing availability of ART). Thus the FPTP system is not necessarily a threat to 
parliamentary democracy at national level in Botswana, but it may have a significant influence 
on local government, especially where prevalence is high (in mining towns, tourist 
destinations and on the trade routes).  
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The impact of an increase in by-elections needs further investigation, but the researchers 
made the following points. Firstly, the government of Botswana is reportedly spending an 
unprecedented amount on by-elections (it was estimated in 2008 that each by-election costs 
the government $18 900) (Gossett and Lotshwao 2010). In a poorer country, this could have 
been devastating, while no costs would be incurred in a PR system. Secondly, Gossett and 
Lotshwao find no evidence that by-elections advantage the ruling party; the BDP lost more 
seats than it won in local by-elections between 1990 and 2009, the period during which 
AIDS was widespread throughout the population. The researchers did not investigate 
whether there was lower voter turnout at by-elections (as is usually the case). Ultimately the 
question is whether the pandemic has reduced the legitimacy of the local government 
electoral system or elected candidates in the eyes of voters – such an impact could be 
determined using surveys.  
Besides electoral system legitimacy, Leftwich (2000:138) also notes that the electorate must 
consider the outcome of the elections legitimately free and fair. Thinking along the same 
lines, Strand (2005: 4) warns that HIV and AIDS affect both electoral systems (as discussed 
above) and electoral governance. He anticipates, for instance, increased trouble with keeping 
the voters’ roll up to date and higher turnover of electoral management board (EMB) staff; 
the related loss of continuity and the need to accommodate large numbers of sick voters (see 
also, Youde 2001).  
Figure 4: Deaths as a Percentage of Total Membership on Botswana District and 
Town Councils 
Source: Gossett and Lotshwao (2010: 13). 
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We turn now to the experience of electoral governance in practice. Elections in Botswana 
have been held every five years since 1965 and have always been declared free and fair by 
observers. After complaints about the lack of an independent electoral body (Shale 2009: 63), 
a referendum was held in 1997 and the constitution was subsequently amended to lower the 
voting age from 21 to 18; to create an absentee ballot (for citizens outside Botswana at 
voting time); and to establish an independent electoral commission (IEC) (Molomo 2005: 34-
35). The reforms of 1997 ended the most salient complaints about the transparency of 
electoral governance – but at the same time, HIV prevalence was nearing its peak, posing new 
challenges, particularly as it is among the 15-49 years age group that HIV infection is the 
most prevalent. (As mentioned, AIDS mortality has peaked, and declined dramatically after 
2002.) 
For one there is the problem of enabling a large percentage of voters who are sick to cast 
their vote. In Botswana those who are too sick to register for voting have the right to request 
the local registration officer to register for them, but Youde (2001: 15) expressed his doubts 
with regards to the practicality of this system. Those who provide care for the sick may also 
be excluded if multiple trips are required in order to register and vote. However, PLWHA are 
not a vocal pressure group in Botswana and there is no research specifically indicating the 
number of PLWHA who vote and whether they face particular challenges. The new IEC 
brought out short reports on the elections of 1999 and 2004, but these did not mention the 
influence of the disease. Nor has the IEC acknowledged any problems with recruitment or a 
loss of institutional memory. 
Given little detailed research into the impact of HIV and AIDS on electoral governance, we 
may look at the overall legitimacy of the elections in the eyes of Botswana’s voters. In 1999, 
at the height of the pandemic, a combined 83% of citizens of Botswana expressed 
confidence that the recent national elections was both free and fair, or free and fair but with 
some minor problems. They expressed even higher confidence in the 2004 elections, the 
combined total coming to 84% in 2005 and 86% in 2008 (Afrobarometer 2009c: 10). A great 
majority of citizens therefore consider electoral governance legitimate despite the problems 
discussed here – in fact, their trust in the system has recently increased.  
To conclude, firstly, a study of the impact of HIV and AIDS within the FPTP system in 
Botswana does not present a particularly strong case for electoral reform at the national level 
(although disproportionate urban/rural HIV prevalence could formerly have presented such 
a case). It is not certain that a single MP has died of AIDS. However, local government has 
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been seriously affected and the legitimacy of district and town councils should be 
investigated. Secondly, there has been little attention paid to the challenges that Botswana 
faces in electoral governance in an era of AIDS. For now, the public approves of electoral 
governance, and the potential administrative pitfalls listed by Strand (2005: 4) and Youde 
(2001) have not yet come to light. With Botswana now achieving universal access to ART 
and mortality rates having peaked (see the introduction to this chapter), the worst may 
already be over. 
3.2.3. Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that the degree of respect afforded to political rights and civil 
liberties influences democratic consolidation, both by definition and causally. If HIV and 
AIDS influence citizens’ ability to enjoy these rights, whether positively or negatively, it can 
be said to influence democratic consolidation in the same direction.  
Because of limitations in terms of time and length, this study cannot present information on 
all aspects of civil rights and political liberties in Botswana. The country’s Freedom House 
scores are presented here in order to give an overall impression of the freedoms citizens have 
enjoyed since independence, followed by a brief overview of current human rights issues. 
Thereafter the focus shifts to those rights and liberties that have reportedly been affected by 
HIV and AIDS. 
Botswana has been rated Free since 1974 (Freedom House ratings are available from 1973) 
and scored 2 for both political rights and civil liberties from 1995 to 2009. Botswana’s score 
for political rights declined in 2010 from 2 to 3 due to “decreased transparency and 
accountability in the executive branch under President Seretse Khama Ian Khama30” 
(Freedom House 2010a). Political rights related to democratic participation (such as the right 
to vote or to compete for public office) have not explicitly been violated (see also, the 
section on electoral systems above). The decreased rating is probably more related to the 
president’s style of governance and the hand of his executive in controversial events, 
described below, than with HIV and AIDS directly. 
Although the government of Botswana generally respects citizens’ civil liberties, as enshrined 
in Chapter II of the constitution, a long-standing dispute over the plight of the Basarwa (also 
                                               
30 Seretse Khama Ian Khama, or Ian a Sêrêtsê, is the full name of the president. 
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called the San or Bushmen)31 has clouded its civil liberties record. Further question marks 
over the government’s otherwise relatively respectful treatment of citizens have become 
more common in the last decade (Good and Taylor 2007b). A recent spate of extrajudicial 
killings by security forces were allegedly ordered by the recent Khama administration 
(Freedom House 2010a). With regards to freedom of speech the private media in Botswana, 
although available since 1982 (Holm and Darnolf 2000: 136), has never been on equal par 
with state-owned media, partly due to a lack of funds. There are reports that the government 
occasionally has censored or restricted the public media and accused the private media, when 
it was critical of the government, of being unpatriotic and “rallying behind the enemy” 
(Reporters Without Borders 2006). A Media Practitioners Act, which requires all media 
workers to register with a committee that reports to the government, was passed in 2008. 
Furthermore, the National Security Act of 1986 has been used only against journalists and 
trade unionists. (This implies the silencing of civil society.) Despite these apparent 
infringements upon freedom of speech, a combined 83% of respondents in the 2008 
Afrobarometer survey felt “completely free” to say what they think (Afrobarometer 2009c: 
11). None of these matters – the plight of the Basarwa; the alleged extrajudicial killings; and 
the occasionally restricted media environment – have been linked directly to HIV and AIDS. 
In 2007, a study (AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit 2007) highlighted legal aspects of 
Botswana’s HIV and AIDS policy and practices. The right to privacy of PLWHA is 
protected, and the disease is not legally notifiable in the public health system, although 
record is kept of infection levels for planning purposes (AIDS and Human Rights Research 
Unit 2007: 16-17). In 2000, the Court of Appeal has set a precedent whereby constitutional 
protection from discrimination extends to PLWHA (AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit 
2007: 20-21). Until recently the government has tested potential civil service employees of 
foreign nationality for HIV, implying that the state could discriminate on the basis of HIV 
status. Government-sponsored students intending to study abroad; persons convicted of 
rape and potential employees of some private firms (such as Debswana) were also subjected 
to compulsory HIV testing. Such practices were rendered illegal by recent legislation 
including the Employment Act of 2010 (Freedom House 2011b) and the Public Service Act 
(see the section on civil society below). Moreover, according to some legal scholars, the law 
does not sufficiently protect women from certain discriminatory customs that exacerbate 
                                               
31 The Basarwa were forcibly evicted from their ancestral lands in 2002. After winning a court case, they 
were allowed to resettle there in 2006, but it took two more battles in court for them to be re-allowed 
access to a well in the vicinity, of which the government had taken control after their eviction. Five judges 
in the High Court (which serves as the court of appeal) unanimously ruled against the government in 
January 2011, stating that denying the Basarwa access to their well amounted to “degrading” treatment 
(Survival International 2011). 
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their political and economic subjugation to men and which exacerbates their risk of 
contracting HIV (AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit 2007: 24-26). Judged in context, 
Botswana has been relatively responsive to HIV and AIDS-related concerns with regards to 
political rights and civil liberties, as its policy initiatives and treatment interventions are the 
best in Africa.  
The right to medicine is not a basic political right or civil liberty (see Freedom House’s 
definition of these freedoms). The constitution does not explicitly guarantee the right to 
health, but it does guarantee the right to life (Part II Section 4). This, interpreted broadly, can 
be said to imply a governmental obligation to promote long life and eliminate epidemics 
(AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit 2007: 12). The government of Botswana itself 
established a link between the right to life and HIV and AIDS: in a report to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), the government of Botswana listed a range of 
health measures, including HIV and AIDS-related measures, that were implemented “[i]n 
order to increase life expectancy and promote the right to life” (HRC 2007: 30). It is 
therefore relevant that President Khama announced in 2008: “the level of [ART] response is 
unsustainable in the face of other competing development imperatives. At this rate, 
continued progress cannot be guaranteed.” Freedom House (2010a) also notes that in the 
light of recent revenue shortfalls the government announced a cutback on HIV and AIDS 
spending. By then (see Jefferis, et al. 2008: 114), AIDS mortality had peaked already (but this 
was possibly due to the extensive provision of ART after 2002). 
To conclude, political rights and civil liberties have been relatively well protected in 
Botswana despite HIV and AIDS. It has been argued that citizens have the right to ART 
based on their right to life, yet there are indications that the government’s commitment to 
the provision of ART could wane in future. That civil society, in its present weak position 
(see below), or the opposition (see above) will organise against the possibility of decreased 
AIDS spending, seems unlikely. Instead, the focus may fall on the courts. However, so far no 
steps have been made to decrease funding.  
3.3. Socio-economic factors 
3.3.1. Affluence, economic growth and inequality reduction 
Chapter 1 gave an overview of the expected economic effects of HIV and AIDS in Southern 
African countries. It was concluded that scholars anticipated that HIV and AIDS would 
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reduce African states’ GDP growth and increase inequality, while the impact on affluence (in 
terms of aggregate income per capita) was uncertain. Taking into account that theory 
(particularly that of Przeworski, et al. 1996) has linked these three macroeconomic factors to 
democratic consolidation, Mattes (2003) considers the economic effects of HIV and AIDS 
problematic for democratic consolidation, especially in poorer countries. An overview of 
Botswana’s status in terms of these factors will be presented here, followed by an assessment 
of how HIV and AIDS are believed to influence them. 
Botswana is considered an upper middle income country by the World Bank, and, in terms 
of this study, affluent. In 2010 it generated an estimated GDP (PPP) of $26.6 trillion (CIA 
World Factbook 2011) and in 2009 its GDP per capita (PPP)32 was estimated at $13 384 for 
2009 (World Bank 2010a). This level of per capita income places it above the level of $12 
195.78 beyond which democracies may, according to the Przeworski, et al. study (1996), be 
considered “impregnable”. Of course it is not impossible that a democracy may “die”33 at a 
higher level of affluence in the future. When considering such a possibility, the interplay 
between income per capita and other indicators of human development and institutional 
erosion is crucial – as will be explained hereunder. 
Botswana has registered impressive levels of economic growth (see Figure 5). The past 
decade has however seen fluctuations, with the country registering a 3.7% contraction in 
2009 due to global financial instability, followed by 7.2% growth in 2010 as the economy 
rebounded. These events confirm that the economy is vulnerable to external shocks, 
especially because it is heavily reliant on diamonds, from which analysts insist it must 
diversify if sustainable growth is to be attained (Siphambe 2011: 37; Benza 2011). 
                                               
32 The figures used by Przeworski, et al. (1996) were drawn from version 5.5 of the Penn World Tables. 
This table estimated states” gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP), using 1985 
as baseline. Newer versions of the Penn World Tables provide more recent data but their methodology 
differs from earlier versions, rendering Przeworski, et al.’s (1996) figures incomparable. However, it is 
assumed that the $6 000 level provided by Przeworski, et al. (1996) was not provided as a precise figure. 
33 The Przeworski, et al. study (1996: 39) used a minimal definition of democracy, counting as democratic 
“all regimes that hold elections in which the opposition has some chance of winning and taking office”. A 
transition to dictatorship, in which the abovementioned condition is no longer met, was treated as a 
democratic “death”. 
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Botswana has been quite unequal since independence. Holm and Darnolf (2000: 119) argue 
that the government has not attempted to change the distribution of income in the country 
and that inequality has remained at the same level since independence, or even worsened. 
Using Botswana’s Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES), Siphambe (2011: 54) 
produces the following Gini coefficients: 0.556 in 1985/6; 0.537 in 1993/4; and 0.573 in 
2002/3. He concludes that income inequality has increased marginally since the 1985/6 
study, meaning that Botswana’s high levels of economic growth have not benefited the poor 
as much as the wealthy. The country also suffers from high, stagnant unemployment (at 
17.6% in 2005/6), rooted in high population growth and slow job growth (Siphambe 2011: 
32; 47). 
Against this background, we may now focus on HIV and AIDS and the economy. 
Macroeconomic studies by BIDPA (2000), Bollinger and Stover (1999), Greener, Jefferis and 
Siphambe (2000), Masha (2004) and Jefferis, et al. (2008) investigate the macroeconomic 
impact of the pandemic in Botswana34. Of these, only the Masha (2004) and Jefferis, et al. 
(2008) studies are recent enough to take into account the widespread availability of ART. 
The Jefferis, et al. (2008) study benefits from the most recent economic and epidemiological 
data for Botswana.  
                                               
34 There are also studies on the micro-level economic impact of HIV and AIDS in Botswana. They tend to 
confirm that in Botswana, businesses, households and government are negatively affected by the disease, as 
previously suggested. Because the macroeconomic studies mentioned here attempt to take such costs into 
account, these studies will not be elaborated upon here. 
Figure 5. Botswana GDP growth (% annual), 1990-2010 
Source: World Bank / OECD 2011. 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
G
D
P 
gr
o
w
th
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3 Botswana The impact of HIV and AIDS on Democratic Consolidation   
 64 
Jefferis, et al. (2008: 118) find that in Botswana “the macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS 
is now severe enough to be affecting the economy as a whole, thereby pulling some of the 
uninfected population into poverty.” Methodologically they concur with the projections 
expressed in Chapter 1: when they consider the macroeconomic effect of the epidemic, they 
factor in impact channels such as lower productivity, loss of skills and experience, greater 
health expenditure and reduced savings and investments (Jefferis, et al. 2008: 114). They also 
consider two scenarios of the economic impact of the disease on government expenditure: 
the fiscal cost of providing treatment versus the fiscal cost of not providing treatment, but 
then fulfilling other obligations such as orphan support.  
Jefferis, et al. (2008) find that even with the provision of ART to 80% of those who need it 
(which has now become a reality), the economy of Botswana will grow 1.2% less per annum 
than in a no-AIDS scenario. After 20 years, this means that the economy will be one fifth 
smaller than in the absence of HIV and AIDS.35 If ART is not provided, the blow to 
economic growth is much greater. Siphambe (2011: 22) also mentions HIV and AIDS as a 
factor that has hampered economic growth in the past decade. 
Like older studies (for instance, Greener, et al. 2000), Jefferis, et al. (2008: 116) find that the 
negative impact on economic growth outstrips the decline in population growth, pushing 
average incomes down to between 1.1% and 2.2% less than they would have been in the 
absence of the disease (but not reversing them). By 2021, average real incomes are projected 
to be 10-15% lower than without AIDS, but if ART is provided to 80% of those who need 
it, this effect can be lessened. They also find that labour-intensive industries such as 
agriculture will be harder hit than capital-intensive industries such as the mining sector, 
especially since lower skilled labourers have higher prevalence rates and less access to ART 
(Jefferis, et al. 2008: 116). They thus expect Botswana’s experience to contradict Pharaoh and 
Schönteich (2003: 7) who stated that HIV and AIDS have a particularly pronounced effect 
on the mining sectors of SADC states. The authors however do not discuss inequality 
directly. Greener, et al. (2000) did not expect the GINI coefficient to be affected by HIV and 
AIDS, but their model assumed that all sectors of society were equally likely to become 
infected with HIV. In contrast, Jefferis, et al. (2008) mention that lower skilled labourers 
have higher prevalence levels. No recent investigation of the impact of the pandemic on 
                                               
35 Jefferis, et al. (2008: 117) also find that the total costs of HIV and AIDS to the government, should it 
not provide ART, is only slightly lower than if it does provide ART. This is because, should the 
government “save” by not providing ART, the cost of caring for the sick and dying and of supporting 
orphans would vastly increase; while the economy would suffer greater setbacks and the government 
would receive less in revenue than in the with-ART scenario. 
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stagnant income inequality in Botswana is forthcoming. However, they do re-affirm Greener, 
et al.’s (2000) finding that the macroeconomic effect of HIV and AIDS is sufficiently large to 
drag uninfected persons and households into poverty through its retarding impact on income 
and employment growth. The model used also shows that ART can prevent between one-
third and one-half of AIDS-induced poverty (Jefferis, et al. 2008: 118). As such, ART 
mitigates against the regression of democracy. 
To conclude, the three indicators (affluence, economic growth and inequality) all seem to be 
affected negatively by HIV and AIDS, although not as much as initially projected. Firstly, in 
terms of affluence, the emerging picture is contrary to expectations: whereas older models 
projected that populations may fall faster than national incomes, thereby pushing up GDP 
per capita (Mattes 2003: 4), recent models for Botswana suggest that the indirect effects of 
reduced economic growth are great enough to overshadow the decline in population growth. 
This means that, while Botswana is already above Przeworski, et al.’s (1996) level for 
“impregnable” democracies and remains on an upward trend, this figure climbs at a slower 
pace because of HIV and AIDS. Secondly, Botswana’s experience seems consistent with 
Mattes’s (2003: 4) expectation that economic growth will be hampered by HIV and AIDS, 
especially increased health costs. Thirdly, in terms of inequality, the evidence is unfortunately 
inconclusive. In the absence of such data, it is worth noting that studies (Greener, et al. 2000; 
Jefferis, et al. 2008) agree that the poor in Botswana, as elsewhere, will be the group hardest 
hit financially by HIV and AIDS. Jefferis, et al. (2008: 113) argue that the impact of HIV and 
AIDS is now severe enough to pull some of the uninfected into poverty. But whether this 
would erode civil society and the wealthier middle classes (who tend to have better access to 
ART) is conjecture at this stage. 
Some important caveats remain. The studies quoted above offer projections for, at most, up 
to 2020. Given that HIV and AIDS is a long-wave event (Barnett 2006: 302-303), certain 
impacts may be felt far beyond this date. For instance, it remains to be seen whether children 
newly orphaned in the 2000s will be able to find employment as adults one or two decades 
later. The Jefferis, et al. (2008) study also assumes that the government will continue to 
provide ART on a wide scale to those who need it. As already mentioned, there has been 
mention of a possibility that the government may cut back on HIV and AIDS expenditure in 
the future, making the poor more vulnerable. The government, usually praised for its 
prudent fiscal policies, announced that instead of the surplus it predicted for 2003/4 it would 
run a deficit of $396 million due to AIDS expenses (Zaba, et al. 2004: S6). The report 
(UNAIDS 2010b: 15) of the government to UNAIDS in 2010 projected a 60% increase in 
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the need for adult ART by 2016 – it is therefore worrisome that the level of fiscal 
expenditure on HIV and AIDS has a trade-off effect on other human development priorities 
(Youde 2009: 221; Molatole and Thaga 2006: 37). We turn now to a study of these priorities, 
as defined and measured by the United Nations.  
3.3.2. Trends in Human Development (UN HDI) 
As noted in Chapter 2, Welzel, et al. (2003) use the World Values Surveys to identify a causal 
relationship between human development and democratization. Human development, for 
them, is synonymous with “growing individual resources”, which includes income and 
education. Scholars of democratic consolidation such as Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) 
and Leftwich (2000) (quoted in Chapter 2) consider human development crucial for 
democratic consolidation. All these authors found that correlations existed. If the HIV and 
AIDS pandemic is seen as detrimental to human development, it may by the same token be 
detrimental to democratic consolidation.  
Since independence, the government of Botswana has made a relatively rare effort to reach 
even its rural areas in terms of service delivery (Robinson 2009: 3). By 2000, 75% of citizens 
had access to basic amenities like healthcare and drinking water (UNDP 2000: 8). Reflecting 
successes in healthcare development, life expectancy in Botswana climbed steadily to a high 
of 64.1 years in 1989 (see Figure 6). However, as Mogae wrote (UNDP 2000: V): “It took us 
three decades to build [a good human development] record. Yet, the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic threatens to wipe it out in less than a decade”.  
After 1989, the disease began to take its toll on life expectancy (see Figure 6). Within 13 years 
this figure plummeted, reaching 49.0 years in 2002. Hospital admissions doubled between 
1990 and 1996, with deaths as a percentage of discharges demonstrating a steady increase 
over the same period (UNDP 2000: 21). There is no other explanation but HIV and AIDS 
for these trends. As Ian Taylor bitterly points out, Botswana is “fairly unique” in 
experiencing a fall in human development accompanied by high economic growth (Taylor 
2005: 3). After 2002 the life expectancy curve sloped upwards again, reaching 55 years by 
2009 (World Bank 2011c). These statistics demonstrate the success of universal access to 
PTMTC treatment and the Masa programme, discussed in the introductory section of this 
thesis. The disease has therefore drastically lowered health (life expectancy), but the 
availability of appropriate medical treatment has slowly begun to make a difference in 
longevity. This achievement, as described, is not cheap. 
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With regards to education, as with health, Botswana has made impressive progress and it 
seems that its successes in this regard have not been as severely affected. 75% of adults in 
Botswana are literate, with literacy also high in rural areas and 96% of primary school age 
children are in school (Barnett and Whiteside 2008: 137). Even in the context of HIV and 
AIDS the UNDP’s overall education index for Botswana is still on an upward trend (see 
Table 1). Increases in literacy have levelled off, but have not been reversed by the pandemic. 
Education expenditure remains quite high at 10% of GDP (World Bank 2011b).  
 
While qualitative research on the impact of HIV and AIDS on education in Botswana is not 
forthcoming36, one estimate in 2001 was that 35% to 40% of Botswana’s teachers had HIV 
and AIDS, which was more than other professionals (Youde 2001: 37). One study also 
estimated that half of the students at the University of Botswana were HIV positive (Youde 
                                               
36 One more publication (Motshegwa 2003) at the University of Botswana could have helped to shed light 
on the qualitative impact of the disease on the education system in this country, but the researcher was 
unable to access it due to time constraints. 
Table 1. Botswana Education index, selected years, 1980 - 2010 
Source: UNDP 2010. 
 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
0.26 0.36 0.47 0.54 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.67 
 
Figure 6. Botswana Life Expectancy at birth, 1960 - 2009 
Source: World Bank 2011c. 
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2001: 38). Given such prevalence rates, Birdsall and Hamoudi (2006: 141-143) estimated that, 
in order to maintain its current teacher-student ratio, Botswana would need to train almost 
150% more teachers to offset the estimated teacher attrition rates due to AIDS.  
However, newer empirical data contradict these estimates. Bennell (2005: 448) pointed out 
that in 2001, teacher turnover (transfers, study leave and mortality) in Botswana was 14%, 
which is more than 25 times the figure for teacher mortality in the same year. In other words, 
AIDS did not play a major role in the loss of teachers. In 2002-2003, similarly, teacher deaths 
did not exceed 1% of the total number of teachers and it has declined further thereafter as 
the amount of teachers accessing ART has increased37 (Bennell 2006: 2). It seems that ART 
is also keeping teacher absenteeism relatively low, with most students and staff members 
surveyed not considering teacher absenteeism a “serious problem” (Bennell 2005: 449). At 
the time of Bennell’s (2006) update on the impact of AIDS on education, new graduates 
from the six teaching colleges were struggling to find work. Empirical data, therefore, 
suggests that the impact of AIDS on education has been exaggerated in Botswana. 
 HIV and AIDS have thus had a severe effect on human development, especially in terms of 
life expectancy and increased health care costs. The education system, which ultimately 
builds human capital for the future, has fortunately not been affected as severely as some 
studies suggested. Still, the Botswana Human Development Report 2000 is quite justified in 
calling HIV and AIDS “an antithesis to human development” (UNDP 2000: 2). Following 
Welzel (2003), one could argue that reduced levels of human development mean that the 
population of Botswana will be less inclined to attach value to freedom of choice – including, 
ultimately, choice of government.  
3.3.3. Civil Society 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a rich and pluralistic civil society is considered essential for 
democratic consolidation. Butler’s (2005) argument is that in South Africa, HIV and AIDS 
politics has had a positive impact on civil society and by extension, on democratic 
consolidation. Mattes (2003: 9), on the other hand, is concerned with the loss of human 
capital within voluntary organisations due to AIDS. De Waal (2006: 42) finds proof of both 
processes in different countries.  
                                               
37 Botswana’s public sector teachers were the first in Africa to receive ART, with about 62 teachers 
receiving treatment through the government’s medical scheme by 1999 and 474 by 2002 (Bennell 2006: 2). 
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A robust civil society has historically been lacking in Botswana (Holm 1996; Osei-Hwedie 
and Sebudubudu 2004; Carroll and Carroll 2004). A variety of reasons account for this, 
including the specific experience of Botswana as a Protectorate. Ian Taylor (2005: 2) puts it, 
“the experience of popular struggle was wholly absent” in the process of decolonization. 
Political parties only emerged in the last 15 years leading up to independence and the 
Botswana Democratic Party, which came to power at independence and has been in power 
ever since, received support from the colonial government (Mokopakgosi and Molomo 2000: 
5). 
In the past two decades, however, a range of voluntary associations have emerged in 
Botswana. Carroll and Carroll (2004: 334) investigated this “rapid growth” of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in the 1990’s. They found that this sector grew from “only the most 
rudimentary beginnings of a civil society” in 1989 to “literally hundreds of functioning 
indigenous non-governmental organisations”, of which many frequently gave input in 
government policy, a mere ten years later. This growth has continued in the 2000’s. Business 
associations developed as the amount of small to medium business owners grew in the late 
1980’s (Carroll and Carroll 2004: 340-341). A national women’s group, Emang Basadi, was 
founded in 1986 in response to the government’s refusal to change discriminatory citizenship 
laws, and subsequently managed to win their case against this law in the Court of Appeal and 
place gender issues on the political agenda (Maundeni 2004: 45; Carroll and Carroll 2004: 
341-343). 
This proliferation of CSOs, over the past 20 years, has coincided with the spread of HIV 
through the population. In identifying the core factors that contributed to this process, 
Carroll and Carroll do not mention the pandemic. If it can be demonstrated that citizens 
who became involved in these civil society organisations would not have done so had it not 
been for the disease, the line of causation between HIV and AIDS and the encouragement of 
political participation, in terms of numerical growth, could be established. This relationship is 
not explicitly stated, but many of the new groups are HIV and AIDS-related38.  
There is a more obvious relationship between AIDS and the attitude of government toward civil 
society (Carroll and Carroll 2004: 351). Before the mid-1990s, government was hostile to 
                                               
38 Prominent organisations include the Botswana Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS 
(BONEPWA); the Botswana Network of Ethic Law and HIV and AIDS (BONELA); Botswana Christian 
AIDS Intervention Program (BOCAIP) and the Botswana Business Coalition on AIDS (BBCA). Like most 
in Botswana, these HIV and AIDS-related CSOs fall under an umbrella body, the Botswana Network of 
AIDS Service Organisations (BONASO). 
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interventions by fledgling civil society, unless they were carrying out entirely uncontroversial 
activities (such as the Red Cross). This was especially true of foreign NGOs (Carroll and 
Carroll 2004: 339). By the mid-1990s, however, the government had accepted the input of 
CSOs and began to consult with them on policy issues, including HIV and AIDS. Umbrella 
bodies were formed with international and governmental assistance, the main one being the 
Botswana Council of non-governmental organisations (BOCONGO), under which 
BONASO resorts. The government is in the habit of consulting with them. 
Carroll and Carroll (2004: 349) speculate that the government’s change in attitude (lead at the 
time by Masire and Mogae) was motivated, among other things, by the continued pressure of 
international organisations and donors to include civil society in policy making processes. 
Since this change coincided with Botswana’s increasing cooperation with foreign donors for 
HIV and AIDS funding, there is a correlation with the hypothesis of De Waal (2006: 114, see 
Chapter 1) that, amid increased reliance on international assistance, governments may 
become less able to resist outside pressures. At the same time the change in policy could 
have stemmed from simple executive pragmatism. The government states that HIV and 
AIDS-related community organisations were encouraged in the early 1990s as the size of the 
pandemic exceeded government capacity (DCHAP 2011), and because the government and 
civil society “[e]ach brings major strengths that can complement the gaps and weaknesses of 
the other” (Rau 2006: 293). In other words, HIV and AIDS may have motivated the 
government to be more welcoming towards the input from civil society, indirectly (through 
decreased bargaining power vis-à-vis the pressures of international community) and/or 
directly (through a need for CSOs’ assistance in fighting the pandemic).  
For whatever reason, the government of Botswana has a well-established relationship with 
HIV and AIDS-related CSOs. It calls them the “Health Support Network” and 
acknowledges them as “the major stakeholders in implementation of HIV and AIDS 
programmes”. Among the roles that CSOs fulfill, the government lists “reaching 
marginalized vulnerable and underserved communities with ease”; “monitoring and advocacy 
for quality of health services” and “mobilizing material and financial support” (DHAPC 
2011). President Ian Khama thanks civil society (including the private sector) for their part in 
HIV and AIDS efforts, saying that “Government cannot win this war alone” (Khama 2008b: 
10). 
The positive working relationship between government and civil society seems encouraging 
in terms of the country’s fight against HIV and AIDS. But civil society that is in effect 
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merely an extension of government cannot contribute to democratic consolidation as it 
needs to (Friedman 2003). It must be evident that civil society provides citizens with a source 
of power that is not dependent on the state, and/or that it encourages political participation 
among citizens. But most scholars agree that this is not the case (Mogalakwe and 
Sebudubudu 2006: 211). Taylor (2003: 81) asserted that “civil society in Botswana is readily 
co-opted into state structures, lacks a strong grassroots base and is prepared to work within 
the parameters deemed permissible by the state – and not beyond.” As late as during the 
2004 elections, Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie (2005: 28-29) describe the vigorous separation 
of political and civil matters, a separation maintained apparently by political parties as well as 
civil society organisations. Indeed, the inclusion of the word “Service” in the BONASO 
acronym is perhaps indicative of the non-political orientation of most of these groups. Many 
NGOs are partly funded by government or entirely funded by donors, rendering them 
unable to define their own priorities. Recently donor support for civil society groups has 
declined (Osei-Hwedie and Sebudubudu 2005: 2), so that groups that turn down government 
funding and are not membership-based are found not to be “mobilising material and 
financial support” but rather to be ill-resourced.  
On the other hand, Maundeni (2004: 10) argues that the portrayal of Botswana’s civil society 
as “weak” is Eurocentric. In the context of Botswana politics, “lengthy debates are common 
and confrontations are unusual”. Deborah Durham (1999: 196) similarly argues that if 
scholars consider civil society in Botswana weak, it is because of “a lack of familiarity with 
everyday life in villages and towns on the part of those Western social scientists who have 
been most vocal in dissecting the public sphere in this African context”. Instead, Maundeni 
(2004: 16-17) argues that in Botswana, civil society organisations’ strength can be measured 
in their ability to secure the attendance of relevant government ministers at their events, 
where there is the opportunity for “mutual criticism in each other’s presence”. “Street 
encounters”, such as verbal attacks and industrial strikes, are frowned upon and less effective 
(Maundeni 2004: 18-20).  
But civil society that, whether for cultural or other reasons, is only influential as long as it 
does not fall out of favour with the government, simply cannot provide citizens with an 
effective counterweight to state power. There is a lack of evidence that civil society has been 
willing to challenge the government with regards to HIV and AIDS policy. This lack may be 
rooted either in a continued subservience of the population to the leadership and authority 
of the government; or it may indicate a specific policy failure, namely, that the government 
has led the HIV and AIDS response in a “top-down, bureaucratic and patronising” manner, 
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leaving little room for a grassroots activism to develop (Molutsi and Badade 1999, quoted in 
Stegling 2004: 240). Stegling (2004: 240) points to studies that indicate that the disease has 
been “desexualised” through public discussion, while few citizens have yet internalised HIV 
messages.  
Carroll and Carroll (2004: 351) recognise that initially, HIV and AIDS had the effect of strengthening 
civil society's position in Botswana as the demands of the pandemic rendered the government of Botswana 
more open to civil society assistance. However, they fear that in the long term civil society organisations 
are losing human capital.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, Mattes (2003: 9), De Waal (2003: 13) and 
Whiteside (2008: 8) also speculate that African CSOs may weaken as they lose PLWHA and 
their caregivers.  
Trade unions, similar to CSOs, have as mentioned historically been subservient to 
government and reluctant to engage with politicians. Two interviewees representing trade 
unions said that MPs were “shy” and “suspicious” about representing labour associations 
and that labour associations in turn are reluctant to associate with opposition MPs for fear of 
being sidelined by the government (Osei-Hwedie and Sebudubudu 2005: 38). Furthermore, 
Mogalakwe and Sebudubudu (2006: 214-216) point out that Botswana has been a member of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) since 1978, yet it only ratified the conventions 
considered essential to trade union rights and freedoms in 1997 and only began to process 
the amendment of the relevant laws in 2003. On 1 May 2010 the Public Service Act (number 
30 of 2008) was finally launched, for the first time granting thousands of civil servants the 
right to join trade unions. The first major strike the country has seen since independence – 
an eight week long public service workers’ strike – followed in May and June 2011, and 
ended with no substantial victories for workers (SAPA 2011). No research on the impact of 
HIV and AIDS on trade unions was forthcoming.  
In short, civil society in Botswana is rather weak. Despite its now much greater inclusion in 
the policy making process and its important role in addressing HIV and AIDS, there is no 
literature claiming that the disease is affecting civil society in a way that contributes to, or 
damages, the consolidation of democracy. It is therefore plausible that the challenge 
compelled the government to initiate cooperation with civil society in policy formulation and 
execution, but this relationship is still highly unbalanced. In other words, Butler’s (2005) 
argument that the politics around HIV and AIDS in South Africa has energized civil society, 
legitimized conflictual relations with government and opened up fresh space for policy 
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contestation, does not (yet) apply in the case of Botswana. There is no evidence that the 
disease has deepened the institutional framework for democratic politics.  
3.4. Assessment 
It was stated that the rationale behind this study – the “why” – lies in the lack of consensus 
among political scientists with regards to the question: how will HIV and AIDS affect the 
consolidation of African democracies: positively or negatively? Ultimately, therefore, the 
findings in this chapter must be compared to the points raised by Mattes (2003), Strand 
(2005) and Chirambo and his colleagues (2008), who expect the disease to impact negatively 
on democratic consolidation in Southern Africa; as well as the article by Butler (2005a) who 
emphasises the positive effect of HIV and AIDS in activating civil society and deepening 
institutions in South Africa (especially through the use of courts) and the study by De Waal 
(2006), who makes the point that the pandemic has not resulted in any political crises yet. 
Looking at the first variable, HIV and AIDS have not seriously influenced the balance of 
power between the executive and the legislature: it is still skewed in favour of the executive, 
and this continues to pose questions about the democratic nature of the system. Secondly, 
with regards to electoral systems, the FPTP system does not seem to be severely affected by 
AIDS at a national level (this is contrary to the findings in other Southern African states of 
the researchers led Chirambo 2008). On a local government level, however, there are 
indications that the disease caused an unprecedented amount of by-elections, necessitating 
the cost and organisation associated with their administration. This impact lessened towards 
2009 and it is possible that with increasing access to ART the amount of by-elections may 
return to more typical figures, but more research could shed light on these developments. 
More research is also needed on Botswana’s electoral governance amid high HIV infection 
levels (here the problems encountered by the Chirambo study in other states may still be 
identified) – but for now, national elections continue to enjoy overwhelming legitimacy 
despite HIV and AIDS. It is possible that Botswana has ART to thank for this, too. Third, 
De Waal (2006: 119-120) seems justified in his argument that political and civil rights are not 
dramatically affected by HIV and AIDS. The erosion of political rights, which is ominous for 
democratic consolidation (Schedler 1998: 103), cannot be linked directly to the pandemic in 
question. If in the light of recent economic hardship the government cuts its expenditure on 
ART, despite studies that demonstrated that providing ART makes fiscal sense (see above), 
civil society and the courts can and should play meaningful roles, which is not yet the case in 
Botswana.  
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Socio-economically, the effect of HIV and AIDS is more evident. Firstly, it is likely to have 
some detrimental effect on all three economic variables, which means that Mattes’s (2003) 
arguments were partly correct. The magnitude of these effects will determine the severity of 
the threat to democratic consolidation. Low levels of economic growth and a slower increase 
in income per capita is a new phenomenon for the citizens of Botswana, but they are known 
for their remarkable political stability and may bear such a change with patience. Importantly, 
Przeworski, et al. (1996) do not offer a deep analysis of how the abovementioned economic 
factors contribute to the survival or death of democracies. It stands to be seen to what extent 
Przeworski, et al.’s (1996) findings about democratic survival will hold for this country in the 
future. Secondly, in terms of human development, Botswana has suffered a serious blow, 
especially in terms of health/life expectancy. An inversion of Welzel’s (2003) finding about 
the positive influence of human development upon the demand for constitutionally 
protected liberties would suggest that, given a blow to health, the citizens of Botswana may 
revert back to intolerance and a focus on survival: Mattes’s (2003: 9) “uncivil society”. The 
fact that education levels have not deteriorated, may offset this process, as may rebounding 
health levels under a well-administered and continuous ART regime. Thirdly, and finally, civil 
society seems relatively unaffected by HIV and AIDS, except for a numerical proliferation of 
(politically weak) CSOs and, possibly, the greater cooperation between (weak) civil society 
and (strong) government. Neither of these developments necessarily promotes democratic 
consolidation. This means that Butler’s (2005) key argument about the positive effect of HIV 
and AIDS on democratic consolidation in South Africa does not apply to Botswana.  
It is possible that Botswana has its success in achieving universal access to ART to thank for 
much of its apparent functionality in spite of high HIV prevalence. This has not offset all 
negative effects of the pandemic – as Jefferis, et al. (2008: 113) concluded, the impact of HIV 
and AIDS is now severe enough to be affecting the economy as a whole. But where the 
reach of ART is less extensive, such as in South Africa, the effects foreseen by scholars may 
be more obvious. It is to South Africa that we turn now. 
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CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1. Background: HIV and AIDS in South Africa 
HIV and AIDS policy in South Africa has been highly controversial, especially during the 
first term of former president Thabo Mbeki. This section briefly provides background about 
the country; the spread of HIV and AIDS through the population and government HIV and 
AIDS policy to date. The sections thereafter assess whether and in what way this disease 
impacted on democratic consolidation. The focus will be on institutions and socio-economic 
factors. 
South Africa is the southernmost African state. It had a population of 49.99 million by mid-
2010 (Statistics South Africa 2010: 3) and reached 50.58 million in July 2011, consisting of a 
majority of black Africans (80%) as well as smaller groups of whites (of European descent), 
people of Indian descent, people of mixed race, as well as smaller minorities. As the richest 
nation in Africa with GDP valued at $460 billion in 2009 (PPP constant 2005 prices) (World 
Bank 2011d), the state is sometimes described as a regional hegemon (for example, Adebajo 
and Landsberg 2003; Alden and Soko 2005) and has been grouped as an emerging economy 
along with such states as Brazil, Russia, India and China (for instance, see Cooper, 
Anthkiewicz and Shaw 2007). It plays an influential role in international diplomacy, serving 
as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2007-2008 and 2011-
2012. 
Historically inhabited by San and Khoikhoi peoples and later by Bantu-speaking African 
groups who migrated from the north, South Africa was colonised in 1652, initially by the 
Dutch, followed by Britain (see Ross 2008: 5-58). Following four decades of active racial 
discrimination under the rule of the Afrikaner-nationalist National Party (NP) under policies 
known as Apartheid and Separate Development, the country made a transition in the 1990s 
from white minority rule to an inclusive democracy (see Ross 2008: 122-213). The first 
democratic election was held on 27 April 1994, in which the African National Congress 
(ANC) won 62.3% of the national vote and Nelson Mandela became president. Since then, 
three more general elections have taken place and the ANC has established its position as the 
dominant party, with never less than 62% of the vote.  
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The HIV and AIDS pandemic arrived in South Africa during the politically tumultuous 
decade leading up to the demise of Apartheid (Fourie 2006: 55). The first known South 
African AIDS victim was a white homosexual air steward, who died in 1982. The epidemic 
spread mostly among white homosexual men, but was contained, reaching 308 reported 
cases. Prevalence declined by 1990. It did not spread to the general heterosexual population 
and because initially it did not appear to be a serious threat to society, the pre-1994 
government did not draft a comprehensive policy to address it. The main sufferers of the 
disease, homosexuals as well as some commercial sex workers and injecting drug users, had 
already been criminalised (Fourie 2006: 97). In 1986 the first AIDS cases in heterosexual 
members of the population were detected among male black mineworkers (Iliffe 2006: 43-
44). Thereafter, HIV spread exponentially through the black population (Iliffe 2006: 44). In 
South Africa, there was no particular core group spreading HIV (such as sex workers or 
truck drivers). Rather, infection occurred “by diffusion across a long, much-permeated 
northern frontier and through individual contacts in many sectors of a mobile, 
commercialised environment” (Iliffe 2006: 44).  
Not only did the country face an epidemic from multiple neighbouring states, but 
additionally, Fourie (2006: 50-64) argues that the political situation under Apartheid was a 
perfect environment for AIDS to flourish. Shula Marks (2008) agrees, basing her argument 
on the work of Zwi and Cabral (1991, quoted in Marks 2008: 39). These scholars argued that 
certain social, political and economic forces place groups at a high risk of contracting HIV. 
Factors likely to create a “high-risk situation” included impoverishment and 
disenfranchisement, rapid urbanization, the anonymity of urban life, labour migration, 
widespread population movements and displacements, and social disruption and wars, 
especially counter-insurgency wars. In such circumstances, they argued, daily survival may be 
precarious and social bonds loosened, leading to high risk individual behaviour such as 
transactional sex. Marks (2008: 40) argues that all these factors were a reality in the 
experience of the black population of South Africa in the 1980s. HIV infection levels 
skyrocketed. By 1989, the NP government had to acknowledge that its lack of an HIV and 
AIDS policy was no longer tenable and began to redefine the challenge and took steps to 
address it more broadly (Fourie 2006: 99).  
In 1992, as the ANC prepared for government, it participated with members of the NP 
government, trade unionists, HIV and AIDS activists and medical professionals in the 
National AIDS Convention of South Africa (NACOSA). NACOSA drafted the National 
AIDS Plan, which was to be government policy from 1994 onwards. The drafting process 
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was inclusive and the plan widely praised (Fourie 2006: 101). However, it had certain key 
weaknesses: for one, it overestimated the human and economic resources that would be 
available to the new government; it also pigeonholed HIV and AIDS policy under the central 
Department of Health. These weaknesses, as well as the simultaneous bureaucratic 
restructuring of the political system and perhaps a lack of prioritisation and commitment 
(Schneider and Stein 2001: 726; Palitza and Ridgard 2010: xi; Butler 2005b: 593), meant that 
once the ANC came to power, its AIDS policy got off to a slow and hesitant start (Schneider 
and Stein 2001: 726). What is more, a number of HIV and AIDS-related scandals surfaced 
during this time, such as those around the misappropriation of funds toward the musical 
screenplay Sarafina II; and the government’s promotion of the antiretroviral drug Virodene, 
which was later found to contain toxic substances, while it rejected calls to administer the 
scientifically approved drug AZT to HIV positive pregnant women for the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) (Palitza and Ridgard 2010: x). During Nelson 
Mandela’s term (1994-1999), South African HIV prevalence is estimated to have shot up 
from 1.8% of the population in 1994 to 10.1% in 199939 (Fourie 2006: 109). 
Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), who was to succeed Mandela as president in 1999, was involved 
in a large-scale review of the HIV and AIDS situation in 1997 and initially promised to 
promote greater public awareness and acknowledged of the multi-sectoral nature of the 
problem (Butler 2005b: 593). Yet by 1999 it was evident that Mbeki doubted the intellectual 
foundations of AIDS, taking a stance that would become labeled AIDS “denialism” 
(Nattrass 2007). With the newly-appointed health minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, the 
government was claiming that antiretroviral drugs are “toxic” and Mbeki argued that instead 
of HIV, socio-economic factors (for example, nutrition), along with viral factors, might cause 
AIDS. When challenged upon this, he set up a presidential advisory panel to investigate the 
issue, but this panel was composed mainly of what Nattrass (2007) terms “AIDS 
dissidents”40.  
By 2000 Mbeki’s doubt became embedded in policy: the government released the 
HIV/AIDS/STD Strategic Plan for South Africa 2000-2005 which was based on United 
Nations guidelines but lacked clear time frames and dates, and most importantly, evaded 
ART (Butler 2005b: 595). A national controversy ensued around health policies that 
                                               
39 Note that these figures are for the population as a whole (unlike most estimates in this study, which are 
for adults aged 15-49). Fourie (2006: 109) compiled this data from estimates published by Dorrington and 
Johnson in 2002. 
40 For more extensive analyses of this stance and their motivation for it, see Butler (2005b), Nattrass 
(2007), and Gevisser (2007). 
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prevented the provision of ART to HIV-positive individuals through the public health 
system (Palitza and Ridgard 2010: xiii). Between 1999 and 2004, Afrobarometer surveys 
(2005) recorded a rapid increase in the percentage of South Africans citing HIV and AIDS as 
one of the priorities for government to address. The issue rose to equal importance as crime 
and security, as the second-most important priority (about 30% of South Africans mentioned 
both issues), with only unemployment and job creation ranking higher (at 77%). Its 
prioritisation remained relatively constant through consecutive surveys up to 2006 
(Afrobarometer 2006). A sharp increase was also noted in the percentage of South Africans 
who were willing to divert government resources to addressing the disease, from 40% in 
2002/3 to 56% in 2004. 
The TAC, a civil society group dedicated to the HIV and AIDS problem, sued the 
government about its refusal to roll out PMTCT drugs to more than a handful of its pilot 
test sites. It won the case in 2001, and won again in 2002 after the government appealed. 
Govender (2007: 117) argues that the case was a very easy one from the position of the 
Court, as sufficient evidence was produced to demonstrate that the cost of the drug was not 
an issue and neither was its efficacy in preventing the transmission of HIV from mother to 
child. Thereafter, the TAC shifted its focus to the provision of ART to all who need it.  
With growing pressure from within and outside the ANC, the government committed itself 
to scale up ART provision in November 2003 (Butler 2005b: 595). Rollout commenced 
slowly and scholars (Nattrass 2004; and Willan 2004, quoted in Quinlan and Willan 2005: 
230) expressed their doubts about the commitment of the president and minister of health to 
HIV and AIDS and social welfare generally. Tshabalala-Msimang insisted on a healthy diet 
(including beetroot and onions) as an alternative to ART, claims for which she was ridiculed 
at the 2006 International AIDS Conference in Toronto, and which exposed South Africa’s 
official AIDS policy to increased international criticism (Meldrum 2006). It was also 
observed that if HIV and AIDS allocation were left out, a decrease in the health budget was 
evident, meaning that this component of the health budget was crowding out other health 
spending (Nhlanhla, quoted in Quinlan and Willan 2005: 234). The president then publicly 
withdrew from debates about the disease, but continued to make controversial statements; in 
short, he was perceived not to provide leadership on the matter of AIDS (Quinlan and 
Willan 2005: 239). It was only when Tshabalala-Msimang was hospitalised in late 2006 that 
her deputy, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, and the Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka took steps to revive the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) and restore 
ties with civil society, including the TAC.  
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In 2007, government launched the HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 
(NSP) 2007-2011, which aimed to provide ART to 80% of those who need them41 by 2011. 
Following the resignation42 of Thabo Mbeki in September 2008, interim president Kgalema 
Motlanthe replaced Tshabalala-Msimang with Barbara Hogan, who had openly identified 
with the TAC and opposed the government’s AIDS denialism (Achmat and Hassan 2010). 
Hogan explicitly acknowledged that HIV causes AIDS, commended the work of medical, 
scientific and activist communities, and committed government to achieving the targets of 
the NSP (Hogan 2008; TAC 2008). Although making promising strides, she served for only 
six months before being replaced in 2009 by Aaron Motsoaledi in the Zuma administration. 
Motsoaledi won praise so far, fostering closer ties with NGOs and civil society and 
developing a creative new procurement process that forced international pharmaceutical 
companies to compete for the tender and provide breakdowns of their manufacturing costs, 
thereby successfully halving the price South Africa will pay for ART over the next two years 
(Parker 2010).  
The ART target of the NSP (above) will probably not be reached by the end of 2011, but the 
country is making progress in this regard. In 2009, it reached 81% of children and 65% of 
adults who needed it, as opposed to the 2008 figures of 44% and 55% respectively (RSA 
2010a: 44). Today, prevalence seems to have stabilized, but at extremely high levels (as in the 
rest of Sub-Saharan Africa – see Chapter 1): the latest estimates put the adult HIV prevalence 
rate at 17.8% of South Africans (UNAIDS 2010: A1). Data also shows that incidence is 
slowing down (Marais 2010: 306). Total AIDS deaths increased from 198 000 in 2001 to a 
high of 314 000 in 2005 and then declined to 281 000 in 2010 (Statistics South Africa 2010: 
8). 
However, HIV is not spread evenly across the population. For one, the age distribution of 
the epidemic is changing, with signs of increased safe sex among young people (UNAIDS 
2010: 28) and South Africa has achieved almost 90% PMTCT coverage (UNAIDS 2010: 10), 
meaning that fewer children are born with HIV (see Figure 7). Furthermore Hein Marais 
(2010) emphasises that HIV and AIDS statistics, when disaggregated, reveal familiar patterns 
                                               
41 “Those who need ART” are defined here according to the older WHO guidelines, namely, those whose 
CD4 counts are 200 or less (see footnote 9). 
42 In December 2007 at the landmark 52nd National Conference of the ANC in Polokwane, Limpopo, 
Mbeki lost his contest for re-election as president of the ANC to his rival Jacob Zuma.  In September 
2008, when Zuma was acquitted of the rape charges that Mbeki had used as a pretext to dismiss Zuma as 
deputy president, the ANC requested Mbeki to step down as president of South Africa. Kgalema 
Motlanthe finished Mbeki’s term until the general elections in May 2009, after which Zuma was instated as 
president. 
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akin to South African patterns of social inequality. For instance, supporting the argument of 
Marks (2010) above, that the social conditions of black South Africans have rendered them 
especially vulnerable to HIV, Shisana, et al. (2005, quoted in Marais 2010: 306) reported in 
2005 that 20% of (black) African adults, 3.2% of coloureds, 1.0% of Indians and 0.5% of 
whites were infected with the disease43. The link between HIV infection and poverty is less 
clear, but case studies have also demonstrated that in South Africa, HIV risk is embedded in 
“social ills” that tend to accompany poverty (Kalichman, et al. 2006 and Bärnighausen, et al. 
2007, quoted in Marais 2010: 308). It is therefore possible, in South Africa, to generalize that 
the majority of PLWHA are poor and black (Marais 2010: 306). Furthermore, HIV is most 
prevalent among unskilled and semi-skilled workers (Vass 2005, quoted in Leibbrandt, 
Woolard, McEwen and Koep 2010: 47) and among urban, rather than rural dwellers (Marais 
2011: 307). In the younger age cohorts, they are now also predominantly female (Marais 
2010: 306). 
 
4.2. Institutions 
4.2.1. System of government  
Has this epidemic impacted on democracy? We turn to institutions first. The South African 
government, though parliamentary in nature, combines some elements of presidentialism. 
Chapter 5 (section 86) of the constitution dictates that the National Assembly (parliament) 
elects a woman or man from among its members to be president. He or she is head of state 
                                               
43 A 2008 study (Shisana, et al. 2009) confirmed this pattern.  
Figure 7. HIV Prevalence by sex and age in South Africa, 2008 
Source: Shisana, Rehle, Simbayi, Zuma and Jooste 2009: 31. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4: South Africa The impact of HIV and AIDS on Democratic Consolidation   
 
 81 
and head of government. He or she appoints the deputy president and the cabinet 
(executive) from the members of parliament, except for a maximum of two cabinet 
ministers, who may be appointed from outside the Assembly.  
The South African legislature consists of two chambers: the National Assembly and the 
National Congress of Provinces. Since 1994, Parliament has been dominated by the ANC 
and its two coalition partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Council 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), in the “Tripartite Alliance”. Their share of the 
national vote has never been less than 62% and has been around two thirds since 1999: they 
obtained 62.65% in 1994; 66.35% in 1999; 69.69% in 2004 and 66% in 2009, which was the 
latest round of general elections (Friedman 2009: 109).  
It was noted in Chapter 2 that the high stakes of presidential elections could lead to the 
perception among the opposition that democratic politics is a zero-sum game. The first 
mechanism that serves to include diverse political powers within the democratic system is the 
closed-list PR system used to constitute both the Parliament and the NCOP. Seats are 
allocated according to the Droop formula, which allows for a close match between the 
percentage of votes and the proportion of seats obtained. Since there are 400 seats, a party 
must obtain 0.25% of the national vote to win a seat in parliament. This low threshold 
enhances the inclusivity of the system, which is a key nation-building strength of PR systems 
in general, as it provides for fair representivity. 
There are some checks in place to diffuse power and prevent the centralisation of power in 
the presidency. These include provisions for the South African Human Rights Commission, 
the Commission for Gender Equality and the Public Protector. However, these provisions 
may not entirely safeguard against an over-powerful presidency: Butler argues (2005a: 9) that 
during Mbeki’s first term, he challenged or undermined several of these provisions. Mbeki 
also became increasingly “disciplinarian” in his approach, stifling dissent in the party 
(Southall 2000: 202) and created structures of “upwards accountability” (as opposed to 
accountability towards the electorate or even the party in general) (Friedman 2009: 110). 
Nattrass (2007: 47) attributes this move towards centralisation of power to the leadership 
style developed by the ANC in exile and the armed struggle against Apartheid as well as to 
the electoral system, which guarantees the top leaders of the ANC their seats in parliament. 
Although the centralisation of power was initially seen as a necessary step to increase the 
efficiency of the executive, it became apparent by 2007 that the government was achieving 
little more success on important issues such as crime and poverty reduction under the iron 
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fist of Mbeki (Friedman 2009: 110). It also looked like the silencing of civil society on issues 
like HIV and AIDS. 
According to Butler (2005a), there are grounds to argue that AIDS served to counter this 
move toward centralisation. Butler (2005: 9) mentions, for example, how AIDS-related 
events led to the affirmation of a “quasi-federalist” system. National and provincial 
governments are separately elected. The Constitution provides for some provincial 
autonomy, but up until the debate around AIDS, policy had primarily been defined by 
central government and implemented by provinces, subject to national norms and standards. 
Amidst attempts at increasing centralization generally, and especially government’s attempts 
to control the availability of PMTCT drugs and information that would support the TAC’s 
case, provinces asserted their independence by publicly making statements opposing 
government policy and by making information available to the TAC showing that they had 
the capacity to provide PMTCT. The National Treasury in turn hid its support for provincial 
HIV and AIDS interventions by providing direct funding to provinces for the refurbishment 
of hospitals, thereby indirectly freeing up funds to spend on addressing the pandemic 
(Quinlan and Willan 2005: 235). Butler (2005: 9) therefore argues that one of the ways in 
which AIDS “partially reversed the growing trend to centralization” in the national 
government was by re-affirming that the provinces have a degree of policy autonomy. 
It could be argued that Mbeki’s policy on AIDS demonstrated the tight control he exercised 
over his inner circle, while becoming increasingly out of touch with the political sentiments 
of the party’s rank and file, many of them members of the TAC. The ousting of Mbeki at 
Polokwane in 2007 (see footnote above) demonstrated that a degree of internal democracy is 
still a reality in the ANC and that to an extent leaders remain accountable to members of the 
ANC (Friedman 2009: 110). The succession of Mbeki by Zuma contrasts sharply with the 
system of “automatic elitist succession”, witnessed in Botswana for example.  
4.2.2. Electoral System 
Unlike Botswana, South Africa employs a PR system at the national level. This section will 
contain a brief overview of the electoral system, followed by an analysis of literature on the 
impact of HIV and AIDS on South Africa’s electoral systems and electoral governance. South 
Africa’s general elections run every five years and allow voters to elect their provincial and 
national government on separate ballots. Elections for local government are also held every 
five years, taking place during the second year after the general elections. All elections to date 
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have been considered free and fair. The electoral management board in South Africa is 
known as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). 
Using the PR system, the 400 seats in Parliament were allocated as follows in 2009: the 
ANC’s 66% of the vote won it 264 seats; the DA, with 16.7% of the vote, won 67 seats; the 
Congress of the People (COPE), the party newly splintered off from the ANC, won 7.4% 
and 30 seats; the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) won 4.6% and 18 seats; and 1 seat each went 
to 9 smaller parties (Friedman 2009: 108). On municipal level, an MMP system is employed. 
There are three types of Municipalities (styled A, B and C). For local (A) and municipal (B) 
councils, half of ward councillors are elected on a FPTP basis while half are appointed 
through a PR list system. At the district level (type C) 60% of councillors are representatives 
from their local and municipal councils while 40% are elected on a FPTP basis by eligible 
residents (Strand, et al. 2005: 73).  
It has been recommended that the national electoral system be reformed in order to make 
parliamentarians more accountable to the public. Two reports, the Van Zyl Slabbert 
Commission (Electoral Task Team 2003) and a second report by a panel of experts more 
recently (Afrobarometer 2009a: 1), have recommended electoral reform towards an MMP 
system. Renewed calls for reform have emanated from the opposition after Parliament 
passed a decision to disband the successful special investigative unit, the Scorpions, initially 
without consulting the public (as was required by law) (Afrobarometer 2009a). However, 
recent Afrobarometer (2009a) data indicates that electoral reform is not a great priority for 
South African citizens, and that their counterparts in 11 other African countries, including 
those with constituency based electoral systems, are not more satisfied with the performance 
of their MPs. Compared to their African counterparts elsewhere, South Africans are in fact 
marginally more confident in the power of elections to ensure that MPs represent the views of 
voters. 
Looking purely at the impact of HIV and AIDS on electoral systems, Strand (2005: 7) and 
Chirambo (2008: 31) argue that the PR system is preferable to FPTP in states where HIV 
prevalence is high, such as South Africa. In an FPTP system, they argue that an increase in 
by-elections due to the death of elected representatives could become expensive (Chirambo 
2008: 35-36; Strand 2005: 8); it could result in a weaker mandate for the new candidate 
because of low voter turnout and the replacement of MPs in Parliament may shift the 
balance of power between parties, often to the detriment of the opposition (Chirambo 2008: 
32; Strand 2005: 10).  
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Given the PR list system employed to constitute the National Assembly of South Africa, this 
body was not exposed to the financial cost of by-elections or a shift in the balance of power: 
the affected party could simply fill the vacancy from its party list. A loss of individual 
democratic legitimacy due to the low voter turnout at by-elections, similarly, was not an issue 
in the PR system. With regards to national government, Strand, et al. (2005: 72) reported that 
235 members of Parliament were replaced between 1994 and 2003, of whom 23 were 
replaced because of their demise. With a maximum of 5 deaths per year (in 1999 and again in 
2002), and a lack of data that could permit extensive longitudinal comparisons, no clear 
pattern emerges and it is impossible to say with certainty to what extent AIDS was the cause 
of these deaths.  
The MMP system employed on local level was expected to be more vulnerable to the effects 
of the pandemic. Chirambo and Steyn (2009) specifically studied the impact of HIV and 
AIDS on ward councillors in South Africa. Of 589 by-elections held in the country from 
2001 to 2007, 285 were due to the death of a councillor, making death the biggest single 
cause of by-elections at this level. There was a concentration of deaths among 29-to-42-year 
olds, with the majority of deceased councillors dying before their 51st birthday. Although 
causes of death were not available, this data is suggestive of the mortality pattern of AIDS in 
South Africa (Chirambo and Steyn 2009: 42-46). Given this pattern and certain assumptions 
(Chirambo and Steyn 2009: 47), the authors concluded that the majority of deaths (the 
authors estimate 70%) were probably due to AIDS. This study therefore indicates that, 
although we cannot prove this conclusively, the disease probably had a substantial impact on 
ward councillor attrition. Some qualitative focus group data substantiated this (Chirambo and 
Steyn 2009: 49) but the research methods used in this study could not corroborate this. 
Since it looks likely that AIDS deaths caused a significant number of by-elections, an 
evaluation of the impact of municipal by-elections in South Africa is in order. Firstly, in 
terms of financial cost, the authors calculate that South Africa spent at least R14,7 million 
(US$946 667) on by-elections over the period in question. The IEC does not consider this an 
unsustainable figure (Hendrickse, quoted in Chirambo and Steyn 2009: 58). Secondly, in 
terms of power balance between political parties, the study found that local government by-
elections are indeed contributing to shifts, with the ruling ANC the biggest beneficiary of by-
elections, confirming Strand, et al.’s (2005: 68) hypothesis in this regard. Finally, low voter 
turnout in by-elections was indeed a reality, but the authors did not investigate the impact of 
low voter turnout on newly elected councillors’ democratic legitimacy (Chirambo and Steyn 
2009: 60-61). Organisationally, the authors found that mechanisms were in place to deal with 
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the loss of representation that communities experience for the time between the loss of a 
councillor and a by-election (Chirambo and Steyn 2009: 56-58). Chirambo and Steyn (2009: 
5-6) discussed serious problems with local government service delivery, but the impact of 
HIV and AIDS was only one of several factors contributing to these. 
In terms of governance, three broad potential risks were listed in Chapter 1, namely, reduced 
efficiency and loss of institutional memory associated with losing electoral management 
board (EMB) staff members; a bloated voters’ roll (Chirambo 2008: 38; Strand 2005: 5); and 
for PLWHA, structural and attitudinal restrictions to voting (Strand 2005: 6; Chirambo 2008: 
37). The first empirical study to investigate this topic in South Africa was by Strand, Matlosa, 
Strode and Chirambo (2005). In studying the IEC, these scholars generally could not prove 
or disprove the abovementioned expectations of scholars. They could find no data to 
indicate IEC staff attrition due to the disease, with only four permanent staff members dying 
from unspecified causes during the period studied (2001-2003) (Strand, et al. 2005: 88-91). 
Concerning volunteer staff, who are mostly teachers and according to certain studies are at 
great risk of infection (Chirambo 2008: 37), insufficient data was available. In studying the 
2004 general elections, the authors did not become aware of any trouble with updating of the 
South African voters’ roll, although an increase in deaths among young adults was noted by 
staff members (Strand 2005: 93). It was with the “special vote” that Strand, et al. (2005) 
detected an important impact. The special vote (for those unable to vote on the day) was 
available and utilized in the 2004 election, but citizens in regions heavily affected by HIV and 
AIDS did not make greater use of this facility than elsewhere, and the authors argue that 
information about eligibility for the special vote was not clearly communicated to PLWHA 
(Strand, et al. 2005: 164-5). Having HIV or providing care to a person living with HIV or 
AIDS did not render South Africans any less likely to value their right to vote, but these 
individuals expressed fear of stigma and discrimination at the polling stations (Strand, et al. 
2005: 165-166). They also mentioned logistical obstructions to voting, such as lack of toilets 
and lack of transport (Strand, et al. 2005: 168-169). These findings indicate that the political 
participation of PLWHA is restricted. As Strand (2005: 11) argued, “[u]nless electoral 
governance is designed so as to maximise the actual opportunity for people who are directly 
or indirectly affected by HIV/AIDS to participate in elections, the risk is that the political 
voices of this critical and growing constituency will never be heard.” Another general 
election took place in 2009, and a similar study to the one by Strand, et al. (2005) may 
provide vital new data and enable longitudinal comparison.  
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To summarise, electoral systems at the national level are protected from an increase in by-
elections by the PR list system, meaning that at least in terms of minimizing the effects of 
HIV and AIDS on democratic institutions, it is not advisable to reform the electoral system. 
Electoral systems at local government level have been burdened with many by-elections, 
many of which were caused by deaths that follow AIDS mortality patterns. These by-
elections were not deemed financially unsustainable, but increased the proportion of seats 
held by the ruling party. With regards to scholars’ expectations that these by-elections may 
affect councillor legitimacy or service delivery negatively, no hard evidence has been 
forthcoming. The main concern regarding the impact of HIV and AIDS on electoral 
governance is Strand, et al.’s (2005) finding that PLWHA face structural and attitudinal 
restrictions to voting. This is an important area for further investigation.  
Because South Africa continues to extend access to ART, with access extended from a small 
minority of those who needed it in 2003 to 65% of adults in 2009 (see introductory section 
above) the impact of HIV and AIDS on electoral systems and electoral governance will have 
changed since the abovementioned studies were conducted. New studies of the impact of 
HIV and AIDS on the 2009 general elections and 2011 local government elections would 
enable valuable longitudinal comparisons. 
4.2.3. Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
This section presents a brief overview of the status of political rights and civil liberties in 
South Africa. It then makes mention of the constitutional provision for socio-economic 
rights and the impact of court cases concerning the right of citizens to ART on citizens’ 
ability to exercise their political rights and civil liberties in South Africa.  
The South African Bill of Rights, written into Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution, 
incorporates all universally accepted fundamental rights and freedoms (Govender 2006: 119), 
including the right to access to healthcare. The country has done better than expected in 
upholding essential civil and political liberties (Friedman 2009: 109), but has lost some 
ground according to its Freedom House ratings since 1994 (see Table 2). 
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The country scored a 2 for political rights and a 3 for civil liberties in 1993. These scores 
improved to 1 and 2 respectively in 1994. Thereafter the trends are (a) that political rights 
fared better than civil liberties, and (b) that political rights eroded slightly since 2006. 
Civil liberties have remained constant at a score of 2. The rights of detained and accused 
prisoners, the excessive use of force by the police, anti-foreigner sentiments, violence against 
women and the slow realisation of broad socio-economic rights, especially in rural areas, are 
some of the issues clouding the country’s record in this regard (Human Rights Watch 2005, 
quoted in Govender 2006: 118). There are also indications that the situation with regards to 
freedom of the press is deteriorating. A Freedom House (2010b) publication, Freedom of the 
Press, moved South Africa into the “partly free” category in terms of its media freedom in 
2010. The report cited “top government officials’ hostile rhetoric toward the media”; 
“official encroachments on the editorial independence of the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC)” and the passage of the Film and Publications Act, which “legitimizes 
some forms of prepublication censorship” ostensibly to protect against child pornography 
and hate speech (Freedom House 2010b). Since the publication of the 2010 Freedom of the 
Press report, the Protection of Information Bill (RSA 2010b) was tabled before parliament, 
raising further controversy. Rights-related NGOs and media companies initially pointed to 
the harshness of proposed sentences for revealing unauthorised information and the broad 
definition of state security, arguing that the proposed legislation could be used to veil 
corruption and illegal activity (Sole, Dawes and Brummer 2008). Some concessions have 
been made, but the Bill remains controversial, criticised by civil society, parliamentary 
opposition and legal experts as a threat to democratic transparency and as inconsistent with 
the Constitution (Donnelly 2011). This Bill, coupled with a proposed Media Tribunal whose 
Table 2. South African Freedom House Ratings, 1973-2010 
Sources: Freedom House (2011c); Freedom House (2011d). 
 
Year PR CL Year PR CL Year PR CL Year PR CL Year PR CL 
     1980 5 6 1990 5 4 2000 1 2 2010 2 2 
     Jan.1981-Aug. 1982 5 6 1991 5 4 2001 1 2 2011 2 2 
     Aug.1982-Nov.1983 5 6 1992 5 4 2002 1 2      
1973 4 5 Nov.1983-Nov.1984 5 6 1993 5 4 2003 1 2      
1974 4 5 Nov.1984-Nov.1985 5 6 1994 2 3 2004 1 2      
1975 4 5 Nov.1985-Nov.1986 5 6 1995 1 2 2005 1 2      
1976 4 5 Nov.1986-Nov.1987 5 6 1996 1 2 2006 2 2      
1977 5 6 Nov.1987-Nov.1988 5 6 1997 1 2 2007 2 2      
1978 5 6 Nov.1987-Nov.1988 5 6 1998 1 2 2008 2 2      
1979 5 6 Nov.1988-Dec.1989 6 5 1999 1 2 2009 2 2      
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legislation has not yet been drafted, have raised fears that government is taking steps to 
reduce its accountability and protect corruption from public scrutiny. 
In explaining the decline in South Africa’s political rights score, Freedom House (2007) cited 
“the ruling ANC’s growing monopoly on policy making and its increasingly technocratic 
nature” – by implication, Freedom House was arguing that the political rights of South 
Africans outside the ANC (be it the opposition, whose share of the vote was shrinking 
consistently until 2009, or ordinary citizens) to influence public policy was being 
compromised. Since then, with a score of 2 for both civil rights and political liberties, the 
country is closer to the borderline between states classified by Freedom House as “free” and 
those considered “partly free”. Provided one accepts Freedom House’s analysis as a good 
reflection of the level of democraticness in a given country (as does Diamond, see Chapter 
2), this decline in South Africa’s rating could be seen as possibile proof of democratic 
erosion (Schedler 1998: 103). The notion that the ANC under Mbeki exercised a “growing 
monopoly on policymaking” is supported by the work of Butler (2005a: 600). However, 
given the successful challenge to the government’s HIV and AIDS policy in 2001-2003, and 
the more collaborative policy formation on this issue thereafter, it is unlikely that the decline 
in rating was directly related to this disease alone. Suggestions of constraints to the electoral 
participation of South African PLWHA and their caretakers (see above) were not mentioned 
in Freedom House reports.  
Aside from the abovementioned political rights and civil liberties usually associated with 
democracies, the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution provides for certain socio-
economic rights. These include Section 25, the right to property, Section 26, the right to 
housing, Section 29, the right to education, and, importantly for the purpose of this study, 
Section 27. This section grants citizens access to health care services, along with the right to 
food, water and social security. It adds that the state must take “reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each 
of these rights” (RSA 1996).  
Govender (2006: 114) notes that it was feared these socio-economic rights would be 
“reduced to a wish list as it would be extremely difficult to prove that government had acted 
irrationally and in bad faith”. However, the outcome of the PMTCT case Minister of Health 
and others v Treatment Action Campaign and others (Constitutional Court of South Africa 2002, 
see introductory section) and its appeal, demonstrated that the government could be required 
to justify its policy choices that impacted on socio-economic rights, taking into account the 
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minimum core of the right, available resources and other factors and would be held “to the 
benchmark of reasonableness” (Govender 2006: 116-117). This case, it has been argued, 
indirectly strengthened citizens’ ability to participate in decision-making, beyond the issue of 
access to PMTCT drugs. Butler (2005a: 15) argues that the TAC, by relying on the 
Constitution and the courts as democratic institutions which are designed to protect citizens’ 
rights, strengthened these institutions and advanced judicial activism as a means of calling the 
executive to account (Butler 2005a: 15). At the more individual level, Robins (2006: 314) 
argues that HIV and AIDS activism has mediated and retold the traumatic experiences of 
AIDS sufferers, enabling the revitalisation of large numbers of formerly isolated and 
stigmatized HIV and AIDS sufferers into a social movement. Many PLWHA, through 
organisations such as the TAC and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF or Doctors Without 
Borders), have participated in activism and policy debates around broader issues such as the 
National Health Insurance (NHI). Therefore it could be argued that through the legitimation 
of rights-based legal challenges to the state and the political empowerment of previously 
marginalised citizens, the politics around the constitutional right to access to medical care has 
intersected with – and strengthened – political rights and civil liberties in South Africa. This 
will be elaborated upon in the section concerning civil society below. 
4.3. Socio-economic factors 
4.3.1. Affluence, economic growth and inequality reduction 
South Africa is an upper middle income country with an estimated per capita income in 2009 
of $10 060 (PPP) (World Bank 2010a). When Przeworski, et al.’s (1996) $6 000 mark for 
“impregnable” democracies is adjusted for inflation, to $12 195.78 in 2010 prices (see 
Chapter 2), South Africa is not affluent enough to render its democracy “impregnable”: it lies 
in the upper ranges of “fragile” democracies.  
Economic growth, although modest, has been consistent, averaging 3.27% per quarter 
between 1993 and 2010 and experiencing only three quarters of negative growth due to the 
2009 global financial crisis (TradingEconomics 2011). As the economy has grown, so have 
real earnings for those in the formal sector (Burger and Yu 2007: 15) – but high 
unemployment and a large percentage of individuals living in absolute poverty are an 
inequality inheritance that the country is struggling to rectify. Van der Berg (2010: 19) argues 
that the main challenge in South Africa remains the condition of the labour market, namely, 
the low human capital of the unskilled bulk of the population (see the discussion of 
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education in the next section). Inequality is therefore extremely high and has not been 
reduced since 1994 – in the mid-2000s, the poorest 5 million South Africans received only 
0.2% of GDP while the richest 5 million received 51% (Marais 2010: 317). However, the 
racial dimension of inequality has softened, with more differentiation in earnings within racial 
groups (Van der Berg 2010: 19). A system of social grants since the 1990s has been expanded 
to become one of the largest in the world (as a percentage of GDP) for a country that is not 
a “welfare state”44 and has been successful in partially relieving the effects of extreme 
poverty (Van der Berg, Burger, Burger, Louw and Yu 2006: 9-10). 
The arguments of Mattes (2003) regarding the potential impact of HIV and AIDS on 
economics in countries with high prevalence of HIV were described previously. Citing 
Przeworski, et al. (1996), he argued that affluence, economic growth and inequality reduction 
all influence the endurance of democracy positively and that affluence has a particularly 
strong correlation with democratic survival. Mattes (2003: 3-6) reviewed what literature was 
available in 2003 about the impact of HIV and AIDS on the economies of heavily affected 
countries. All projections of this impact were negative, particularly with regard to slower 
economic growth and increasing inequality, with the exception of uncertainty about the 
influence of HIV and AIDS on per capita income (some scholars believed that it could rise 
due to the high levels of mortality). AIDS-related pressure on fiscal budgets could also 
reduce the funds available for other development priorities (Mattes 2003: 5-6). But he 
emphasised there were no case studies yet, only conjecture in search of testable hypotheses. 
Using differing methodologies, three studies (quoted in Smit and Ellis 2009: 250) published 
in the beginning of the 2000s predicted that South Africa’s economic growth from year to 
year would be lower with AIDS than without it: ING Barings (Quattek 2000) estimated it at 
0.3 percentage points lower while Laubscher, Smit and Visagie (2001) put the figure at 
between 0.33 and 0.63. Arndt and Lewis (2000) projected a more pessimistic reduction of 
1.6% percentage points in economic growth. The latter scholars furthermore projected that 
the growth of per capita income could decline (although it would not be reversed) as a result 
of the epidemic while the former two studies found that the epidemic would result in higher 
per capita growth rates because of population reduction. In short, differing methodologies 
reached quite different conclusions about the macroeconomic impact of the epidemic – but 
contradicting Butler (2005: 4) who stated that economists had yet to reach any consensus on 
                                               
44 Welfare states, like Sweden, make benefits available to all citizens. In South Africa, social grants are paid 
to about 14 million beneficiaries, most of them poor and black, in a population of 50 million.  
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the general macroeconomic impacts of AIDS, there was widespread agreement that the 
epidemic would result in lower GDP growth rates.  
The most recent study of the macroeconomic impact of HIV and AIDS was undertaken by 
the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) in 2004/5 and a summary of the findings was 
published by Smit and Ellis (2009). The study simulated three scenarios: one in which AIDS 
did not exist in South Africa; one in which some HIV prevention programmes were in place, 
but no ART was provided; and one in which a large-scale ART programme consistently 
reached 50% of those who needed it. The time period for which the simulations were run is 
2000-2020. 
The BER considered that AIDS would impact the economy in the following ways (see Smit 
and Ellis 2009: 254-258). It would lead to a lower fertility rate and higher mortality, thereby 
reducing population growth and the size of the labour force. Higher levels of government 
health care and welfare expenditure was inevitable, and the study assumed that 50% of health 
care costs would simply crowd out other health priorities. Companies would face direct costs 
in the form of medical aid and death benefits to their employees, as well as a much bigger 
(and less avoidable) burden of indirect costs related to absenteeism, lost experience and 
skills, recruitment and training and lower labour productivity. Funerals would impact on 
household consumption expenditure and personal savings.  
The study confirmed that, as has been argued for a decade (particularly by Nattrass 2004), 
the macroeconomic benefits of providing ART to South Africans who need it far outweigh 
the costs. In the scenario of AIDS with no ART, GDP growth could be 0.46 percentage 
points lower per annum for the period 2000-2020 than in the scenario in which AIDS did 
not exist in the country. Considering that South Africa’s average growth rate is 3.27% per 
annum, this figure would make a dent in economic growth, but not come close to reversing 
it. If ART is provided to 50% of those who need it, the figure lowers to 0.38 percentage 
points. The amount of GDP “saved” by providing ART to 50% of those who need it was 
almost thrice the projected cost of the medicine – and given the better prices that South 
Africa has recently negotiated with pharmaceutical companies (see the introductory section 
of this chapter), this “saving” may be even greater. Even purely in terms of the government’s 
fiscal considerations, ART made sense: providing ART meant that the AIDS-related budget 
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deficit would be 10% smaller than it would be if government provided no ART45 (instead of 
increasing the government deficit by an annual average of 0.73% of GDP, it would increase 
it by only 0.66%). In short, there are steps to be taken to ameliorate the impact of AIDS, but 
it will slow economic growth. Although this is far from positive for democratic 
consolidation, it is not catastrophic either. 
In contrast to this relatively mild impact on macroeconomic growth, the projected impact of 
the epidemic on population growth was quite pronounced. For this reason the model 
predicted that the average income per capita would be higher because of AIDS than it would 
have been without it46, and since the virus decimates the labour force much more than it 
impacts on employment creation, Smit and Ellis (2009: 260) found that the country could 
expect that, albeit in a grim way, AIDS would greatly reduce the unemployment rate. In the 
absence of AIDS the model projected an unemployment rate of 21% by 2020 as opposed to 
a rate of only 8.7% by the same year in the case of AIDS without ART. The authors did not 
provide an estimate for the unemployment rate if 50% ART is provided, stating only that 
providing ART meant that more employment would be created. At the same time, the 
provision of ART would reduce the AIDS mortality rate (as mentioned before). The 
projected decrease in unemployment because of HIV and AIDS is therefore uncertain. 
Leibbrandt, et al. (2010: 23) pointed out that the unemployment rate47 increased in the period 
2001-2008 despite the loss of a proportion of the labour force to AIDS, because this loss has 
been offset by increased participation in the labour market (in other words, more individuals 
are seeking employment). Other events, such as the global financial crisis of 2008/9, could 
also not be taken into account when the simulation was run in 2004/5, while the provision 
of ART now exceeds the level factored into the above simulation and has become cheaper 
(as mentioned before). The point is that the authors considered AIDS a factor that would 
reduce unemployment – but other factors, unanticipated or underestimated in the study in 
question, seem to be working in the opposite direction, increasing the labour force and 
reducing employment opportunities. 
Unfortunately the study drew no conclusions about the effect of the epidemic on income 
inequality, which must take into account the net effect of a smaller labour force, slower 
                                               
45 This is not to say that providing ART is cheap. There are concerns about the future affordability of 
antiretroviral drugs (Marais 2011: 318). The argument here is that the cost of not providing ART would be 
even less affordable as other welfare costs would be driven up. 
46 Smit and Ellis qualify this statement by emphasising that the model does not capture the long-term effect 
of AIDS on human capital formation, which according to Bell, et al. (2006) could be severely affected.  
47 These scholars use the broad definition of unemployment, which includes those who have sought work 
in the past four weeks instead of the past week.  
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economic growth and job creation and the vulnerability of the poor. Such a study is sorely 
needed, as aggregate figures such as the ones discussed above may mask the development of 
an increasingly “polarised” society (Marais 2010). Marais (2010: 310) argued that the disease 
disproportionately impacts upon those individuals who are already impoverished, stressed 
and unable to deflect the costs of illness and death beyond the confines of their lives, 
therefore “driving an even thicker wedge between the privileged and the deprived”. In other 
words, he postulated that the epidemic is reinforcing the patterns of inequality already so 
pronounced in South Africa. However, it is possible that the South African GINI coefficient, 
which Przeworski, et al. (1996) use to measure income inequality, could remain stable or 
actually improve, given the contradictory influences of an increase in the number of poor 
citizens and a simultaneous reduction in the size of the labour force (which was expected to 
decrease unemployment, although other factors seem to have offset this effect). In this case, 
the divide between minimum wage earners and the very poor would widen – how such 
structural changes may influence a democracy’s chances at survival has not been studied. 
To conclude, the implications for democratic consolidation are mixed. The available 
literature projected that HIV and AIDS would impact negatively on economic growth, but 
that this impact would be less severe amid the current move to scale up access to ART than 
without it. It was expected that the disease would even speed up the growth of per capita 
incomes through a reduction in population growth. Unfortunately, there was no quantitative 
analysis of the impact of HIV and AIDS on inequality, but there are indications that poor 
South Africans carry a disproportionate share of the AIDS burden.  
4.3.2. Trends in Human Development (UN HDI) 
South Africa’s HDI, like that of Botswana, has declined in the past 20 years despite 
economic growth and efforts to expand access to basic services. 
 
South Africa’s HDI rating rose to 0.634 in 1995, but then fell substantially to 0.587 in 2005 
(see Table 3). Despite incremental gains thereafter, it ended in 2010 at a worse level than in 
Table 3. South African Human Development Index, selected years, 1990-2010 
Source: UNDP 2010. 
 
1990 1995 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
0.601 0.634 0.587 0.588 0.590 0.592 0.594 0.597 
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1990. Since South Africans’ income per capita consistently improved over the period 1995 to 
2005 and the education rating fell by only 0.19 points (see Table 3 below), this fall is 
attributable mostly to the third variable that makes up the HDI, namely life expectancy, 
which declined by almost a decade during the past 10 years (see Figure 8 below). Thereafter, 
with the downward trend in life expectancy reaching a turning point and the education rating 
slowly climbing upwards, the country’s overall HDI began to rise again, ending at 0.597 in 
2010. This did not prevent it from slipping to 110th (down 6 places from 104th in 2005) in 
comparison with the HDI of other countries in the world (UNDP 2010). 
Since the previous section included a discussion of the impact of HIV and AIDS on per capita 
incomes, this section will only discuss the state of South Africa’s education and health and 
the likely influence of the disease on these two aspects of the UN HDI.  
 
The UNDP’s Education Index for South Africa combines mean years of schooling for adults 
aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school going age. The rating 
improved considerably48 between 1990 and 1995; dropped marginally in the decade leading 
up to 2005 and thereafter continued on an incremental upward trend (see Table 4). This 
indicates that, compared to 1990, South Africans receive several more years of schooling 
today. Although the country’s education index has not been improving at a rapid pace, the 
table shows that the declines in overall HDI are mostly not attributable to the education 
index. 
It is important to note that this index does not measure the quality of education that citizens 
receive. This table reflects an encouraging trend of increased years of schooling among South 
Africans, which has been the norm throughout the 1900s for all race groups. Although 
schooling was only made compulsory for black South Africans after 1994 (Fiske and Ladd 
2003: 4), low quality education was expanded for a great part of the population during 
                                               
48 The reason for the great difference between 1990 and 1995 is not indicated. It is possible that different 
data sources were incorporated after 1994, and/or that the expected years of schooling for children in 1995 
was unrealistically high in 1995 and adjusted downward thereafter. 
Table 4. South African Education Index, selected years 
Source: UNDP 2010. 
 
1990 1995 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
0.549 0.667 0.648 0.653 0.656 0.66 0.664 0.668 
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Apartheid, dramatically reducing the gap in the average number of years of schooling for the 
different race groups (Van der Berg 2010: 17). In 1994, South Africa’s new government 
inherited racially defined, separate departments of education. Since then the system has 
undergone some far-reaching changes including the merging of the old departments, the 
introduction of an outcomes-based curriculum and changes in the framework for educators’ 
qualifications (Louw, Shisana, Peltzer and Zungu 2009: 205-6). 
Unfortunately, studies indicate that by international standards, the quality of South African 
education has not improved (Louw, et al. 2009: 205-6). By 2008, Servaas van der Berg still 
wrote that “[m]assive differentials on achievement tests and examinations reflect South 
Africa’s divided past. Improving the distribution of educational outcomes is imperative to 
overcome labour market inequalities.” If AIDS impacts negatively on education, particularly 
education for poor black learners, it compounds this problem. 
 It was projected in 2001 that HIV prevalence among teachers could rise from 12% in 2001 
to 30% in 2010 (AbT associates, quoted in Bennel 2005a: 453). This prompted a broad-scale 
study by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 2004-2005. The results of this 
study, which surveyed 20,626 educators in 1,766 South African schools, were analysed by 
Shisana, Peltzer, Zungu-Dirwayi and Louw (2005), Peltzer (2008) and Louw, et al. (2009).  
Firstly, the study confirmed fears that HIV prevalence was high among educators, but did 
not match Chirambo’s (2008: 31) assertion that in Southern Africa, a third of teachers are 
infected with HIV. By testing specimens voluntarily provided (by 83% of the educators) for 
HIV, they found that 12.7% of educators were HIV positive, and that young female 
educators were particularly affected, with a prevalence rate of 21% (Louw, et al. 2009: 208). 
This is high, but the age, gender and racial distribution of HIV among teachers was quite 
similar to that of the general population (Shisana, et al. 2005: 55-56).  
Secondly, the quality of education was affected by HIV at the learner, family and community 
level. The majority of teachers who were aware of learners affected or infected by HIV 
extended emotional, psychological and/or material support to such learners. 45% of such 
teachers reported not having time to attend to the educational needs of all learners in the 
class and 28% found it difficult to teach learners. At the family level, educators who had 
infected or affected family members were frequently struggling to cope with their workload 
(34.5%), were stressed (43.5%) and “sad and depressed” (45.4%). At the community level, 
frequent attendance of funerals (38% of respondents had attended an AIDS-related funeral 
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in the past two years) was likely to impact upon teacher attendance, especially in African 
communities where attending a funeral could often mean missing one or two days of work. 
Thirdly, according to this study an HIV-infected educator was the single factor that had the 
greatest impact, on the school in general as well as on fellow educators specifically: having an 
HIV-infected colleague in 39.5% of cases led to larger classes; in 57.8% to a shortage of 
educators; in 59.1% to educators teaching subjects they were not trained for on behalf of 
their ill colleagues; and in 71% of cases, to many educators feeling depressed. It was not clear 
from the article how many teachers were already receiving ART if they needed it, but 
apparently ART was not yet provided at schools, making it difficult for educators who 
needed ART to access medication without missing school.  
This study indicated that HIV and AIDS are indeed negatively affecting education in South 
Africa. As Bennell (2006) pointed out, however, in South Africa teacher mortality itself 
would not likely pose a catastrophic threat to the education system as a whole. For instance, 
by 2003, teacher mortality (all causes) had risen and then declined in KwaZulu-Natal and had 
never reached more than 1% of teachers (Babcock-Walters and Wilson, quoted in Bennel 
2006: 3). Bennell (2006: 3) suggests that the decline could be explained by teacher behaviour 
change and access to ART. Instead of a direct link between AIDS and a single aspect of the 
education system (such as the death of teachers), it is the composite impact of the disease 
that places strain on an already struggling system. 
As pertains to health, some background is appropriate. Previously, the system prioritised the 
health of whites above that of blacks (Youde 2007; Fourie 2006; Chopra, Lawn, Sanders, 
Barron, Karim, Bradshaw, Jewkes and Karim, Flisher, Mayosi, Tollman, Churchyard and 
Coovadia 2009). Treatable conditions such as tuberculosis and cholera were common causes 
of death among black adults; similarly, gastroenteritis, chest infections and diarrhea in 
children were among the dominant causes of death among the non-white population, while 
white children mostly died of accidents such as drowning (Youde 2007: 70). Youde (2007: 
71-72) argues that the National Party government often ignored diseases that seemed 
containable among the non-white population (such as polio and typhoid fever); that it used 
healthcare resources as a form of control over various racial groups, and that what resource-
intensive policies it did launch among blacks often came with heavy ideological baggage. 
Thompson (1995, quoted in Youde 2007: 70) notes that by the 1970s the life expectancy 
rates for white South Africans were comparable with those in the United States and Western 
Europe while government estimates of black life expectancy rates were 15 years lower. Life 
expectancy during Apartheid may be based largely on informed guesses, as the Apartheid 
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government did not require the recording of births and deaths among the black population 
(Seedat, quoted in Youde 2007: 70). 
Since 1994 South Africa has seen an expansion in basic health services and particularly a 
great increase in social and welfare benefits (Chopra, et al. 2009: 2). Health expenditure is 
high and many supportive policies are in place, yet healthcare outcomes remain poor and 
correlated with race. Mortality among black children, for instance, remains four times higher 
than for white children (Chopra, et al. 2009: 2). This may be partly explained by the fact that 
the private healthcare sector, which provides services to a (more privileged) minority of the 
population, receives about 60% of health expenditure, leaving 23-33 million South Africans 
dependent on an under-funded and poorly managed public health system. The public health 
care system is also increasingly under-staffed, with the proportion of total nurses and general 
practitioners working in the private (as opposed to the public) healthcare system having 
doubled since the 1980s. The proposed NHI is currently debated as a means to rectify this 
situation (Marais 2010: 313). 
The pandemic also contributes massively to poor health outcomes in South Africa (Chopra, 
et al. 2009: 1). The impact of the disease on mortality is vividly illustrated in life expectancy. 
Life expectancy – the average for all citizens – had climbed steadily until, in 1992, the average 
newborn South African baby could expect to live 61.5 years. This was still not near the life 
expectancy of citizens in countries with comparable per capita incomes, but the steady 
improvement was encouraging. Within the next decade and a half, that figure dropped 
rapidly, reaching a low of 51.4 years in 2007 – a figure it had last seen in 1966 (see Figure 8). 
It has now begun to climb slowly. 
 
Figure 8. South Africa Life Expectancy at birth, 1960 - 2009 
Source: World Bank 2011c. 
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Although noting that some parts of the health system have been reinvigorated by the 
challenge of HIV and AIDS, members of The Lancet team for South Africa emphasised in a 
series of articles on health in South Africa that increased AIDS-related morbidity and 
mortality threaten to overwhelm the South African health system (Chopra, et al. 2009: 1). 
Not only does the disease place strain on fiscal resources, but there is also evidence of a 
“brain drain” out of the public sector into HIV and AIDS-related programmes, thereby 
worsening the overall capacity of the health system (Chopra, et al. 2009: 5). Those who 
remain in public hospitals are often frustrated, citing burn-out, low morale and dysfunctional 
systems as chronic problems in the system (Van Holdt and Murphy 2007, quoted in Marais 
2010: 314). The HIV and AIDS pandemic also brings with it several other health challenges. 
Spreading exceptionally fast because of the weak immune systems of PLWHA, tuberculosis 
(TB) has become a serious epidemic and has developed multi drug-resistant (MDR) and 
exceptionally drug-resistant (XDR) strains. Had ART been rolled out earlier, this could have 
been prevented (Chopra, et al. 2009: 3). As mentioned in Chapter 1, the timely provision of 
ART to Ugandan HIV patients increased their life expectancy by up to 28 years (for those 
who initiated treatment at age 35) (Malan 2011). 
In short, challenges in the health and education systems are compounded by the additional 
pressure of HIV and AIDS. The impact on the education system is significant but not 
catastrophic on its own. In the health system, the disease has had a major impact, not only 
on those infected with HIV, but on the system as a whole as it adds pressure to resources 
and enables the spread of other diseases.  
4.3.3. Civil Society  
A robust civil society is deemed an essential factor in the process of democratic 
consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996: 17; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997:254; Leftwich 2000: 
146-147). Scholars (Mattes 2003: 9; Strand 2005: 3; De Waal 2006: 41-42; 2003: 13) have 
differed concerning the likely impact of HIV and AIDS on civil society (see Chapter 1). 
Unlike much of Africa (including Botswana), South Africa does not suffer from a “missing 
middle” (Chazan 1992: 282), at least until the end of Apartheid. It had a vibrant civil society 
sector. Many scholars have cited South Africa as an example of a civil society that was 
actually mobilised to get involved in public life because of HIV and AIDS.  
After 1994, a key reason for mobilisation – anti-Apartheid activism – fell away and initially, 
the behaviour of many civil society organisations was informed by the expectation that 
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“adversarial social struggle with the government” was no longer relevant. The dominant 
ANC government also co-opted many civil society associations, many CSOs were granted 
the opportunity to influence policy through engagement and cooperation with the 
government (Ballard, Habib, Valodia and Zuern 2006: 1). However, new social struggles – 
many of them linked to continued poverty and inequality – also soon emerged. Bolstered by 
the “positive” socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution and the newfound 
opportunity to use the Constitutional Court to influence policy (Friedman and Mottiar 2006: 
24-25), this proliferation of new CSOs have called the government to account for perceived 
inactivity, or insufficient effort, to provide in its citizens’ rights (Friedman 2003: 8; Ballard, et 
al. 2006: 2) such as adequate housing, sufficient jobs and the social and welfare services it has 
promised (Ballard, et al. 2006: 2). South African CSOs are also quick to challenge policies 
that are seen to be infringing on their political rights and civil liberties. Civil society in South 
Africa thus functions to challenge the state both where it is perceived as overweening and, 
notably, to “push” the government into policy areas where they believe it “can respond to 
social demands but chooses not to” (Friedman 2003: 8).  
It is likely that South Africa’s CSOs have had some negative experiences with HIV and 
AIDS. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Mattes (2003: 9) noted research that indicated that South 
African CSOs suffered losses in terms of productivity and human capital because of HIV 
and AIDS. In an exploratory study, Ryann Manning (2002, quoted in Mattes 2003: 9 and De 
Waal 2006: 41-42) found that civil society organisations in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal 
province were being affected by the disease as increasing numbers of their staff and 
volunteers succumbed to the disease. Moolman (2004) discussed the challenges of CSOs in 
the face of HIV and AIDS and reported on a workshop where South African CSO 
representatives sought solutions, but does not report on the perceived extent of the impact 
on these organisations. The negative impact of the disease on CSOs is thus under-
researched.  
On the other hand, scholars (especially Butler 2005a) argue that South Africa’s civil society 
may have been positively impacted by the politics around HIV and AIDS. The TAC, one of 
the most prominent rights-related CSOs, was founded as a direct response to HIV and AIDS 
in South Africa to campaign for the right of PLWHA to access to health care, as enshrined in 
Section 27 of the Constitution. Arguably one of the most successful of the South African 
social movements, the TAC is seen to have led the campaign (also through the courts) to 
pressure the cabinet into approving the rollout of ART to South Africans during Mbeki’s 
tenure (Friedman and Mottiar 2006: 24).  
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The TAC was founded in 1998 by a group of activists who drew up a petition calling on the 
South African government to develop a treatment plan for all those living with HIV and 
AIDS. Still active today, its states that it “advocates for increased access to treatment, care 
and support services for people living with HIV and campaigns to reduce new HIV 
infections” (TAC 2011). The group mobilised mostly among the black working class, the 
unemployed (particularly unemployed black women) and trade unions. It emphasised the 
civil rights of the poor and the working class to health care, employing class-based politics in 
contrast to the reliance of Mbeki and his (elite) supporters on race and cultural nationalist 
rhetoric (Robins 2004: 661-2). At the same time the TAC has also drawn support from 
health professionals and university students, and developed an organisational structure and 
support network that ultimately represented diverse class, ethnic, occupational and 
educational backgrounds (Robins 2004: 663).  
Confronting a popularly elected government as opposed to one widely deemed illegitimate 
(as some members had done as anti-Apartheid activists), the group has been particularly 
careful not to be seen to threaten democratically elected leaders. Instead, it has exhibited a 
willingness to “change strategic calculations to accommodate formal democracy” (Friedman 
and Mottiar 2006: 25). In this sense, the TAC is an example of a CSO that is beneficial to 
democratic consolidation: it does not aim to seize government or dispute the legitimacy of 
the democratic regime, but rather operates within, and therefore reinforces, democratic 
norms (Chazan 1992: 283; Linz and Stepan 1996: 18). 
The action of civil society, and the TAC in particular, is the key reason why Butler (2005a) 
argues that the impact of AIDS in South Africa has not only been negative, but also in some 
sense positive for democratic consolidation, because it deepened democracy institutionally. 
Firstly, as also discussed earlier in this chapter, Butler (2005a: 12-13) argues that the TAC 
case against the government (Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign and others 
2002), which it won, legitimated judicial activism to enforce the provision of constitutionally 
protected socio-economic rights. In a new democracy in which the (elected) executive had 
sometimes questioned the legitimacy of the judiciary, the TAC case resoundingly affirmed 
the legitimacy of judicial independence within constitutional democracy.  
Secondly, Butler (2005a: 13-15) argues that the TAC broke ground in terms of engagement 
with the government in a post-Apartheid environment. On the one hand, the group made it 
very difficult for the government to write it off as a vocal minority that lacked the 
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majoritarian or liberation credentials of the ANC and therefore did not deserve the 
government’s audience. The organisation, after all, opposed not only the government’s AIDS 
policies, but also the “western” international pharmaceutical industry, which was protected 
by international patents from selling AIDS drugs at prices affordable to the South African 
government. Challenging the government’s attempts to “whitewash” them or frame them as 
“anti-black”, many TAC activists expressed their support for the ANC and the Tripartite 
Alliance, and COSATU was one of the TAC’s key partners and some of the TAC’s symbols 
and songs also drew inspiration from the anti-Apartheid struggle (Robins 2006: 665). On the 
other hand, while demonstrating their support of the ANC generally, they certainly did not 
conform to government AIDS policy. In short, they found a balance between “craven 
deference” – which would not advance their goals – and “blind confrontation” (Butler 
2005a: 14). 
Besides taking care to portray itself, the TAC invested in innovative methods of 
campaigning. The TAC took to the streets and debated in courtrooms; it also made use of the 
internet, the media and its networks of South African and international CSOs. The TAC 
educated its members with regards to AIDS science and marshaled scientific research to 
support its case. It also engaged in acts of civil disobedience, such as buying cheap generic 
AIDS drugs (which were at the time unavailable to the South African public health system) 
in Thailand and illegally distributing them in South Africa (Robins 2004: 665), an action 
which drew such international attention that the pharmaceutical companies concerned were 
pressured into abandoning legal action to prevent the government from importing cheaper 
generic medicines.  
The TAC is thus a case study of a strong civil society movement in an African democracy. It 
owes its existence, and directs much of its work, to the HIV and AIDS epidemic in South 
Africa. Given its role in affirming the legitimacy of the legal system and judicial activism and 
its groundbreaking example of engagement with the post-Apartheid government, it may be 
argued that civil society in South Africa (not just those concerned directly with HIV and 
AIDS) would have operated in a less favourable environment had it not been for the TAC. It 
may even serve as an example to those civil society associations that opposed the 
government’s proposed censorship of the media in the “protection of information” debates 
in 2010-2011. 
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4.4. Assessment 
The South African experience with AIDS has been highly political. The AIDS stance of the 
government under Mbeki and health Minister Tshabalala-Msimang, labeled AIDS 
“denialism” by its opponents, was influenced by South Africa’s political history and sparked 
great controversy locally and abroad. While its negative influence on human development 
will be felt directly and indirectly for decades to come, the direct impact of the disease has, in 
some instances, been positive.  
In terms of the system of government, events around AIDS affirmed that provinces have a 
degree of policy independence vis-à-vis the national government and weakened the 
legitimacy of the increasingly centralist Mbeki as the developments around the disease 
revealed his disdain for debate even with his fellow ANC members.  
With regards to the electoral system, the PR system through which national government is 
elected mostly protects it from the negative effects of the disease, but these are being felt to 
some extent on a local level, with an increase in by-elections which have shifted the balance 
of power in favour of the ruling party. Perhaps the most important finding to emerge so far 
is the apparent lack of participation of PLWHA in the 2004 national elections. The electoral 
participation of this large proportion of society is a political right and, incidentally, one which 
they value highly. A follow-up study could shed light on whether this problem improved 
during the 2009 elections.  
With regards to political rights and civil liberties, the decline in Freedom House ratings since 
2006 does not seem directly linked to HIV and AIDS, and the action of the TAC with 
regards to the disease has encouraged an active pursuit of socio-economic rights using the 
democratic institutions of the Constitution and legal system; and has empowered citizens to 
participate in the development of public policy.  
With regards to socio-economic factors, the macroeconomic impact of HIV and AIDS is not 
clear-cut. The disease was projected to impact negatively on economic growth, but positively 
on per capita income. The impact on income inequality has not been quantified but scholars 
suggest that the poor will find it more difficult to escape poverty because of the disease. The 
research of Przeworski, et al. (1996) would therefore suggest a mixed effect on the “life 
expectancy” of South Africa’s democracy. Of course, a range of assumptions had to be made 
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about South Africa’s economic prospects for the period 2000-2020 and the projections may 
prove incorrect because of unanticipated or underestimated changes. 
Human development has been severely affected by the disease, as it compounds other 
unrelated challenges in both the education and health systems. The health system in 
particular is under great strain. If the theory of Welzel, et al. (2003) is borne in mind (see 
Chapter 2), a lower level of human development could damage the value South Africans 
attach to democracy. 
Finally, the impact of HIV and AIDS on civil society seems to have been mostly positive. It 
has affirmed the people’s right to organise and protest democratically; broken ground in 
terms of its tactics and engagement with the government; and affirmed the legitimacy of the 
judiciary vis-à-vis the executive government. What negative impact the pandemic is having 
on the productivity and human capital of CSOs is unclear and requires further research. 
In short, it appears that HIV and AIDS have had some positive effect on especially the 
democratic institutional framework within which politics take place, particularly revitalising 
civil society, but it also impacts negatively on socio-economic development in South Africa. 
Whether AIDS is South Africa’s greatest challenge is debatable – especially as it is 
intertwined with the challenges of high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality. If 
the country can succeed in scaling up access and adherence to ART, it can further mitigate 
the negative effect of the disease. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
5.1. Introduction  
This thesis studied the impact of HIV and AIDS on democratic consolidation in two African 
democracies. As discussed in Chapter 1, Mattes (2003) and others warned that this impact is 
potentially negative, particularly with regards to economic indicators, while Butler (2005a) 
emphasises some of the positive impacts that the epidemic had in South Africa, notably on 
civil society and the legitimacy of democratic institutions, inter alia through the courts. A 
multivariate model of democratic consolidation, developed in Chapter 2, was used to assess 
the impact of the pandemic on some key institutional (political system, electoral system, and 
political and civil liberties) and socio-economic factors (macroeconomic indicators, human 
development and civil society) in Botswana and South Africa. This chapter compares the 
findings and relates them to the arguments mentioned before. These comparisons are made 
by focusing on similarities and differences between Botswana and South Africa.  
5.2. Institutional comparison 
Botswana and South Africa are both parliamentary democracies that nevertheless feature a 
powerful executive president. They differ in the electoral system employed at national level – 
South Africa uses a PR list system while Botswana uses an FPTP system – but both countries 
regularly host free and fair elections. Each has been relatively successful in protecting 
citizens’ constitutional rights and is considered Free by Freedom House. These are 
similarities above the consolidation line, but neither have had any Huntingtonian “turnovers” 
(see the institutional requirements for democratic consolidation in Chapter 2). The current 
political system in Botswana has been in place and continuously ruled by the BDP since its 
independence almost five decades ago. South Africa’s system, ruled by the ANC, is not yet 
twenty years old. 
The first institutional factor of democratic consolidation that was studied is the system of 
government. Although Chapter 2 focused on the benefits to democratic consolidation of 
parliamentary versus presidential systems of government, the political systems in place in the 
two countries studied are quite similar, combining a parliamentary system with the strong 
executive president typical of African democratic systems. Therefore the states chosen for 
this study did not allow for a comparison of the effectiveness of parliamentary and 
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presidential systems in the context of HIV and AIDS. Yet, despite their similar design, these 
two governments handled HIV and AIDS differently, with divergent outcomes (so far) for 
their respective political systems. 
Given the extensive powers they both enjoy, the positive response of president Mogae and 
the initial response of president Mbeki to HIV and AIDS, labeled “denialism”, were 
important factors contributing to their states’ ability to address the pandemic. Botswana 
developed the most extensive ART distribution system in Africa (in terms of the proportion 
of citizens reached) and life expectancy levels began to increase from 2002 onwards, while in 
South Africa these levels continued to deteriorate until as late as 2007. While it may be 
argued that a purely parliamentary system in South Africa would have diffused policymaking 
power and minimised the harm of Mbeki’s denialism, his power to enforce a “denialist” 
policy was successfully challenged. It did not lead to serious political instability as 
presidentialism often has according to scholars such as Linz (1990) and Przeworski, et al. 
(1996). The successors of Mogae and Mbeki – Ian Khama and Jacob Zuma49 respectively – 
are taking a more moderate stance, with Khama acknowledging the pandemic but allowing 
former president Mogae to continue spearheading the national response as chair of NACA 
and promote HIV and AIDS efforts internationally, and President Jacob Zuma confirming 
medical orthodoxy and the importance of HIV and AIDS efforts while upholding the court 
decision of 2002 on the provision of ART (Constitutional Court of South Africa 2002).  
Instead of emphasising the importance of the choice of political system for South Africa’s 
democratic consolidation, Butler (2005a) points to the fact that the system in place is new 
and malleable. The era of HIV and AIDS coincided with the advent of South Africa’s 
democracy and with it the opportunity for Mandela, Mbeki, Motlanthe and Zuma to set 
precedents with regards to the president’s relationship to other democratic institutions. 
Butler (2005a) argues that the HIV and AIDS controversy demonstrated Mbeki’s willingness 
to undermine checks and balances and centralise executive power. It is therefore auspicious 
that Mbeki’s initial “denialist” policies were attacked and defeated by civil society 
organisations through the mechanisms of legitimate activism and the courts. The response of 
civil society, the courts, the provinces and the ANC itself demonstrated that presidential 
authority has limits: future presidents can expect a challenge through the mechanisms 
provided by the constitution if they make similarly controversial public policy. Democratic 
consolidation of the attitudinal and constitutional dimensions (Linz and Stepan 1996: 15) was 
                                               
49 Kgalema Motlanthe was Mbeki’s immediate successor, serving out the remainder of Mbeki’s term, from 
September 2008 to May 2009. 
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demonstrated as these actors showed a commitment to democratic procedure amidst a policy 
crisis.  
In contrast, the political system in place in Botswana has a relatively long and stable history. 
Masire (who was in office in 1985 when the first AIDS cases were reported in Botswana) 
supported HIV and AIDS efforts and Mogae (president from 1998 to 2008) demonstrated a 
level of commitment to addressing the pandemic that earned him international praise. This 
reaped political benefits for him and probably helped the BDP to remain popular, the 
majority of Botswana’s citizens are satisfied with the government’s efforts in terms of HIV 
and AIDS policy. But while South Africa responded to the president’s AIDS “denialism” by 
entrenching restraints on the power of the executive, there is no evidence in the literature 
surveyed that the popularity of the Botswana presidents’ vigorous efforts to address HIV and 
AIDS significantly impacted the relationship between president and parliament, civil society, 
the courts, or other institutions with regards to health and other policy development. Civil 
society remains relatively weak, and the executive, led by the president, continues to 
dominate the legislature. 
The second institutional factor is the electoral system. Botswana’s FPTP system, in place 
since the advent of democracy in the country, is typical of FPTP systems globally (see 
Chapter 2) in that it disproportionately advantages the ruling BDP. This party’s support base 
is rural, and 80% of seats in parliament represent rural areas, while at least half the 
population is urbanised. As a result many votes for the opposition are effectively “wasted” 
(notably in the 2004 elections, in which the BDP won 51% of the national vote and was 
awarded 77% of the seats in parliament). The FPTP system does at least ensure that there is 
an MP accountable to each geographic constituency. In South Africa there is a PR system 
and the composition of parliament is highly representative of parties’ national support, but as 
is typical of such systems, the lack of constituency accountability of MPs to voters is often 
seen as problematic. 
In Chapter 2 it was pointed out that both of the abovementioned electoral systems have 
advantages and disadvantages and that neither electoral system is necessarily always the best 
for democratic consolidation. Leftwich (2000: 138) emphasised that whichever system is 
used, that system must be deemed legitimate by voters and the process considered free and 
fair. The political considerations of the democracy in question should be considered – for 
instance, the need for political inclusivity in a previously divided society (Lijphart 1991), or 
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the need for a high level of accountability between political elites and the electorate 
(Reynolds 1995). This discussion in Chapter 2 was focused on national elections.  
On the one hand, in the context of HIV and AIDS, it may be suggested that the direct 
representation (and accountability) of MPs to their constituencies in Botswana was a major 
advantage, as it would compel them to lobby on behalf of their voters with regards to an 
issue of local concern, such as high infection levels in the mining towns or tourist hubs (see 
Chapter 3) and the corresponding need for healthcare services. The first HIV case was 
reported in an opposition constituency, Selebi-Phikwe, in 1985, and Botswana’s 
commendable, government-driven response started shortly thereafter (in 1986). Whether this 
is indeed partly attributable to its constituency system has not yet been established, however. 
On the other hand, the financial cost and quality of representation of the two systems were 
weighed up by such scholars as Strand (2005) and Chirambo and his colleagues (2008). 
Strand (2005) expressed the expectation, and Chirambo (2008) the finding50, that PR systems 
would function better than FPTP systems if increasing numbers of elected representatives 
died due to the disease, as a PR system is cheaper and less cumbersome to administer, 
requiring no by-elections (the next person on the party list simply fills the vacancy). It was 
therefore to be expected that the proponents of electoral reform in Botswana could point to 
the effects of the disease to strengthen their case. Instead, it is not clear whether the disease 
has significantly affected national electoral systems in either state, or citizens’ trust in them. 
Very few parliamentarians died while serving their terms and qualitative data regarding the 
health of MPs was confidential and not forthcoming. With only four deaths among MPs, and 
none of them attributable with certainty to AIDS, since HIV was first recorded in the 
country, the FPTP system of Botswana was apparently neither more costly, nor more 
cumbersome. But in a poorer country like Malawi, which also utilises an FPTP system, this 
verdict may have been different. 
The importance of local electoral systems was not touched upon earlier, yet Strand’s (2005) 
discussion of the negative effects of an AIDS-induced increase in by-elections in FPTP 
systems included their potential effect on local councils. Even though HIV and AIDS policy 
is not made at this level of government, he (Strand 2005) and Chirambo and Steyn (2009: 1) 
considered the potential effects of an increase in by-elections problematic for the quality of 
democracy. It was at this level of government – a level at which both countries employ MMP 
systems – that the Gossett and Lotshwao study (2010) and the Chirambo and Steyn study 
                                               
50 This finding (Chirambo, et al. 2008: 31) was made with regards to southern African states generally. 
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(2009) found mortality patterns typical of AIDS among directly elected representatives. 
These studies strongly suggested that both South Africa and Botswana have been forced to 
conduct more local government by-elections because of AIDS. Relating their findings to the 
expectations of Strand (2005) and others (mentioned above), these scholars found that by-
elections had not become unaffordable. The assertion that by-elections would favour the 
ruling party was found to be true for South Africa, but false for Botswana, where the BDP 
lost more by-election seats in local by-elections than it won. Finally, in South Africa there 
was anecdotal evidence of a reduction in the quality of representation. However, this was not 
investigated in this thesis.  
With regards to electoral governance, both Botswana and South Africa seem relatively 
unaffected. On the part of electoral management boards, neither Botswana’s nor South 
Africa’s IEC reported major operational obstacles related to HIV and AIDS. It is possible 
that the relative affluence of the two states in question made it easier for them to cope with 
such challenges as a dying voter corps (which necessitates frequent updating of the voters’ 
rolls) and staff replacement and training. In a poorer country (such as Zambia or Malawi), 
the pandemic may have a more destabilising effect on electoral governance. On the voters’ 
side, there is little research on the ability of people living with HIV and AIDS to participate 
in elections. Botswana’s PLWHA are not a vocal or coherent pressure group, and little 
research has been conducted about their challenges, but a group of South African PLWHA 
were available for Chirambo and Steyn’s (2009) study. These individuals expressed a fear of 
stigma and discrimination at voting stations, as well as challenges with regards to the “special 
vote”. Given South Africa’s improvements in the rollout of ART and the passing of another 
general election in 2009, a follow-up study was recommended in Chapter 4.  
Botswana and South Africa have thus had similar experiences with HIV and AIDS and 
elections. These similarities are above the consolidation line: regular and free and fair 
elections were never threatened by HIV and AIDS while the marked increase in deaths that 
both states experienced at local level remained affordable in terms of by-elections. From this 
point of view, therefore, while HIV and AIDS may be a health and even an economic 
problem, it is not a political crisis. 
The effect of the HIV and AIDS pandemic on political rights and civil liberties was also 
analysed. According to Freedom House the political rights of citizens in both countries have 
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recently worsened51. Both countries are considered Free, but political rights in South Africa 
remain better protected than those in Botswana. Botswana now scores a 3 for political rights 
and a 2 for civil liberties and is placed on the borderline between Free and Partly Free. South 
Africa (whose political rights score declined due to the ruling party’s growing monopoly on 
policy making) remains more securely in the Free category with political rights and civil 
liberties each rated at 2.  
Are these declines related to HIV and AIDS? This study has found very little evidence that 
they are. The official reasons given for the declines did not mention HIV and AIDS – 
Botswana’s decline was to a great extent due to perceptions that President Ian Khama tends 
to intolerance; and South Africa’s due to the ruling ANC’s growing monopoly on policy 
making and its increasingly technocratic nature. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
publication Human rights protected? (AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit 2007) reported in 
detail the extent to which human rights are legally protected with regards to HIV and AIDS 
in South Africa (especially since 2002) and Botswana (since 1986). While there were 
infringements (importantly, the constitutional right of South African PLWHA to access to 
healthcare was initially denied), it has been argued in the two states studied, the disease did 
not lead to political rights and civil liberties being gravely infringed upon, using Freedom 
House’s definitions of these concepts. 
Firstly, political rights, defined as “rights that enable people to participate freely in the 
political process” by Freedom House (2011a) have not been altered by HIV and AIDS, 
except to an extent for some PLWHA, who faced obstacles to voting as mentioned above – 
but this needs to be researched in more depth. On the whole, virtually all citizens of 
Botswana and South Africa may still “vote, compete for public office and elect 
representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the 
electorate” (Freedom House 2011a). Thanks to organisations such as the TAC, participation 
in policymaking has arguably even increased for many previously marginalised people living 
with HIV and AIDS. 
Secondly, civil liberties, which “allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational 
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the 
state” (Freedom House 2011a) are similarly relatively well-protected in these states, at least as 
far as HIV and AIDS are concerned. For instance, in both countries HIV is a non-notifiable 
                                               
51 The declines occurred at a time when Freedom House has declared the longest running global decline in 
political rights and civil liberties in the 40-year history of the survey (Freedom House 2011e). 
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disease except in narrowly defined circumstances (see Chapters 3 and 4), limiting 
discrimination against PLWHA. Those HIV and AIDS-related abuses that have been 
documented both in Botswana and South Africa (see Chapters 3 and 4) were not mentioned 
in Freedom House reports, except for South Africa’s experience with AIDS “denialism”.  
The controversial HIV and AIDS policy of president Mbeki is mentioned by Freedom 
House (2011d), but did not result in a lower civil liberties rating (see Chapter 4). This 
political episode may even have had some positive outcomes for civil liberties: as noted, 
Butler (2005a) argued that the politics around the constitutional right to access to healthcare, 
especially civil society’s court victories over the state, strengthened the rights of the infected 
population and demonstrate that those citizens have the right to freely organize, express 
criticism of, and litigate against the government. These events did not improve civil liberties 
to such an extent as to merit an increase in the countries’ Freedom House ratings, but De 
Waal (2006: 119) mostly seems justified in arguing that democratisation has thus far been 
protected by the voluntaristic, human rights-based approach adopted towards AIDS policy.  
Having reviewed these three institutional factors, it can be said that the two countries’ 
experiences with regards to HIV and AIDS and electoral systems have been similarly mild 
despite their differing electoral systems; and that the pandemic has also not resulted in an 
erosion of political rights and civil liberties ratings for either state. The impact of HIV and 
AIDS on the political system has however differed for the two countries under 
consideration. In South Africa, this impact was significant and even positive while in 
Botswana little impact was observed. This difference can be ascribed to the fact that South 
Africa’s political system was more responsive to challenges, leaving more room for 
precedents to be established. It even compelled a “denialist” president to support more 
orthodox HIV policies.  
5.3. Socio-economic comparison 
The neighbouring states of Botswana and South Africa are home to populations dissimilar in 
size and composition: Botswana’s almost 2 million citizens are relatively homogenous, while 
South Africa’s 50 million are more racially and ethnically heterogeneous. The two countries 
are both relatively affluent (among the top six in Africa, and far above Przeworski’s 
“extremely fragile” level), have had stable, moderate economic growth over the past decade 
and a half, but suffer from high income inequality. In South Africa, state services, including 
healthcare and education, were historically distributed in a highly discriminatory manner. 
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Despite considerable state spending post-1994, many South Africans still do not have access 
to basic state services, and municipal services in many townships are dysfunctional. 
Botswana’s government has for a longer time attempted to service even rural areas, which is 
logistically more difficult than servicing urban areas, and achieved considerable success. A 
history of political resistance (pre-1994) has also emboldened South African civil society, 
while their counterparts in Botswana are more deferential.  
Economic variables were the first socio-economic factor to be studied. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Mattes (2003) used the work of Przeworski, et al. (1996) to discuss the potential 
effect of HIV and AIDS on democratic consolidation through economic factors in high 
prevalence countries. He found that the pandemic would mostly have a detrimental impact 
on these factors and therefore would most likely affect the outlook for democratic 
consolidation. He also expressed the expectation that fiscal pressures and taxes would 
increase. However he emphasised there were no case studies yet, only conjecture in search of 
testable hypotheses, and that a drop in ART prices or innovative awareness campaigns could 
change the trajectory of the pandemic. The sections on economic factors in Chapters 3 and 4 
drew upon studies that were undertaken recently enough to take into account the fact that 
first-line ART had indeed become more affordable since the publication of Mattes’ paper.  
HIV and AIDS were expected to affect economic growth negatively in both countries 
(although without ART, the impact would be much more severe). The Jefferis, et al. (2008) 
study projected that even if Botswana achieved 80% ART coverage (which it now has), its 
economy would still grow at 1.2 percentage points less per annum than it would have in the 
absence of HIV and AIDS. This is a substantial impact if compared to the country’s growth 
levels over the past two decades (see Chapter 3). In the South African case, the BER 
(2004/5) study summarised by Smit and Ellis (2009) suggested a much milder impact of 0.38 
percentage points less growth per annum, assuming only 50% ART coverage (the country 
surpassed this level of coverage in 2009). Botswana’s economy is thus impacted much more, 
even with higher levels of ART coverage. One reason for this is, of course, that its HIV 
prevalence is simply higher than that of South Africa. With an estimated 25% of adults aged 
15-49 infected with HIV (UNAIDS 2009c: 19), Botswana is bound to see a greater impact 
on its economy than South Africa, where the corresponding figure is 16.9%. Secondly, the 
economy of Botswana is far less diversified, and its second biggest export industry, 
agriculture, is expected to be hard hit by HIV and AIDS, although this is speculation, as a 
sectoral breakdown of the projected impact in South Africa was not given in Smit and Ellis 
(2009). Third, it is possible that HIV prevalence levels are more similar between the skilled 
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and unskilled in Botswana. Because companies find it very expensive to replace skilled 
workers, Botswana’s economy may suffer more. In South Africa infection is concentrated 
mainly among those with low skills, who are less expensive to replace. Finally, 
unemployment in Botswana, although having grown fast since the 1990s, is lower than that 
in South Africa, where structural unemployment has been a problem for several decades (see 
Chapter 4). Botswana may thus also find it more difficult than South Africa to replace the 
unskilled labourers it loses due to AIDS.  
 
With regards to affluence, HIV and AIDS are expected to have opposite effects on 
Botswana and South Africa. Mattes (2003) pointed out that some literature suggests that 
AIDS could increase per capita incomes as it implies slower population growth. This was 
supported by Smit and Ellis (2009) for South Africa and rejected by Jefferis, et al. (2008) for 
Botswana. Neither country was expected to see a decline in per capita incomes, but in 
Botswana it was projected that per capita incomes would grow slower than would have been the case 
had there been no AIDS, as the disease affects economic growth more severely than the growth 
of the population (see discussion in Chapter 3), while in South Africa per capita incomes were 
projected to grow faster than would have been the case had there been no AIDS, as the effect on 
economic growth was expected to be relatively mild while the growth of the population and 
the workforce would slow considerably (see discussion in Chapter 4). In light of Przeworski, 
et al.’s (1996) finding that higher levels of affluence are conducive to democratic 
consolidation (see Chapter 2), AIDS could also be said to slow down an economic trend that 
is necessary for democratic consolidation in Botswana and, ironically, to speed it up in South 
Africa. However, South Africa arguably needs the push more than Botswana since it has not 
Table 5. The influence of per capita income on democratic endurance 
Source: Przeworski, et al (1996: 41); own calculations.  
 
Strength of 
democratic 
regime 
Per Capita 
Income 1985 
Adjusted for 
2009* Botswana 2009 South Africa 2009 
“Impregnable” Above $6 000 
Above  
$12 195 
$13 384  
Slightly above the 
“impregnable” 
bottom line - 
 
“Fragile” 
Between $6 000 
and $1 000 
Between  
$12 195 
and $2 032 - 
$10 060 
 Slightly under the 
“impregnable” level; at 
the upper end of 
“fragile” 
“Extremely 
Fragile” Below $1 000 Below $2 032 - - 
 
* PPP, current international $. 
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yet reached the “impregnable” zone of affluence in which Botswana falls, judged by 
Przeworskian standards (see Table 5). 
With regards to the reduction of inequality, it is important to note that GINI coefficient 
estimates of the impact were not presented for either country. Still, it can be deduced from 
the literature that Botswana’s prospects in the face of HIV and AIDS are more negative, 
while South Africa’s picture is more complicated. This is because Botswana’s more severe 
projected reduction in economic growth would slow the growth in the demand for labour, so 
that poor households, even those not directly affected by HIV and AIDS, risk being poorer 
than in the absence of HIV and AIDS. In South Africa, unemployment was expected to be 
greatly reduced by HIV and AIDS, but optimism in this regard should be tempered, not only 
by the fact that other factors (see Chapter 4) seem to be cancelling out the impact of HIV 
and AIDS on unemployment, but by strong indications that HIV and AIDS affects the poor 
disproportionately more and pushes more South Africans into poverty, correlating with the 
findings of Price-Smith and Daly (2004) for Zimbabwe. Marais (2010; 2011) is particularly 
forceful in arguing that the “heightened marginalisation of the very poor” is problematic in 
the light of South Africa’s already ineffective attempts at reducing inequality.  
In short, in terms of all three economic variables that Przeworski, et al. (1996) consider 
important for democratic consolidation, Botswana was believed to be worse off because of 
HIV and AIDS than it would otherwise have been. However, the democracy still remains 
unlikely to “die” (in Przeworski, et al.’s (1996) terminology) if one takes into account its 
already high level of income per capita, as well as such factors as the government’s 
commitment to treat patients. In practice, citizens of Botswana have until now consistently 
expressed very high levels of support for democracy and rejected authoritarianism (see 
Chapter 3). In contrast, South Africa’s population was more likely to be on average more 
affluent because of HIV and AIDS, but at the same time, the poor may become impatient 
with slow economic growth and continued (possibly aggravated) inequality.  
Both studies found that, as Mattes (2003) argued, the disease placed fiscal pressure on the 
governments of Botswana and South Africa but that government spending on ART makes 
fiscal sense. While both states rely to an extent on foreign donor funding to afford ART, 
neither state is close to becoming primarily a mechanism for ART distribution that would 
heed the instruction of foreign donors above the needs of individual citizens (De Waal 2006: 
114). Fiscal pressure also impacts on governments’ ability to address other developmental 
priorities.  
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With regards to human development, the UN HDI ratings of both South Africa and 
Botswana saw an unprecedented decline as the pandemic spread across their borders. Given 
the complex social effects of the disease, the UN HDI (an index that purposefully consists of 
only three key indicators) cannot offer a comprehensive indication of the damage the disease 
does to human development in these countries, except for the impact on life expectancy.  
With regards to education, a survey of recent ratings and literature has suggested that the 
quantitative effect of HIV and AIDS on education was initially overestimated. Botswana and 
South Africa score the same relatively high figure in the United Nations Human 
Development Report of 2010 at 0.668. This is a figure that combines citizens’ mean years of 
schooling and expected years of schooling, and therefore quantitatively measures the reach 
of the education system without evaluating its quality. Both countries made considerable 
progress in terms of this score between 1990 and 2010. This means that citizens are gradually 
increasing their mean years and expected years of schooling. With regards to teachers, it is no 
longer accepted knowledge that teachers are at particularly high risk of infection (De Waal 
2006: 114; Birdsall and Hamoudi 2006: 139). An in-depth HSRC study (Louw, et al. 2009) 
showed that South African teachers’ infection levels, although high for certain age, sex and 
race groups, are not remarkably higher than those of their demographic peers. Moreover, if 
these HIV positive teachers obtain appropriate ART, they can remain productive for many 
years. In Botswana, no data was available for the prevalence rate among teachers, but annual 
teacher deaths never amounted to more than 1% of their total in this country (Bennell 2005). 
HIV positive teachers who do need ART are likely to have access to it, because Botswana’s 
government began providing ART to teachers as early as 1999, three years before it 
commenced ART rollout to the general population in 2002 (Bennell 2006: 2). 
Education quality must be taken into account along with education quantity (Kinghorn and 
Kelly 2005: 493-494). South Africa’s education system is failing to improve education 
outcomes such as its learners’ performance in international literacy tests. This problem may 
be compounded by HIV and AIDS: the Louw, et al. study (2009) found that the quality of 
education is at risk when educators, learners, and/or members of the community are infected 
with the disease. This is a difficult proposition to measure quantitatively and is not taken into 
account in the composition of the UN HDI. Again, as Marais (2011) emphasises, education 
in poor areas (where learners already tend to receive a lower quality education) will be more 
affected than in affluent areas with often better schools. The situation is expected to be 
similar in Botswana, but further study is required.  
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It can thus be said that the effect of HIV and AIDS on education in Botswana and South 
Africa is very similar, in that it has not reversed a trend of increasing years of schooling but 
poses a threat to the quality of education, and does so to a greater extent in poorer and, 
perhaps, rural, communities.  
As already mentioned, the most drastic reduction in human development is the reduction in 
life expectancy. This is true in both Botswana and South Africa. However, there is a key 
difference in terms of scale: the South African public health system must reach a far greater 
and more diverse population than that of Botswana. Additionally, the South African system, 
unlike that in Botswana, required an overhaul after democratisation in 1994. Consequently, 
whereas not much mention is made of Botswana’s health system, scholars argue South 
Africa’s health system is under tremendous strain in terms of finances and insufficient 
human resources52 not only because of HIV and AIDS but also because of TB and other 
diseases whose spread are facilitated by the spread of HIV and AIDS. (At the same time, the 
country boasts a private healthcare system that is among the best in the world but serves only 
a minority of the population.) In Botswana, life expectancy levels have begun to climb from 
a low of 49 years (in 2002) to 54.1 years (in 2008). Although this is still considerably lower 
than the 64.1 year level the country had attained in 1989, it indicates that the country is 
succeeding in improving public health. In South Africa, similar progress is recent and slow, 
reaching its lowest point (51.4 years) as late as 2007. The restoration of life expectancies in 
both countries hinges upon the successful implementation of HIV prevention efforts. In the 
meantime, the South African public health system, lagging behind that of Botswana in HIV 
and AIDS treatment, reflects particularly poorly on the ability of the government to provide 
the basic needs of all citizens. 
The literature on education and life expectancy thus indicates that citizens of Botswana and 
South Africa – especially the disadvantaged – are experiencing more suffering and less 
improvement in the conditions of their daily lives than had HIV and AIDS not affected 
these countries. This is particularly worrisome in South Africa, a state where the population 
expects democracy to deliver extensive material benefits (Bratton and Mattes 2001: 5). 
Depending upon whether voters separate their support for the ANC from their support for 
democracy, it is possible that they would simply punish the ANC by voting for its 
competitors (which is not yet the case, judging by recent election results), or alternatively, 
                                               
52 These issues are highlighted in the present debate about the proposed National Health Insurance in 
South Africa. 
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support unconstitutional alternatives, such as violent municipal protests. This is when 
democracy begins to suffer.  
However, in neither country have the grave socio-economic effects of the pandemic 
amounted to societal collapse or political crisis as was predicted in earlier literature. Chapter 
2’s suggestion that declining human development is not conducive to democratic 
consolidation may still hold true to an extent, but it has not amounted to an outright 
rejection of democracy or widespread preference for undemocratic alternatives (see 
Afrobarometer data in Chapters 3 and 4). Voters may also embrace democratic options, such 
as punishing the ruling party by voting for another party if they do not consider the 
government’s service delivery adequate.  
Finally, Botswana and South Africa’s civil society sectors have been affected by, and 
responded to, HIV and AIDS in different ways. As Mattes (2003) suggested, the risk of 
losing key members of civil society to the disease is relevant. Some indications that this is 
happening were mentioned in Chapter 4, but more research is needed. As De Waal (2006) 
found, the impact may differ from state to state, with some citizens becoming more involved 
in civil society while others, burdened by illness or illness-related pressures, withdraw from 
public life. Of possibly greater import in terms of consolidating democracy is the behaviour 
of civil society groups (see Linz and Stepan 1996, as discussed in Chapter 2) who continue to 
operate – and here the situation looks more positive for South Africa than for Botswana.  
In South Africa the policy challenges around HIV sparked the founding of the TAC, an 
organisation that has become an iconic example of a vocal, critical civil society in a post-
struggle environment (similar to the Right2Know campaign against the Protection of 
Information Bill presently debated). Arguably, civil society in general would have operated 
less effectively, and in a less favourable environment, had the TAC not affirmed the 
legitimacy of the legal system and judicial activism and broken ground in terms of 
engagement with the post-Apartheid government. It drew broad-based support, challenged a 
popularly elected government and respected democratic rules of engagement. This 
experience suggests that De Waal (2006: 119) was justified in arguing that, with appropriate 
political mobilisation, African democracies could not only survive AIDS but, as Butler 
(2005a) points out, become stronger because of it. 
In Botswana, on the other hand, the government’s response has been considered pro-active 
enough not to provoke a critical response from a (weak) civil society. Here, the disease has 
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contributed to the trend of a proliferation of civil society organisations, but these 
organisations (AIDS-related and others) remain unable or unwilling to express vocal criticism 
of the government. Many of these groups depend on the government for funding; others 
may simply be aware that confrontation with the country’s political leaders could cost them 
popular support. If the recent trade union strikes in this country (related to salary increases) 
are the cause or effect of changing attitudes toward confrontational political engagement, 
behaviour might change. But HIV and AIDS were not an issue in these strikes. 
5.4. Assessment  
Having compared the experiences of Botswana and South Africa concerning the impact of 
HIV and AIDS on the factors of the multivariate model of democratic consolidation, some 
conclusions may be drawn. The most important is that at present, despite the cost and socio-
economic implications of the disease, there are no indications that HIV and AIDS are 
directly threatening to destroy or even erode the democracies of Botswana or South Africa. 
If state collapse is “a real possibility” (Whiteside 2008: 92), the contribution of HIV and 
AIDS to increasing this possibility is not as great as was initially expected. Even the FPTP 
electoral system employed by Botswana, reputed to be less suitable for HIV and AIDS 
communities, continues to function effectively. No democratic institutions in either country 
were weakened to the point of collapse. Remarkable as this may seem, as De Waal (2006) 
pointed out, African democracies have functioned amid socio-economic crises for decades. 
That human development plummeted while the quality of democracy remained relatively 
high suggests that, under certain conditions, retarded human development levels may not 
have a significant impact on democratic consolidation. But this is an issue for further 
research. 
Botswana and South Africa had certain similarities which limited the impact of HIV and 
AIDS in both states. Their experience with the disease also differed in certain respects, 
demonstrating the importance of their differing contexts. While a brief assessment of these 
similarities and differences may now present suggestions for the likely impacts of HIV and 
AIDS on other African democracies, some limitations of the study must be borne in mind, 
and will be discussed in the last chapter.  
The affluence of the two states is an important positive similarity. The findings of this study 
suggest that affluence makes it possible for Botswana and South Africa to overcome AIDS-
related economic challenges as well as those related to electoral governance. It also allows 
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these states to remain somewhat independent from foreign donors in terms of funding their 
efforts to combat the disease. Since Botswana and South Africa – together with Mauritius – 
are among the richest states in Southern Africa, other poorer states are likely to find the 
financial costs of HIV and AIDS more debilitating53.  
Another important positive commonality, which influences every socio-economic factor 
studied, is the availability of ART. (South Africa still lags behind in this regard, as discussed 
in Chapter 4.) While the affluence of the states in question is no doubt key to their ability to 
provide ART, international support can also be successfully secured. Appropriate 
antiretroviral treatment significantly increases life expectancy, relieves the fiscal burden of 
social care on the state, and protects productivity and continuity. Thus both economies and 
levels of human development are spared some of the ravages of the disease that seemed 
inevitable a mere decade ago. Moreover, by its visible effectiveness ART ameliorates the 
desperation of individuals infected and affected by HIV and AIDS and reinforces the 
perception that governments can meet their voters’ needs. If legitimacy hinges on citizens’ 
perceptions of democratic government as able to provide for those in need, ART contributes 
to maintaining popular support for democracy and negates the suggestions of De Waal 
(2003: 8) and Mattes (2003: 8) that the disease could cause a crisis of democratic legitimacy.  
A further similarity concerns the high levels of inequality in both Botswana and South Africa. 
The worst HIV and AIDS-related suffering falls upon the poor and marginalised while the 
elites and to an extent, the middle class, remain in a far better position to absorb economic 
losses and secure good education and health (through corporate medical programmes and 
private health care) despite the disease. In this way inequality has contributed to the overall 
stability observed so far (Whiteside 2008, quoted in Marais 2011: 317) despite the fact that 
between a sixth and a quarter of adults in each country were being infected with a deadly 
virus. What instability there is at present cannot be directly traced to the disease, but it 
remains possible that the desperation of the disadvantaged will eventually have more direct 
effects on the democratic systems in these states. 
The similarities between Botswana and South Africa are that both are affluent in terms of 
income per capita and have access to ART, but have high income inequality. The differences 
between the impact of HIV and AIDS on Botswana and South Africa have to do, firstly, 
                                               
53 Poverty may make it more difficult for states to deal with HIV and AIDS, but does not necessarily 
threaten democratic endurance (Przeworski, et al. 1996). The case of India demonstrates that when 
institutions remain strong, democracies can endure even when the population is poor. 
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with differing levels of infection. A greater percentage – 25% – of Botswana’s adults suffer 
from the disease, as opposed to 16.9% of the same age group in South Africa. Another 
important difference is the policy response of the government: the South African 
government’s response gave its citizenry much reason to criticise it, and as a result, public 
protest and court action were “tested” in a way that Botswana’s constitutionally granted 
methods of criticising the government were not. That South Africa’s democracy was in some 
ways strengthened by the challenge cannot hold true for every democracy in a similar 
position, however, as it had a remarkably robust civil society and judiciary even before HIV 
entered the country. 
Finally, the impact of HIV and AIDS differed between Botswana and South Africa because 
of their notable differences in terms of socio-economic structure. South Africa’s economy is 
diversified which seems to make it less economically vulnerable to the effects of HIV and 
AIDS on labour-intensive industries. The country is relatively unique in this regard. Other 
less diversified African economies may experience the more stark negative effects of HIV 
and AIDS as were projected for Botswana. On the other hand, Botswana’s human 
development index is recovering faster than South Africa’s, not only because of the former 
state’s earlier positive policy responses but also, it has been suggested here, because it has 
developed its public health and education systems over several decades of stability, thereby 
placing it in a better position than South Africa to respond to the new challenges posed to 
these systems by HIV and AIDS. Also, its population is twenty-five times smaller, more 
homogenous and may not necessitate the complex policy responses required in a large 
heterogeneous society such as South Africa’s.  
In conclusion, this thesis has placed the contradictory arguments of scholars with regards to 
the impact of the disease within a framework that deems both institutional and socio-
economic factors important for democratic consolidation. In doing so, it has highlighted 
positive and negative impacts for both the democratic institutions and the socio-economic 
conditions of Botswana and South Africa. Similarities between these states’ experiences with 
HIV and AIDS often hinged upon the states’ combination of relative affluence, the 
availability of ART and high inequality, while many of their differences revolved around their 
differing prevalence levels, divergent policy responses of their respective governments, and 
socio-economic structures. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1. Introduction 
The impact of HIV and AIDS on democratic consolidation has been investigated by means 
of a comparative analysis of two African democracies affected by this pandemic – Botswana 
and South Africa. In each case criteria relevant to consolidation were assessed. These criteria 
were derived from a multivariate model encapsulating both institutional and socio-economic 
factors. This chapter will evaluate the most important findings of the study and the 
methodology employed to reach them.  
The main finding was that, at present, despite the cost implications of the disease, there are 
no indications that HIV and AIDS are directly threatening to destroy the democracies of 
Botswana or South Africa. This finding differs from the expectations expressed by Mattes 
(2003), Barnett and Whiteside (2006) and other authors and comes closer to supporting the 
arguments of Butler (2005a) and De Waal (2006)54. As this main finding could be seen as 
controversial, further research is suggested to clarify some of these issues. Notably, it is 
suggested that the impact of the disease on poorer Southern African states should be 
compared to that on Botswana and South Africa, as it is possible that the comparative 
affluence of both states in question shields them from some negative impacts that other 
(poorer) Southern African states may not be able to avoid. It is emphasised that the negative 
impacts of the disease on the two states are mostly socio-economic: apart from costs and 
implications for governments’ budgets, this study could not provide evidence that 
consolidation theory was undermined. The conclusions are uncertain and could also be 
tested in further research. 
6.2. Evaluation of methodology and main findings  
Although this study was broad in focus, it used a minimalistic multivariate model to assess 
the impact of HIV and AIDS. This limited the extent to which the impact on each factor 
could be scrutinised. Moreover, the methodology was confined to desktop research, with no 
empirical component. It was therefore neither based on interviews, nor on questionnaires, 
nor on the surveys of health departments, local governments, or sufferers themselves.  
                                               
54 It is acknowledged that the four scholars mentioned here had differing regional foci; however, all of 
them discussed the possibility that HIV and AIDS may detrimentally affect democratic consolidation, 
democratic politics and/or political stability. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion The impact of HIV and AIDS on Democratic Consolidation  
 121 
The multivariate model employed consisted of six variables: three are institutional and three 
are socio-economic. The three institutional factors are the system of government (especially 
the president and the executive); the electoral system; and political rights and civil liberties. 
The findings concerning the impact of HIV and AIDS on these will now be summarised. 
Thereafter its impact on the three socio-economic factors, namely economic variables 
(consisting of economic growth; affluence and trends in inequality); human development and 
civil society, will be analysed. 
The first institutional factor studied was the system of government. Amid presidential denials 
of the disease in South Africa, civil society successfully challenged the president’s 
controversial HIV and AIDS policy in 2000-2002. It did so using democratic mechanisms, 
i.e. the courts, advocacy and peaceful protest, demonstrating that presidential authority has 
limits (Butler 2005a). This set an important precedent and suggests that democratic 
consolidation of the attitudinal and constitutional dimensions (Linz and Stepan 1996: 15) was 
taking place. In Botswana, the government was more pro-active despite civil society being 
much weaker, and there is no literature indicating that the dynamics within the system of 
government changed significantly because of the way in which HIV and AIDS were 
managed. The first notification of HIV in Botswana occurred in 1985, and by 1986/7 the 
government responded to the pandemic. It became the first in Africa to provide PMTCT 
drugs to HIV positive pregnant women in the public health system and started large-scale 
rollout by 2002. It has now achieved universal coverage. 
The role of HIV and AIDS in the context of the different electoral systems was one key area 
where a potential risk to democratic consolidation could be tested. Electoral management 
boards continue to function effectively, probably because they can afford to overcome the 
challenges posed by increased AIDS-related illness and death among voters and electoral 
staff. It is safe to say that the disease made no significant difference to the functioning or 
outcome of either the FPTP national electoral system in Botswana or the PR system in South 
Africa.  
This does not challenge Strand’s (2005: 7) argument or Chirambo’s (2008: 31) finding that, in 
Southern African electoral systems generally, PR is superior to FPTP in the context of HIV 
and AIDS. The negligible number of deaths and by-elections in the parliament of Botswana 
(Gossett and Lotshwao 2010) could be testimony to the ability of MPs who are living with 
HIV (should there be any) to obtain medication and to remain productive. At the level of 
local government, both countries employ MMP systems, and Gossett and Lotshwao (2010) 
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and Chirambo and Steyn (2009) suggest that the disease is causing an increase in by-elections 
at this level, where municipal and/or ward constituencies must be filled. These by-elections 
are cumbersome and quite costly. In poorer countries with fewer resources the impact on 
(especially FPTP) electoral systems could have been worse, especially at the national level. 
A study of the available literature, particularly human rights reports and Freedom House 
publications, suggests that the negative impact of HIV and AIDS on political rights and civil 
liberties is not significantly positive or negative enough to warrant a change in ratings. This 
factor is an essential element of this study, presenting us with a gauge of the quality of 
democracy actually enjoyed by the citizens of the two countries and the way the government 
responded. Freedom House, using its definition of civil liberties, holds that these rights are as 
well-protected in Botswana today as they were twenty years ago. Citizens of South Africa 
have enjoyed a similarly wide range of civil liberties since 1994, although under Mbeki’s 
presidency, official “denialism” of the destructive nature of the disease threatened the 
sufferers’ constitutional right to access to health care and medication. While both states’ 
political rights scores have recently declined somewhat in Freedom House’s annual 
publication (they both are rated as free), the explanations given for these declines did not 
suggest that HIV and AIDS were directly to blame (the explanations for the declines can be 
found in Chapters 3 and 4). This supports De Waal’s (2006) argument: whatever negative 
effects the disease is having, it is not significantly negatively affecting the quality of 
democracy – yet. Butler (2005a) argues that in South Africa, it should be recognised that the 
politics around HIV and AIDS have even had some positive consequences for the 
entrenchment of civil liberties, namely by demonstrating that citizens have the right to 
organise, freely express criticism, and litigate against the government to win important policy 
interventions. This was a victory not only for the TAC but for all those sufferers who meet 
the requirements for state intervention.  
The overall impact of HIV and AIDS in Botswana and South Africa on the three 
institutional factors studied has thus until now been minimal, as far as the available literature 
indicates. As the consolidation of democracy is by definition dependent upon the existence 
of legitimate and effective democratic institutions (see Chapter 2), this is an important 
finding. 
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Moving on to the overall socio-economic impact of HIV and AIDS, the situation, as 
revealed by this desktop study, is more negative55, although the question of whether it 
necessarily erodes democracy remains unanswered. The factors studied, which will now be 
discussed in turn, are economic variables (economic growth; affluence; and trends in 
inequality); human development; and civil society. 
As suggested by Mattes (2003), the work of Przeworski, et al. (1996) has been used to 
understand the impact of economic variables (economic growth, affluence, and inequality 
trends) on the likely survival of democracy. A more detailed report of the findings can be 
found in Chapter 5, but some highlights will be mentioned here. The economies of both 
states are expected to grow slower than had there been no pandemic, but not to register negative 
growth. Botswana’s economic growth rate is expected to be affected more severely (despite 
the commodities boom) than its population growth, with the net effect that per capita incomes 
might grow slower than had there been no HIV and AIDS. But according to the calculations 
of Chapter 2 and in terms of the work of Przeworski, et al. (1996: 41), Botswana is already so 
affluent as to be “impregnable” – and at this level of affluence (above $6,000 per capita 
income56) democracies “can be expected to live forever”. South Africa, in contrast, with a 
much bigger population and larger economy, has not attained the level of per capita income 
where its democracy can be considered “impregnable”, but it is well above the level at which 
democracies should be considered “extremely fragile” (Przeworski, et al. 1996: 41). In this 
country, citizens’ average income is projected to grow faster than had there been no HIV and 
AIDS. In an ironic way, therefore, AIDS may theoretically “promote” democratic 
consolidation in terms of per capita incomes, as the growth of the population (and the labour 
force) slows considerably (the death rate has begun to level off). Both studies found that the 
provision of ART makes sense in terms of fiscal expenditure and economic growth, as it 
makes HIV sufferers live longer and lead more productive lives. (It was found in Uganda 
that antiretrovirals, properly used, add almost 28 years of life to HIV sufferers who began 
treatment at the age of 35 – see Malan 2011.) 
With regards to trends in income inequality, Przeworski, et al. (1996: 42-43) used GINI 
coefficients to argue that these trends have an impact on democratic survival. None of the 
literature surveyed on the economic impact of HIV and AIDS in Botswana and South Africa 
                                               
55 Except for a brief period during the global financial crisis, both Botswana and South Africa are 
consistently registering economic growth - Botswana especially, given the current commodity boom (see 
Chapter 3). HIV and AIDS are not expected to reverse this trend in either country. 
56 This figure is based on 1985 values and should be adjusted for inflation as was done in Chapter 2. (See 
Table 5 in Chapter 5.) 
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provide GINI coefficient estimates. However it was emphasised that in both Botswana and 
South Africa, poor households (rural and informal sectors) affected by HIV and AIDS are 
expected to face further impoverishment and marginalisation while their richer compatriots 
are better placed to recover from HIV- and AIDS-related demands on their finances 
(including access to medical aid or, for civil servants, government ART systems), and that 
high unemployment among unskilled and semi-skilled labourers will keep their wages low 
despite their attrition because of AIDS, while any AIDS-induced reduction in an already 
limited skilled workforce will increase these workers’ wages. These projections imply growing 
inequality in states which have already, over several decades, proved unable to reduce 
inequality. 
The abovementioned economic projections are drawn primarily from two publications – the 
Jefferis, et al. (2008) study for the case of Botswana (the Molatole and Thaga study of 2006 is 
also useful), and the Smit and Ellis (2009) summary of the latest BER study (2005/6) for the 
case of South Africa (Marais’s is also useful). These studies focused on the macroeconomic 
impact of HIV and AIDS – neither of them dealt with the question of democracy. These 
studies take into account the fact that the governments in question are rolling out ART – 
they assumed constant 50% coverage for South Africa and 80% coverage for Botswana57. 
While a direct numerical comparison of their projections is probably inappropriate, the 
methodology employed by the two studies is broadly similar: the effects of the disease on key 
economic impact channels are projected and combined to produce macroeconomic 
projections, which are tested for robustness where the accuracy of assumptions is uncertain 
(Jefferis, et al. 2008: 114-116; Smit and Ellis 2009: 246). Butler (2005: 4-5) argued that there 
was no consensus among economists on the general economic impact of HIV and AIDS, 
and while there may still be some dispute, these studies benefit from newer data than those 
that were available at the time of Butler’s writing and are, as far as this researcher can 
ascertain, the most valid economic research available estimating the impact of this complex 
disease at this time. But Butler also dealt with the implications for democracy, just as Mattes 
(2003) did. 
The United Nations Human Development Index (UN HDI) ratings for both Botswana and 
South Africa were reversed because of HIV and AIDS and gradually recovered to reach and 
surpass pre-pandemic levels. Plummeting life expectancy, which is one of three factors 
                                               
57 Botswana began wide-scale ART distribution in 2002 and has now achieved universal access to ART (see 
Chapter 3). South Africa’s ART distribution officially commenced in 2003 and has made significant 
progress since 2008, now reaching an estimated 65% of adults who need it (according to the old WHO 
guidelines - see footnote 9). 
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incorporated into each state’s overall HDI rating, had the greatest part in dragging these 
countries’ human development ratings down, has been recovering since the early 2000’s but 
is still far from fully recovered. But whether UN HDI ratings are a good measurement of 
human development in the context of HIV and AIDS can be questioned: the index, which 
combines education, health and affluence in a single figure between 0 and 1, purposefully 
incorporates only a handful of key indicators and may lead the researcher to overlook the 
effects of the pandemic on important aspects of human development such as inequality. Two 
of these effects will be briefly mentioned. 
The first such effect is a possible deterioration in the quality of education. The indicator used 
to measure education, namely, the average years of schooling enjoyed by citizens, does not 
measure the quality of schooling at all, while studies such as the South African one by Louw, 
et al. (2009) suggest that it is the quality of schooling that risks being compromised because 
of the AIDS burden borne by learners, educators and communities. The fact that in terms of 
the UN HDI, both Botswana’s and South Africa’s education ratings have been on a 
sustained upward curve58 over the past two decades, may therefore mask the qualitative 
damage done by HIV and AIDS, inaccurately suggesting progress when a comparison of 
students’ performance in international literacy tests would indicate deterioration. In fact, 
many previously disadvantaged schools in South Africa are quite rightly viewed as 
dysfunctional. It is also methodologically difficult to ascribe teachers’ competence and 
discipline, or otherwise, to the HIV and AIDS problem.  
The second effect is the possibility of a polarisation in human development, masked by 
aggregate figures. Again researchers (particularly Marais 2011, who looked at the South 
African case) emphasised that the human development of the poorer classes is likely to suffer 
the most while the upper classes can still access superior healthcare and education. Generally, 
UN HDI does not reveal differences between public and private, or between urban and rural 
circumstances. In both countries, the focus is mainly on urban rather than rural areas. The 
use of standard UN HDI does therefore not reveal important intra-country inequalities.  
Finally, in South Africa, HIV and AIDS policy contestation by civil society had the (perhaps 
unforeseen) effect of deepening the institutional framework for democratic politics, by 
demonstrating that “the people have a right and a responsibility to organise and protest” 
(Butler 2005a: 13). It was argued that the TAC broke ground for other South African civil 
society organisations by legitimising constructive and critical engagement between civil 
                                               
58 Except for a spike in South Africa’s ratings in 1995 - see Chapter 4 for a discussion of this. 
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society and government and also through the courts. In Botswana, civil society has 
historically been much weaker, and remains so today. Although the country has over the past 
two decades seen a proliferation of civil society organisations, some of them addressing the 
HIV and AIDS pandemic, the sector remains deferential to government. But there was no 
need to challenge government with regards to its HIV and AIDS policy in the 1990’s, 
because government response was quite pro-active, as mentioned above. 
In short, the impact of HIV and AIDS on the socio-economic factors studied is more salient 
than its impact on institutional factors. In Botswana, the disease is likely to retard both 
economic growth59 and gains in per capita income, and will possibly increase inequality. It has 
reversed gains in life expectancy. In fact, no literature suggests that any good has come of the 
disease in terms of Botswana’s socio-economic circumstances. In South Africa, the picture is 
more complicated. As in Botswana it is expected that economic growth may be retarded and 
inequality increased by the disease, while life expectancy is particularly hard hit. However, in 
South Africa, it is suggested that in terms of at least one economic variable, the speed at 
which per capita income grows, the economy might be better off than had there been no 
pandemic. But the impact on democracy remains uncertain, except for Butler’s views on civil 
society. 
The notion that the disease does not currently threaten democratic consolidation, even in 
Botswana where this study found that the disease has a detrimental impact on all the 
economic effects studied (see above) as well as life expectancy, may seem surprising. Here it 
is necessary to bear in mind that the relevance of socio-economic factors is not as clear cut as 
the relevance of institutions to democratic consolidation. 
The link between democratic erosion/breakdown and regressions in human development is 
particularly unclear, as was stated at the outset (see section 2.1.2.4). The comparative analysis 
undertaken in this thesis suggests that widespread human suffering can take place without 
significantly influencing democratic institutions (at least initially, and under certain 
conditions60). The theory of Przeworski, et al. (1996), which establishes a strong link between 
democracies’ chances of survival and the economic variables studied in this thesis, is based 
on inductive generalisation of political trends in the past. Butler (2005: 5-7) does not dispute 
                                               
59 The impact of the disease is one of many processes (both positive and negative, such as the global 
economic climate, government job creation projects, the rollout of social grants, skilled emigration and 
attempts to attract investment) that influence these economies, meaning that the effects discussed here will 
not be directly evident in economic statistics. 
60 One of these conditions may be deep socio-economic inequality, a characteristic of both countries 
studied here. This will be discussed in the final section. 
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the potential negative socio-economic effects of the disease (for South Africa), but argues 
that political science models are both theoretically impoverished on their own terms and 
inadequate to understand a world with AIDS, as they may be fatally undermined by 
fundamental shifts in citizens’ behaviour in the midst of an HIV and AIDS pandemic. In 
such a situation, it may more valuable to evaluate democracies using concepts such as Linz 
and Stepan’s (1996) “only game in town” and the behavioural dimension of democratic 
consolidation. It must be agreed, at least, that institutional impacts should be considered 
more directly relevant to democratic consolidation while the relevance of socio-economic 
impacts must be argued through falsifiable inductive theories such as those of Przeworski, et 
al. (1996).  
6.3. Suggestions for further research 
In 2003 a framework with regards to the potential impact of HIV and AIDS on democratic 
consolidation in Southern Africa was suggested by Mattes (2003). This scholar emphasised 
that most of the expectations expressed in his article with regards to the topic were based on 
logic and conjecture, with no case studies yet. He highlighted the possibility of conducting 
comparative cross-sectional research on the topic in the Southern African region. This thesis 
has conducted such research on a desktop basis. Hopefully it can contribute to all of the 
above.  
This section will summarise the findings and suggest that further comparative research 
should include poorer African countries, African countries with high HIV prevalence levels 
but with lower levels of ART distribution and less unequal societies. Finally, the need for in-
depth research into the impact of HIV and AIDS on the effectiveness of democratic 
governance is emphasised. 
A comparison of the impact of HIV and AIDS on democratic consolidation in South Africa 
and Botswana, using a minimalist multivariate model that includes institutional and socio-
economic variables, has yielded the finding that at present there are no indications that HIV 
and AIDS is directly threatening to destroy these democracies. To use Schedler’s (1998: 103) 
terms, there has not been evidence of a process of “democratic erosion”, nor of a looming 
“democratic breakdown”, precipitated by the pandemic. One could even say that, for the 
time being, HIV and AIDS have not threatened the future of democracies to the extent that 
dominant ruling parties and their often unaccountable presidencies (or monarchs) may have 
accomplished in some countries. Marais (2011: 310), reviewing the impact of the disease in 
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South Africa on many of the same factors as studied in this thesis, concludes: “[a]t face value, 
much of the doomsaying seems overwrought.” However, as mentioned above, certain socio-
economic factors have been severely impacted: in both countries, growing inequality and 
slower economic growth are expected while life expectancy has been reduced; and in 
Botswana, increases in affluence are expected to occur more slowly than they otherwise 
would have. According to the thinking of Przeworski, et al. (1996) and Leftwich (2000) these 
impacts are not conducive to the endurance of democracy. The continued influence of these 
effects upon democracies should be monitored.  
The findings presented in this study are not generalisable to all Southern African states. 
Chapter 5 discussed the key differences and similarities between Botswana and South Africa 
and how these differences and similarities affected the impact of the pandemic. The 
similarities identified there may guide us toward suggestions for further research. The first 
such similarity was that these states are exceptionally affluent in comparison with their 
poorer Southern African neighbours. Only Mauritius enjoys comparable levels of wealth, 
with a per capita income (PPP) of $11 658 (World Bank 2011d). As noted in Chapter 5, the 
states’ relative affluence helps them to overcome challenges related to the socio-economic 
impact of HIV and AIDS, and on electoral governance (such as updating voters’ rolls and 
facilitating a high number of local government by-elections, as well as parliamentary elections 
in Botswana’s FPTP system). It also allows these states to remain somewhat more 
independent of foreign donors in terms of funding their efforts to address the disease. 
Including poorer Southern African states, such as Zambia, Malawi or Mozambique in a 
comparative study of the impact on HIV and AIDS on democratic consolidation would 
demonstrate the relative importance of national affluence in coping with the pandemic.  
Secondly, the states in question are both making ART available to a growing proportion of 
those who need it. In Botswana this proportion exceeds 80%; South Africa’s has surpassed 
65%. As described in Chapter 5, because of ART, these democracies are spared some of the 
institutional, economic and social ravages of the disease that seemed inevitable a mere decade 
ago. Therefore, the availability of ART might be essential to softening the blow, directly and 
indirectly, to democratic consolidation, thereby producing the perhaps surprising main 
finding of this study, namely that democracies are not (yet) collapsing under the weight of 
HIV and AIDS.  
The possibility of this was noted by Mattes (2003: 11) who pointed out that most of his 
article was based on the assumption that in Southern Africa, HIV-infection was akin to a 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion The impact of HIV and AIDS on Democratic Consolidation  
 129 
death sentence. This has changed, with studies revealing that HIV patients in Africa, with 
appropriate ART, can live almost as long as those who are HIV negative – in Uganda it is 
almost 28 years longer for patients who initiate treatment at the age of 35 (Malan 2011) – and 
that the region is making encouraging progress in ART rollout (UNAIDS 2010). Where 
those that need it do not access and adhere to this treatment, Southern African countries 
would still face the morbidity and mortality of large parts of their productive adult 
population, presenting them with continuing AIDS-related problems that the countries 
studied here have avoided. For instance, it was argued that Botswana might be avoiding an 
increase in expensive parliamentary by-elections because of MPs’ access to ART. This would 
be even cheaper under PR systems as by-elections would not be necessary. States that 
employ the FPTP electoral system at national level but where ART is not as widely available 
as in Botswana (such as Malawi) could be compared to states where ART is reaching the 
population more effectively. ART coverage continues to increase throughout Africa, but 
poorer countries are more dependent on donors than their affluent neighbours, Botswana 
and South Africa.  
Thirdly, this study has argued that not only is societal inequality in both Botswana and South 
Africa probably compounded by HIV and AIDS, as discussed above, but it also acts “as a 
barrier and filter preventing the effects of AIDS from snowballing into systemic collapse” 
(Whiteside 2008, quoted in Marais 2011: 317) despite the deepening suffering of those 
already disempowered, and mainly in the rural areas where health services are more 
stretched. The implication of this argument, which may be investigated in future studies, is 
that more egalitarian Southern African states affected by the disease may experience more 
system-wide shocks and therefore a more detrimental impact on their democratic 
consolidation. 
A final suggestion concerns perhaps the greatest limitation of this thesis: the damage the 
disease is doing to the quality and effectiveness of governance was not studied. While the 
damage done to businesses in terms of a loss of human capital and high turnover of staff will 
show in economic indicators such as growth, unemployment and inequality, the damage 
done to the state will show in its inability to fulfil its duties to citizens. In this regard, Butler 
(2005: 6-7) speaks of a “double crisis of administrators and delivery actors”. As noted before, 
if the state’s capacity to deliver is severely compromised, or if the public comes to believe 
that it is, this may affect the legitimacy of the political system (Butler 2005a: 7). Our desktop 
methodology could not investigate this. The effect of HIV and AIDS on a broad range of 
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aspects of governance should therefore be assessed in future studies, going beyond desktop 
research, to include fieldwork and questionnaire research.  
The possibility that HIV and AIDS may affect the effectiveness of government 
detrimentally, was discussed by De Waal (2003), Mattes (2003: 6), Butler (2005: 5-7), Pharaoh 
and Schönteich (2003: 6) and Barnett and Whiteside (2006: 323-324) (see Chapter 1). Studies 
of the disease in the military already demonstrate personnel weakness (Rupiya 2006; 
Heinecken 2001; 2003; 2009; Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae 2006). While some of 
these risks have been investigated (such as the functioning of electoral management boards) 
or play into factors that were investigated (such as the pressure on health systems) in this 
thesis, others – such as the impact of the disease on the functioning of the bureaucracy, 
judiciary and criminal justice system (Butler 2005a: 6), parliament, the police and soldiers 
(Mattes 2003: 6) and municipalities (Chirambo and Steyn 2009: 5-6), have not been 
investigated. While it is possible that scholars understandably underestimated the extent to 
which ART would become effective and available, it may also be that the deterioration which 
they expected could indeed be identified through a more detailed study of the 
abovementioned structures. To do so would be no small task. 
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that this pandemic is a “long-wave event”, in 
which large-scale effects emerge gradually over decades (Barnett 2006: 302-303). The impact 
of the disease upon each of the factors studied may still worsen or improve, or come to be 
understood in new ways. Already, this thesis benefits from the passage of time: as a vivid 
example, in 2011 one can confidently say that publications such as “Halfway to the holocaust” by 
Shell (2000) – evoking bleak images of what a Southern Africa ravaged by AIDS may look 
like by 2010 – were exaggerated. In the same way, this thesis has assessed what is known now 
using a desktop methodology. It has demonstrated the appropriateness of a multivariate 
model to conduct such a study, but it cannot predict which events may change the trajectory 
of the pandemic in the future. Government, business and civil society have roles to play. 
Moreover, changes in terms of the pricing and international funding of ART, as well as the 
effectiveness of these drugs, could prove particularly important in future. 
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